<SPAN name="startofbook"></SPAN>
<div class="transnote">
<p class="center">Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber
and placed into the Public Domain. Some maps will show more detail in larger
windows or when stretched.</p>
</div>
</div>
<h2 class="nobreak">Contents</h2>
<div class="center vspace"><div class="ilb">
<ul>
<li><SPAN href="#Closing_In">Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#Assault_Preparations">Assault Preparations</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_6_The_Japanese_Commander">Sidebar: The Japanese Commander</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#D-Day">D-Day</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_10_The_Assault_Commanders_at_Iwo_Jima">Sidebar: The Assault Commanders at Iwo Jima</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#Suribachi">Suribachi</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_26_Rosenthals_Photograph_of_Iwo_Jima_Flag-Raising">Sidebar: Rosenthal’s Photograph of Iwo Jima Flag-Raising Quickly Became One of the War’s Most Famous</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#The_Drive_North">The Drive North</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_29_The_Japanese_320mm_Spigot_Mortar">Sidebar: The Japanese 320mm Spigot Mortar</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_32_Marine_Corps_Air_Support_During_Iwo_Jima">Sidebar: Marine Corps Air Support During Iwo Jima</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#The_Bitter_End">The Bitter End</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_37_The_Marines_Zippo_Tanks">Sidebar: The Marines’ Zippo Tanks</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_42_Iwos_Fire_Brigades_The_Rocket_Detachments">Sidebar: Iwo’s Fire Brigades: The Rocket Detachments</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_44_Amphibious_Logistical_Support_at_Iwo_Jima">Sidebar: Amphibious Logistical Support at Iwo Jima</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#Iwo_Jimas_Costs">Iwo Jima’s Costs, Gains, and Legacies</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_50_Above_and_Beyond_the_Call_of_Duty">Sidebar: Above and Beyond the Call of Duty</SPAN></li>
<li class="in2"><SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_52_Assault_Divisions_Command_Structures">Sidebar: Assault Divisions’ Command Structures</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#Sources">Sources</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#About_the_Author">About the Author</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#About_the_Series">About the Series</SPAN></li>
<li><SPAN href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</SPAN></li>
</ul></div>
</div>
<hr />
<h1 style="text-align: left; clear: none;"> <span class="smcap">Closing In</span>:<br/> <span class="subhead smcap">Marines in the<br/> Seizure of Iwo Jima</span></h1>
<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">Marines in<br/>
World War II<br/>
Commemorative Series</span></p>
<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">By Colonel Joseph H. Alexander<br/>
U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)</span></p>
<div id="if_i_001" class="figcenter" style="width: 374px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_001.jpg" width-obs="374" height-obs="500" alt="" />
<div class="captionl"><i>Marines of Company E,
2d Battalion, 28th Marines, lower the
first flag raised over Mount Suribachi,
while other men raise a second flag
which became the subject of Associated
Press photographer Joe Rosenthal’s
world-famous photograph.</i> Department
of Defense Photo (USMC) 112718.</div>
</div>
<div id="if_i_002" class="figcenter" style="width: 440px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_002.jpg" width-obs="440" height-obs="600" alt="" />
<div class="captionl"><i>A Marine flamethrower operator
moves forward to assault a Japanese
pillbox on Motoyama Airfield.</i> Department
of Defense Photo (USMC) 111006.</div>
</div>
<hr />
<p><span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</SPAN></span></p>
</div>
<h2 class="left" style="margin-bottom: 0;"><SPAN name="Closing_In" id="Closing_In"></SPAN>Closing In:<br/> Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima</h2>
<p class="in0" style="margin-bottom: 2em;"><i>by Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret)</i></p>
<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Sunday,</span> 4 March 1945,
marked the end of the
second week of the
U.S. invasion of Iwo
Jima. By this point
the assault elements of the 3d, 4th,
and 5th Marine Divisions were exhausted,
their combat efficiency
reduced to dangerously low levels.
