Back Aa

Principles of Political Economy

<h2>Chapter X. Of An Inconvertible Paper Currency.</h2> <h3>§ 1. What determines the value of an inconvertible paper money?</h3> After experience had shown that pieces of paper, of no intrinsic value, by merely bearing upon them the written profession of being equivalent to a certain number of francs, dollars, or pounds, could be made to circulate as such, and to produce all the benefit to the issuers which could have been produced by the coins which they purported to represent, governments began to think that it would be a happy device if they could appropriate to themselves this benefit, free from the condition to which individuals issuing such paper substitutes for money were subject, of giving, when required, for the sign, the thing signified. They determined to try whether they could not emancipate themselves from this unpleasant obligation, and make a piece of paper issued by them pass for a pound, by merely calling it a pound, and consenting to receive it in payment of the taxes. In the case supposed, the functions of money are performed by a thing which derives its power of performing them solely from convention; but convention is quite sufficient to confer the power; since nothing more is needful to make a person accept anything as money, and even at any arbitrary value, than the persuasion that it will be taken from him on the same terms by others. The only question is, what determines the value of such a currency, since it can not be, as in the case of gold and silver (or paper exchangeable for them at pleasure), the cost of production. We have seen, however, that even in the case of metallic currency, the immediate agency in determining its value is its quantity. If the quantity, instead of depending on the ordinary mercantile motives of profit and loss, could be arbitrarily fixed by authority, the value would depend on the fiat of that authority, not on cost of production. The quantity of a paper currency not convertible into the metals at the option of the holder can be arbitrarily fixed, especially if the issuer is the sovereign power of the state. The value, therefore, of such a currency is entirely arbitrary. The value of paper money is, of course, primarily and mainly dependent on the quantity issued. The general level of value depends on the quantity; but we also find that deviations from this general level, in the direction of further depreciation than could be due to quantity alone, is caused by any event which shakes the confidence of any one that he may get the existing value for his paper. The “convention” by which real value (the essential idea of money) was associated with this paper in the minds of all is thereby broken. Fiat money—that is, a piece of paper, not containing a promise to pay a dollar, but a simple declaration that this is a dollar—therefore, separates the paper from any connection with value. And yet we see that fiat money has some, although a fluctuating, value at certain times: if the State receives it for taxes, if it is a legal acquittal of obligations, then, to that extent, a certain quantity of it is given a value equal to the wealth represented by the taxes, or the debts. Jevons remarks on this point247 that, if “the quantity of notes issued was kept within such moderate limits that any one wishing to realize the metallic value of the notes could find some one wanting to pay taxes, and therefore willing to give coin for notes,” stability of value might be secured. If there is more in circulation than performs these functions, it will depreciate in the proportion of the quantity to the extent of the uses assigned to it; so that the relation of quantity to uses is the only thing which can give value to fiat money, but beyond a certain point in the issues other forces than mere quantity begin to affect the value. Although the paper is not even a promise to pay value, the form of expression on its face, or the term used as its designation, generally tends, under the force of convention and habit, to give a popular value to paper. Although the State may not promise to pay a dollar, yet, wherever such paper money carries any purchasing power with it (which has very seldom happened, and then only for short periods), it will be found that there is a vague popular understanding that the State intends, at some time or other, to redeem the notes with value in coin to some amount. In the early cases of irredeemable money in our colonies, the income of taxes, or similar resources, were promised as a means of redemption. To some—although a slight—extent, the idea of value was associated with such paper. The actual quantity issued did not measure the depreciation. The paper did depreciate with increased issues. But only in so far as the increased issues proved to the community that there was less and less possibility of ever receiving value for them did they depreciate. In other words, we come to the familiar experience, known to many, of a paper money depending for its value on the opinions of men in the country. This was partially true, even of our own greenbacks, which were not fiat money, but promises to pay (although not then redeemable), as may be seen by the movement of the line in Chart XII (p. 359), which represents the fluctuations of our paper money during the civil war. The upward movement of the line, which indicates the premium on gold during our late war, of course represents correspondingly the depreciation of the paper. Every victory or defeat of the Union arms raised or lowered the premium on gold; it was the register of the opinion of the people as to the value to be associated with the paper. The second and third resorts to issues of greenbacks were regarded as confessions of financial distress; it was this which produced the effect on their value. It was not only the quantity but also that which caused the issue of the quantity. It is, of course, clear that the value of a paper money like the greenbacks, which were the promises to pay of a rich country, would bear a definite relation to the actual quantity issued; and this is to be seen by the generally higher level of the line on the chart, showing a steadily diminishing purchasing power as the issues increased. But the thing which weighed largely in people's minds was the possibility of ultimate redemption; and the premium on gold was practically a register of the “betting” on this possibility. In 1878, when Secretary Sherman's reserve was seen to be increasing to an effective