The thrilling sight of the American
flag being raised by the 28th Marines
on Mount Suribachi had occurred 10
days earlier, a lifetime on “Sulphur
Island.” The landing forces of the V
Amphibious Corps (VAC) had already
sustained 13,000 casualties, including
3,000 dead. The “front lines”
were a jagged serration across Iwo’s
fat northern half, still in the middle
of the main Japanese defenses. Ahead
the going seemed all uphill against a
well-disciplined, rarely visible enemy.</p>
<p>In the center of the island, the 3d
Marine Division units had been up
most of the night repelling a small
but determined Japanese counterattack
which had found the seam between
the 21st and 9th Marines.
Vicious close combat had cost both
sides heavy casualties. The counterattack
spoiled the division’s preparations
for a morning advance. Both
regiments made marginal gains
against very stiff opposition.</p>
<p>To the east the 4th Marine Division
had finally captured Hill 382,
ending its long exposure in “The Amphitheater,”
but combat efficiency
had fallen to 50 percent. It would
drop another five points by nightfall.
On this day the 24th Marines, supported
by flame tanks, advanced a
total of 100 yards, pausing to
detonate more than a ton of explosives
against enemy cave positions in
that sector. The 23d and 25th Marines
entered the most difficult terrain
yet encountered, broken ground
that limited visibility to only a few
feet.</p>
<p>Along the western flank, the 5th
Marine Division had just seized Nishi
Ridge and Hill 362-B the previous
day, suffering more than 500 casualties.
It too had been up most of
the night engaging a sizeable force of
infiltrators. The Sunday morning attacks
lacked coordination, reflecting
the division’s collective exhaustion.
Most rifle companies were at half-strength.
The net gain for the day, the
division reported, was “practically
nil.”</p>
<div id="ip_1" class="figcenter" style="width: 800px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_003.jpg" width-obs="800" height-obs="758" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><span class="smaller">THE</span><br/>
PACIFIC OFFENSIVE</div>
</div>
<p>But the battle was beginning to
take its toll on the Japanese garrison
as well. General Tadamichi
Kuribayashi knew his <i>109th Division</i>
had inflicted heavy casualties on the
attacking Marines, yet his own losses
had been comparable. The American
capture of the key hills in the
main defense sector the day before
deprived him of his invaluable artillery
observation sites. His brilliant
chief of artillery, Colonel Chosaku
Kaido, lay dying. On this date
Kuribayashi moved his own command<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</SPAN></span>
post from the central highlands
to a large cave on the northwest
coast. The usual blandishments from
Imperial General Headquarters in
Tokyo reached him by radio that afternoon,
but Kuribayashi was in no
mood for heroic rhetoric. “Send me
air and naval support and I will hold
the island,” he signalled. “Without
them I cannot hold.”</p>
<div id="ip_2" class="figcenter" style="width: 433px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_004.jpg" width-obs="433" height-obs="575" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Marine Corps Art Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>“Silence in the Gorge,” an acrylic painting on masonite by Col Charles H. Waterhouse,
USMCR (Ret), who as private first class was wounded during the battle.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>That afternoon the fighting men of
both sides witnessed a harbinger of
Iwo Jima’s fate. Through the overcast
skies appeared a gigantic silver bomber,
the largest aircraft anyone had
ever seen. It was the Boeing B-29 Super
Fortress “Dinah Might,” crippled
in a raid over Tokyo, seeking an
emergency landing on the island’s
scruffy main airstrip. As the Americans
in the vicinity held their breaths,
the big bomber swooped in from the
south, landed heavily, clipped a field
telephone pole with a wing, and
shuddered to a stop less than 50 feet
from the bitter end of the strip. Pilot
Lieutenant Fred Malo and his
10-man crew were extremely glad to
be alive, but they didn’t stay long.
Every Japanese gunner within range
wanted to bag this prize. Mechanics
made field repairs within a half hour.
Then the 65-ton Superfort lumbered
aloft through a hail of enemy fire and
headed back to its base in Tinian.
The Marines cheered.</p>
<p>The battle of Iwo Jima would rage
on for another 22 days, claiming
eleven thousand more American
casualties and the lives of virtually
the entire Japanese garrison. This
was a colossal fight between two
well-armed, veteran forces—the biggest
and bloodiest battle in the history
of the United States Marine
Corps. From the 4th of March on,
however, the leaders of both sides entertained
no doubts as to the ultimate
outcome.</p>
<hr /></div>
<h2><SPAN name="Assault_Preparations" id="Assault_Preparations"></SPAN><i>Assault Preparations</i></h2>
<p>Iwo Jima was one of those rare
amphibious landings where the assault
troops could clearly see the
value of the objective. They were the
first ground units to approach within
a thousand miles of the Japanese
homeland, and they were participating
directly in the support of the strategic
bombing campaign.</p>
<p>The latter element represented a
new wrinkle on an old theme. For 40
years the U.S. Marines had been developing
the capability for seizing advanced
naval bases in support of the
fleet. Increasingly in the Pacific
War—and most especially at Saipan,
Tinian, and now Iwo Jima—they
were seizing advanced airbases to further
the strategic bombing of the
Japanese home islands.</p>
<p>American servicemen had awaited
the coming of the B-29s for years.
The “very-long-range” bombers,
which had become operational too
late for the European War, had been
striking mainland Japan since
November 1944. Results proved disappointing.
The problem stemmed
not from the pilots or planes but
rather from a vexing little spit of volcanic
rock lying halfway along the
direct path from Saipan to Tokyo—Iwo
Jima. Iwo’s radar gave the
Japanese defense authorities two
hours advance notice of every B-29
strike. Japanese fighters based on Iwo
swarmed up to harass the unescorted
Superforts going in and especially<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</SPAN></span>
coming home, picking off those
bombers crippled by antiaircraft
(AA) fire. As a result, the B-29s had
to fly higher, along circuitous routes,
with a reduced payload. At the same
time, enemy bombers based on Iwo
often raided B-29 bases in the Marianas,
causing some damage.</p>
<p>The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided
Iwo Jima must be captured and a
U.S. airbase built there. This would
eliminate Japanese bombing raids
and the early warning interceptions,
provide fighter escorts throughout
the most dangerous portion of the
long B-29 missions, and enable greater
payloads at longer ranges. Iwo
Jima in American hands would also
provide a welcome emergency field
for crippled B-29s returning from
Tokyo. It would also protect the
flank of the pending invasion of
Okinawa. In October 1944 the Joint
Chiefs directed Fleet Admiral Chester
W. Nimitz, CinCPac, to seize and develop
Iwo Jima within the ensuing
three months. This launched Operation
Detachment.</p>
<p>The first enemy in the campaign
would prove to be the island itself,
an ugly, barren, foul-smelling chunk
of volcanic sand and rock, barely 10
square miles in size. Iwo Jima means
“Sulphur Island” in Japanese. As
described by one Imperial Army staff
officer, the place was “an island of
sulphur, no water, no sparrow, no
swallow.” Less poetic American
officers saw Iwo’s resemblance to a
pork chop, with the 556-foot dormant
volcano Mount Suribachi
dominating the narrow southern
end, overlooking the only potential
landing beaches. To the north, the
land rose unevenly onto the Motoyama
Plateau, falling off sharply along
the coasts into steep cliffs and
canyons. The terrain in the north
represented a defender’s dream:
broken, convoluted, cave-dotted, a
“jungle of stone.” Wreathed by volcanic
steam, the twisted landscape
appeared ungodly, almost moon-like.
More than one surviving Marine
compared the island to something
out of Dante’s <i>Inferno</i>.</p>
<p>Forbidding Iwo Jima had two
redeeming features in 1945: the military
value of its airfields and the psychological
status of the island as a
historical possession of Japan. Iwo
Jima lay in Japan’s “Inner Vital
Defense Zone” and was in fact administered
as part of the Tokyo
Prefecture. In the words of one
Japanese officer, “Iwo Jima is the
doorkeeper to the Imperial capital.”