amount, and when it became evident that he would have the means (i.e., the value represented by all the paper that was likely to be presented) to resume on the day set, January 1, 1879, the premium gradually faded away. The general shifting of the level to a lower stage in this later period was not due to any decrease in the quantity outstanding, because the contraction had been stopped in 1868, and that consequent on the resumption act in May, 1878. Suppose that, in a country of which the currency is wholly metallic, a paper currency is suddenly issued, to the amount of half the metallic circulation; not by a banking establishment, or in the form of loans, but by the Government, in payment of salaries and purchase of commodities. The currency being suddenly increased by one half, all prices will rise, and, among the rest, the prices of all things made of gold and silver. An ounce of manufactured gold will become more valuable than an ounce of gold coin, by more than that customary difference which compensates for the value of the workmanship; and it will be profitable to melt the coin for the purpose of being manufactured, until as much has been taken from the currency by the subtraction of gold as had been added to it by the issue of paper. Then prices will relapse to what they were at first, and there will be nothing changed, except that a paper currency has been substituted for half of the metallic currency which existed before. Suppose, now, a second emission of paper; the same series of effects will be renewed; and so on, until the whole of the metallic money has disappeared [see Chart No. XIV, Chap. XV, for the exportation of gold from the United States after the issue of our paper money in 1862]: that is, if paper be issued of as low a denomination as the lowest coin; if not, as much will remain as convenience requires for the smaller payments. The addition made to the quantity of gold and silver disposable for ornamental purposes will somewhat reduce, for a time, the value of the article; and as long as this is the case, even though paper has been issued to the original amount of the metallic circulation, as much coin will remain in circulation along with it as will keep the value of the currency down to the reduced value of the metallic material; but the value having fallen below the cost of production, a stoppage or diminution of the supply from the mines will enable the surplus to be carried off by the ordinary agents of destruction, after which the metals and the currency will recover their natural value. We are here supposing, as we have supposed throughout, that the country has mines of its own, and no commercial intercourse with other countries; for, in a country having foreign trade, the coin which is rendered superfluous by an issue of paper is carried off by a much prompter method. Mr. Mill's statement, that, if paper be not issued of as low a denomination as the lowest coin, “as much will remain as convenience requires for the smaller payments,” will not hold true. During our recent experiment of depreciated paper, the depreciation was such as to drive out the subsidiary silver coins, by July, 1862, and we were forced to supply their place by a fractional paper currency. By an amendment inserted June 17, 1862, into the act authorizing a second issue of $150,000,000 of greenbacks, it was ordered “that no note shall be issued for the fractional part of a dollar, and not more than $35,000,000 shall be of lower denominations than five dollars” (act, finally passed July 11, 1862). Although there were no fractional notes, yet one-dollar notes drove out subsidiary silver, simply because the paper had depreciated to a value below that of the 345.6 grains of silver in two halves or four quarters of a dollar. By July 2d the disappearance of small coin was distinctly noted. Let the value of gold be represented by 100; and a dollar of small silver coin (345.6 grains), relatively to a gold dollar, by 96. Now, if paper depreciates to 90, relatively to gold, it will drive out the subsidiary silver at 96, in accordance with Gresham's law. Up to this point the effects of a paper currency are substantially the same, whether it is convertible into specie or not. It is when the metals have been completely superseded and driven from circulation that the difference between convertible and inconvertible paper begins to be operative. When the gold or silver has all gone from circulation, and an equal amount of paper has taken its place, suppose that a still further issue is superadded. The same series of phenomena recommences: prices rise, among the rest the prices of gold and silver articles, and it becomes an object, as before, to procure coin, in order to convert it into bullion. There is no longer any coin in circulation; but, if the paper currency is convertible, coin may still be obtained from the issuers in exchange for notes. All additional notes, therefore, which are attempted to be forced into circulation after the metals have been completely superseded, will return upon the issuers in exchange for coin; and they will not be able to maintain in circulation such a quantity of convertible paper as to sink its value below the metal which it represents. It is not so, however, with an inconvertible currency. To the increase of that (if permitted by law) there is no check. The issuers may add to it indefinitely, lowering its value and raising prices in proportion; they may, in other words, depreciate the currency without limit. Such a power, in whomsoever vested, is an intolerable evil. All variations in the value of the circulating medium are mischievous: they disturb existing contracts and expectations, and the liability to such changes renders every pecuniary engagement of long date entirely precarious. The person who buys for himself, or gives to another, an annuity of one [hundred dollars], does not know whether it will be equivalent to [two hundred or to fifty dollars] a few years hence. Great as this evil would be if it depended only on accident, it is still greater when placed at the arbitrary disposal of an individual or a body of individuals, who may have any kind or degree of interest to be served by an artificial fluctuation in fortunes, and who have at any rate a strong interest in issuing as much as possible, each issue being in itself a source of profit—not to add, that the issuers may have, and, in the case of a government paper, always have, a direct interest in lowering the value of the currency, because it is