Even by the slowest aircraft, Tokyo
could be reached in three flight hours
from Iwo. In the battle for Iwo Jima,
a total of 28,000 Americans and
Japanese would give their lives in
savage fighting during the last winter
months of 1945.</p>
<p>No one on the American side ever
suggested that taking Iwo Jima
would be an easy proposition. Admiral
Nimitz assigned this mission to
the same team which had prevailed
so effectively in the earlier amphibious
assaults in the Gilberts, Marshalls,
and Marianas: Admiral Raymond
A. Spruance, commanding the
Fifth Fleet; Vice Admiral Richmond
Kelly Turner, commanding the Expeditionary
Forces; and Rear Admiral
Harry W. Hill, commanding
the Attack Force. Spruance added the
highly regarded Rear Admiral William
H. P. Blandy, a veteran of the
Peleliu/Angaur landings, to command
the Amphibious Support
Forces, responsible for minesweeping,
underwater demolition team
operations, and preliminary naval air
and gun bombardment.</p>
<p>As usual, “maintaining unremitting
military pressure on the enemy”
meant an accelerated planning schedule
and an overriding emphasis on
speed of execution. The amphibious
task force preparing to assault Iwo
Jima soon found itself squeezed on
both ends. Hill and Blandy had a
critical need for the amphibious
ships, landing craft, and shore bombardment
vessels currently being
used by General Douglas MacArthur
in his reconquest of Luzon in the
Philippines. But bad weather and
stiff enemy resistance combined to
delay completion of that operation.
The Joint Chiefs reluctantly postponed
D-day for Iwo Jima from 20
January 1945 until 19 February. The
tail end of the schedule provided no
relief. D-Day for Okinawa could go
no later than 1 April because of the
approach of the monsoon season.
The constricted time frame for Iwo
would have grave implications for the
landing force.</p>
<p>The experienced V Amphibious
Corps under Major General Harry
Schmidt, USMC, would provide the
landing force, an unprecedented assembly
of three Marine divisions, the
3d, 4th, and 5th. Schmidt would
have the distinction of commanding
the largest force of U.S. Marines ever
committed in a single battle, a combined
force which eventually totalled
more than 80,000 men. Well above
half of these Marines were veterans
of earlier fighting in the Pacific;
realistic training had prepared the
newcomers well. The troops assaulting
Iwo Jima were arguably the most
proficient amphibious forces the
world had seen.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, two senior Marines
shared the limelight for the Iwo Jima
battle, and history has often done
both an injustice. Spruance and
Turner prevailed upon Lieutenant
General Holland M. Smith, then
commanding Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific,
to participate in Operation
Detachment as Commanding General,
Expeditionary Troops. This was
a gratuitous billet. Schmidt had the
rank, experience, staff, and resources
to execute corps-level responsibility
without being second-guessed by
another headquarters. Smith, the
amphibious pioneer and veteran of
landings in the Aleutians, Gilberts,
Marshalls, and Marianas, admitted
to being embarrassed by the assignment.
“My sun had almost set by
then,” he stated, “I think they asked
me along only in case something<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</SPAN></span>
happened to Harry Schmidt.” Smith
tried to keep out of Schmidt’s way,
but his subsequent decision to withhold
commitment of the 3d Marines,
the Expeditionary Troops reserve, remains
as controversial today as it was
in 1945.</p>
<div id="ip_4" class="figcenter" style="width: 423px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_006.jpg" width-obs="423" height-obs="176" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109649</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Burdened with heavy packs and equipment, Marine communicators dash for cover
while advancing under heavy fire during the drive inland from the beaches.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Holland Smith was an undeniable
asset to the Iwo Jima campaign. During
the top-level planning stage he
was often, as always, a “voice in the
wilderness,” predicting severe casualties
unless greater and more effective
preliminary naval bombardment was
provided. He diverted the press and
the visiting dignitaries from Schmidt,
always providing realistic counterpoints
to some of the rosier staff estimates.
“It’s a tough proposition,”
Smith would say about Iwo, “That’s
why we are here.”</p>
<p>General Schmidt, whose few public
pronouncements left him saddled
with the unfortunate prediction of a
10-day conquest of Iwo Jima, came
to resent the perceived role Holland
Smith played in post-war accounts.
As he would forcibly state:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was the commander of all
troops on Iwo Jima at all times.
Holland Smith never had a
command post ashore, never issued
a single order ashore,
never spent a single night
ashore.... Isn’t it important
from an historical standpoint
that I commanded the greatest
number of Marines ever to be
engaged in a single action in the
entire history of the Marine
Corps?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>General Smith would not disagree
with those points. Smith provided a
useful role, but Schmidt and his exceptional
staff deserve maximum
credit for planning and executing the
difficult and bloody battle of Iwo
Jima.</p>
<p>The V Amphibious Corps achievement
was made even more memorable
by the enormously difficult
opposition provided by the island
and the enemy. In Lieutenant General
Tadamichi Kuribayashi [see <SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_6_The_Japanese_Commander">sidebar</SPAN>],
the Americans faced one of the most
formidable opponents of the war. A
fifth-generation <i>samurai</i>, hand-picked
and personally extolled by the
Emperor, Kuribayashi combined
combat experience with an innovative
mind and an iron will. Although
this would be his only combat
against American forces, he had
learned much about his prospective
opponents from earlier service in the
United States. More significantly, he
could appraise with an unblinking
eye the results of previous Japanese
attempts to repel American invasions
of Japanese-held garrisons. Heroic
rhetoric aside, Kuribayashi saw little
to commend the “defend-at-the-water’s-edge”
tactics and “all-or-nothing”
<i>Banzai</i> attacks which had
characterized Japan’s failures from
Tarawa to Tinian. Kuribayashi, a
realist, also knew not to expect much
help from Japan’s depleted fleet and
air forces. His best chances, he concluded,
would be to maximize Iwo’s
forbidding terrain with a defense in
depth, along the pattern of the recent
Biak and Peleliu defensive efforts. He
would eschew coast defense, anti-landing,
and <i>Banzai</i> tactics and instead
conduct a prolonged battle of
attrition, a war of nerves, patience,
and time. Possibly the Americans
would lose heart and abandon the
campaign.</p>
<p>Such a seemingly passive policy,
even that late in the war, seemed
revolutionary to senior Japanese
Army and Navy leaders. It ran counter
to the deeply ingrained warrior
code, which viewed the defensive as
only an unpleasant interim pending
resumption of the glorious offensive
in which one could destroy the enemy
with sword and bayonet. Even
Imperial General Headquarters grew
nervous. There is some evidence of
a top-level request for guidance in
defending against American “storm
landings” from Nazi Germany, whose
sad experience in trying to defend
Normandy at the water’s edge had
proven disastrous. The Japanese remained
unconvinced. Kuribayashi
needed every bit of his top connections
with the Emperor to keep from
being summarily relieved for his radical
proposals. His was not a complete
organizational victory—the
Navy insisted on building gun casemates
and blockhouses along the obvious
landing beaches on Iwo—but
in general he prevailed.</p>
<p>Kuribayashi demanded the assistance
of the finest mining engineers
and fortifications specialists in the
Empire. Here again, the island favored
the defender. Iwo’s volcanic
sand mixed readily with cement to
produce superior concrete for installations;
the soft rock lent itself to
rapid digging. Half the garrison lay
aside their weapons to labor with
pick and spade. When American
heavy bombers from the Seventh Air
Force commenced a daily pounding
of the island in early December 1944,
Kuribayashi simply moved everything—weapons,<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</SPAN></span>
command posts,
barracks, aid stations—underground.
These engineering achievements
were remarkable. Masked gun
positions provided interlocking fields
of fire, miles of tunnels linked key
defensive positions, every cave featured
multiple outlets and ventilation
tubes. One installation inside Mount
Suribachi ran seven stories deep. The
Americans would rarely see a live
Japanese on Iwo Jima until the bitter
end.</p>
<p>American intelligence experts, aided
by documents captured in Saipan
and by an almost daily flow of aerial
photography (and periscope-level
pictures from the submarine
<i>Spearfish</i>), puzzled over the “disappearing
act” of the Japanese garrison.
Trained photo interpreters, using
stereoscopic lenses, listed nearly 700
potential targets, but all were
hardened, covered, masked. The intelligence
staffs knew there was no
fresh water available on the island.