the medium in which their own debts are computed. The United States Supreme Court had decided in December, 1870, by the second legal-tender decision, that the issue of greenbacks (inconvertible from 1862 to 1879) was constitutional during a time of war; but it was thought that the reissue of these notes since the war, when no war emergency could be pleaded, was unconstitutional. This view, however, was met by the unfortunate decision of the Supreme Court, delivered by Justice Gray, March, 1884, which announced the doctrine that the expediency of an issue of legal-tender paper money was to be determined solely by Congress; and that, if Congress judged the issue expedient, it was within the limits of those provisions of the Constitution (section 8), which gave Congress the means to do whatever was “necessary and proper” to carry out the powers expressly granted to it. Nothing now can prevent Congress, should it choose to do so, from issuing paper money of any description whatever, even if of absolutely no value. The disaster that might be brought upon the country by a rising tide of repudiation among debtors, taking its effect through a facile and plastic Congress (as in the case of the silver coinage in 1878), is appalling to reflect upon. <h3>§ 2. If regulated by the price of Bullion, as inconvertible Currency might be safe, but not Expedient.</h3> In order that the value of the currency may be secure from being altered by design, and may be as little as possible liable to fluctuation from accident, the articles least liable of all known commodities to vary in their value, the precious metals, have been made in all civilized countries the standard of value for the circulating medium; and no paper currency ought to exist of which the value can not be made to conform to theirs. Nor has this fundamental maxim ever been entirely lost sight of, even by the governments which have most abused the power of creating inconvertible paper. If they have not (as they generally have) professed an intention of paying in specie at some indefinite future time, they have at least, by giving to their paper issues the names of their coins, made a virtual, though generally a false, profession of intending to keep them at a value corresponding to that of the coins. This is not impracticable, even with an inconvertible paper. There is not, indeed, the self-acting check which convertibility brings with it. But there is a clear and unequivocal indication by which to judge whether the currency is depreciated, and to what extent. That indication is the price of the precious metals. When holders of paper can not demand coin to be converted into bullion, and when there is none left in circulation, bullion rises and falls in price like other things; and if it is above the mint price—if an ounce of gold, which would be coined into the equivalent of [$18.60], is sold for [$20 or $25] in paper—the value of the currency has sunk just that much below what the value of a metallic currency would be. If, therefore, the issue of inconvertible paper were subjected to strict rules, one rule being that, whenever bullion rose above the mint price, the issues should be contracted until the market price of bullion and the mint price were again in accordance, such a currency would not be subject to any of the evils usually deemed inherent in an inconvertible paper. But, also, such a system of currency would have no advantages sufficient to recommend it to adoption. An inconvertible currency, regulated by the price of bullion, would conform exactly, in all its variations, to a convertible one; and the only advantage gained would be that of exemption from the necessity of keeping any reserve of the precious metals, which is not a very important consideration, especially as a government, so long as its good faith is not suspected, need not keep so large a reserve as private issuers, being not so liable to great and sudden demands, since there never can be any real doubt of its solvency. The United States since 1879 finds that a reserve of from $130,000,000 to $140,000,000 is a sufficient reserve for outstanding notes to the amount of $346,000,000, and greenbacks are now at a par with gold. Against this small advantage is to be set, in the first place, the possibility of fraudulent tampering with the price of bullion for the sake of acting on the currency, in the manner of the fictitious sales of corn, to influence the averages, so much and so justly complained of while the corn laws were in force. But a still stronger consideration is the importance of adhering to a simple principle, intelligible to the most untaught capacity. Everybody can understand convertibility; every one sees that what can be at any moment exchanged for five [dollars] is worth five [dollars]. Regulation by the price of bullion is a more complex idea, and does not recommend itself through the same familiar associations. There would be nothing like the same confidence, by the public generally, in an inconvertible currency so regulated, as in a convertible one: and the most instructed person might reasonably doubt whether such a rule would be as likely to be inflexibly adhered to. The grounds of the rule not being so well understood by the public, opinion would probably not enforce it with as much rigidity, and, in any circumstances of difficulty, would be likely to turn against it; while to the Government itself a suspension of convertibility would appear a much stronger and more extreme measure than a relaxation of what might possibly be considered a somewhat artificial rule. There is therefore a great preponderance of reasons in favor of a convertible, in preference to even the best regulated inconvertible, currency. The temptation to over-issue, in certain financial emergencies, is so strong, that nothing is admissible which can tend, in however slight a degree, to weaken the barriers that restrain it. The French Government, in the Franco-Prussian War (1870), issued inconvertible paper on this plan, as explained by Mr. Mill; but, acting through the Bank of France, they conducted their issues so successfully that the notes never depreciated more than about one half of one per cent. But this was a very rare management of inconvertible paper, since the issues were actually limited as the price of gold in paper rose above par. <div style="break-after:column;"></div>

1 of 2

2 of 2

Update Required To play the media you will need to either update your browser to a recent version or update your Flash plugin.