They could see the rainwater cisterns
and they knew what the average
monthly rainfall would deliver. They
concluded the garrison could not
possibly survive under those conditions
in numbers greater than 12,000
or 13,000. But Kuribayashi’s force
was twice that size. The men existed
on half-rations of water for months
before the battle began.</p>
<p>Unlike earlier amphibious assaults
at Guadalcanal and Tarawa, the
Americans would not enjoy either
strategic or tactical surprise at Iwo
Jima. Japanese strategists concluded
Iwo Jima would be invaded soon after
the loss of the Marianas. Six
months before the battle,
Kuribayashi wrote his wife, “The
Americans will surely invade this Iwo
Jima ... do not look for my return.”
He worked his men ruthlessly to
complete all defensive and training
preparations by 11 February
1945—and met the objective. His
was a mixed force of veterans and
recruits, soldiers and sailors. His artillerymen
and mortar crews were
among the best in the Empire.
Regardless, he trained and disciplined
them all. As the Americans soon discovered,
each fighting position contained
the commander’s “Courageous
Battle Vows” prominently posted
above the firing apertures. Troops
were admonished to maintain their
positions and exact 10 American lives
for every Japanese death.</p>
<p>General Schmidt issued VAC
Operation Plan 5-44 on 23 December
1944. The plan offered nothing
fancy. Mount Suribachi dominated
both potential beaches, but the 3,000
yards of black sand along the
southeastern coast appeared more
sheltered from the prevailing winds.
Here the V Amphibious Corps would
land on D-day, the 4th Marine Division
on the right, the 5th on the
left, the 3d in reserve. The initial objectives
included the lower airfield,
the west coast, and Suribachi. Then
the force would swing into line and
attack north, shoulder to shoulder.</p>
<p>Anticipation of a major Japanese
counterattack the first night influenced
the landing plan. “We welcome
a counterattack,” said Holland
Smith, “That’s generally when we
break their backs.” Both Schmidt and
4th Marine Division commander
Major General Clifton B. Cates knew
from recent experience at Tinian how
capable the Japanese were at assembling
large reserves at potential soft
points along a fresh beachhead. The
assault divisions would plan to land
their artillery regiments before dark
on D-day in that contingency.</p>
<div id="ip_5" class="figcenter" style="width: 633px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_007.jpg" width-obs="633" height-obs="800" alt="" />
<div class="captionr l1"><p>E.L. Wilson</p>
</div>
<div class="caption">
<p>IWO JIMA</p>
<p>(SULPHUR ISLAND)</p>
</div>
</div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</SPAN></span></p>
<p>The physical separation of the
three divisions, from Guam to
Hawaii, had no adverse effect on
preparatory training. Where it counted
most—the proficiency of small
units in amphibious landings and
combined-arms assaults on fortified
positions—each division was well
prepared for the forthcoming invasion.
The 3d Marine Division had
just completed its participation in the
successful recapture of Guam; field
training often extended to active
combat patrols to root out die-hard
Japanese survivors. In Maui, the 4th
Marine Division prepared for its
fourth major assault landing in 13
months with quiet confidence.
Recalled Major Frederick J. Karch,
operations officer for the 14th Marines,
“we had a continuity there of
veterans that was just unbeatable.” In
neighboring Hawaii, the 5th Marine
Division calmly prepared for its first
combat experience. The unit’s newness
would prove misleading. Well
above half of the officers and men
were veterans, including a number of
former Marine parachutists and a
few Raiders who had first fought in
the Solomons. Lieutenant Colonel
Donn J. Robertson took command of
the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, barely<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</SPAN></span>
two weeks before embarkation
and immediately ordered it into the
field for a sustained live-firing exercise.
Its competence and confidence
impressed him. “These were professionals,”
he concluded.</p>
<div id="ip_7" class="figcenter" style="width: 428px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_009.jpg" width-obs="428" height-obs="205" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 112392</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>“Dinah Might,” the first crippled B-29 to make an emergency landing on Iwo Jima
during the fighting, is surrounded by Marines and Seabees on 4 March 1945.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Among the veterans preparing for
Iwo Jima were two Medal of Honor
recipients from the Guadalcanal campaign,
Gunnery Sergeant John
“Manila John” Basilone and Lieutenant
Colonel Robert E. Galer.
Headquarters Marine Corps
preferred to keep such distinguished
veterans in the states for morale purposes,
but both men wrangled their
way back overseas—Basilone leading
a machine gun platoon, Galer
delivering a new radar unit for employment
with the Landing Force Air
Support Control Unit.</p>
<p>The Guadalcanal veterans would
only shake their heads at the abundance
of amphibious shipping available
for Operation Detachment.
Admiral Turner would command 495
ships, of which fully 140 were amphibiously
configured, the whole array
10 times the size of Guadalcanal’s
task force. Still there were problems.
So many of the ships and crews were
new that each rehearsal featured embarrassing
collisions and other accidents.
The new TD-18 bulldozers
were found to be an inch too wide
for the medium landing craft
(LCMs). The newly modified M4A3
Sherman tanks proved so heavy that
the LCMs rode with dangerously low
freeboards. Likewise, 105mm howitzers
overloaded the amphibious
trucks (DUKWs) to the point of near-unseaworthiness.
These factors
would prove costly in Iwo’s unpredictable
surf zone.</p>
<p>These problems notwithstanding,
the huge force embarked and began
the familiar move to westward. Said
Colonel Robert E. Hogaboom, Chief
of Staff, 3d Marine Division, “we
were in good shape, well trained,
well equipped and thoroughly supported.”</p>
<p>On Iwo Jima, General Kuribayashi
had benefitted from the American
postponements of Operation Detachment
because of delays in the Philippines
campaign. He, too, felt as ready
and prepared as possible. When the
American armada sailed from the
Marianas on 13 February, he was
forewarned. He deployed one infantry
battalion in the vicinity of the
beaches and lower airfield, ordered
the bulk of his garrison into its assigned
fighting holes, and settled
down to await the inevitable storm.</p>
<div id="ip_7b" class="figcenter" style="width: 430px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>An aerial view of Iwo Jima before the landing clearly shows “pork chop” shape.
Mount Suribachi, in the right foreground, is at the southern end of the island.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 413529<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_009a.jpg" width-obs="430" height-obs="333" alt="" /></div>
<p>Two contentious issues divided the
Navy-Marine team as D-day at Iwo
Jima loomed closer. The first involved
Admiral Spruance’s decision
to detach Task Force 58, the fast carriers
under Admiral Marc Mitscher,
to attack strategic targets on Honshu
simultaneously with the onset of Admiral
Blandy’s preliminary bombardment
of Iwo. The Marines suspected
Navy-Air Force rivalry at work
here—most of Mitscher’s targets were
aircraft factories which the B-29s had
missed badly a few days earlier.
What the Marines really begrudged
was Mitscher taking all eight Marine
Corps fighter squadrons, assigned to<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</SPAN></span>
the fast carriers, plus the new fast
battleships with their 16-inch guns.
Task Force 58 returned to Iwo in time
to render sparkling support with
these assets on D-day, but two days
later it was off again, this time for
good.</p>
<div id="ip_8" class="figcenter" style="width: 430px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_010.jpg" width-obs="430" height-obs="245" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Col William P. McCahill Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>A Marine inspects a Japanese coastal defense gun which, although protected by
steel-reinforced concrete, was destroyed in prelanding naval gunfire bombardments.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>The other issue was related and it
concerned the continuing argument
between senior Navy and Marine
officers over the extent of preliminary
naval gunfire. The Marines looked at
the intelligence reports on Iwo and
requested 10 days of preliminary fire.
The Navy said it had neither the time
nor the ammo to spare; three days
would have to suffice. Holland Smith
and Harry Schmidt continued to
plead, finally offering to compromise
to four days. Turner deferred to Spruance
who ruled that three days prep
fires, in conjunction with the daily
pounding being administered by the
Seventh Air Force, would do the job.</p>
<p>Lieutenant Colonel Donald M.
Weller, USMC, served as the
FMFPAC/Task Force 51 naval gunfire
officer, and no one in either sea
service knew the business more
thoroughly. Weller had absorbed the
lessons of the Pacific War well, especially
those of the conspicuous
failures at Tarawa. The issue, he argued
forcibly to Admiral Turner, was
not the weight of shells nor their
caliber but rather time. Destruction
of heavily fortified enemy targets
took deliberate, pinpoint firing from
close ranges, assessed and adjusted
by aerial observers. Iwo Jima’s 700
“hard” targets would require time to
knock out, a lot of time.</p>
<p>Neither Spruance nor Turner had
time to give, for strategic, tactical,
and logistical reasons. Three days of
firing by Admiral Blandy’s sizeable
bombardment force would deliver
four times the amount of shells Tarawa
received, and one and a half times
that delivered against larger Saipan.
It would have to do.</p>
<div id="ip_8b" class="figcenter" style="width: 581px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_010a.jpg" width-obs="581" height-obs="800" alt="" />
<div class="caption">JAPANESE DEFENSE
SECTORS</div>
</div>
<p>In effect, Iwo’s notorious foul
weather, the imperviousness of many<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</SPAN></span>
of the Japanese fortifications, and
other distractions dissipated even the
three days’ bombardment. “We got
about thirteen hours’ worth of fire
support during the thirty-four hours
of available daylight,” complained
Brigadier General William W.
Rogers, chief of staff to General
Schmidt.</p>
<p>The Americans received an unexpected
bonus when General
Kuribayashi committed his only
known tactical error during the battle.
This occurred on D-minus-2, as
a force of 100 Navy and Marine underwater
demolition team (UDT)
frogmen bravely approached the
eastern beaches escorted by a dozen
LCI landing craft firing their guns
and rockets. Kuribayashi evidently
believed this to be the main landing
and authorized the coastal batteries
to open fire. The exchange was hot
and heavy, with the LCIs getting the
worst of it, but U.S. battleships and
cruisers hurried in to blast the casemate
guns suddenly revealed on the
slopes of Suribachi and along the
rock quarry on the right flank.</p>
<p>That night, gravely concerned
about the hundreds of Japanese targets
still untouched by two days of
firing, Admiral Blandy conducted a
“council of war” on board his flagship.
At Weller’s suggestion, Blandy
junked the original plan and directed
his gunships to concentrate exclusively
on the beach areas. This was
done with considerable effect on D-minus-1
and D-day morning itself.
Kuribayashi noted that most of the
positions the Imperial Navy insisted
on building along the beach approaches
had in fact been destroyed,
as he had predicted. Yet his main
defensive belts criss-crossing the
Motoyama Plateau remained intact.
“I pray for a heroic fight,” he told his
staff.</p>
<p>On board Admiral Turner’s flagship,
the press briefing held the night
before D-day was uncommonly somber.
General Holland Smith predicted
heavy casualties, possibly as many
as 15,000, which shocked all hands.
A man clad in khakis without rank
insignia then stood up to address the
room. It was James V. Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy. “Iwo Jima, like
Tarawa, leaves very little choice,” he
said quietly, “except to take it by force
of arms, by character and courage.”</p>
</div>
<div class="sidebar">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_6_The_Japanese_Commander" id="Sidebar_page_6_The_Japanese_Commander"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_6">page 6</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Japanese Commander</h3>
<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">In</span> the estimation of Lieutenant Colonel Justice M.
Chambers, USMC, a battalion commander (3/25)
whose four days ashore resulted in the Purple Heart
and the Medal of Honor: “On Iwo Jima, one of their smartest
generals commanded, a man who did not believe in
the Banzai business; each Jap was to kill ten Marines—for
awhile they were beating their quotas.” Chambers was
describing Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Imperial
Japanese Army, Commanding General, <i>109th Division</i>
and Commander, <i>Ogasawara Army Group</i>. The U.S.
Marines have rarely faced a tougher opponent.</p>
<div id="ip_6" class="figright" style="width: 298px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_008.jpg" width-obs="298" height-obs="380" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 152108</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>LtGen Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Imperial Japanese Army.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Kuribayashi, 53, a native of Nagano Prefecture, had
served the Emperor as a cavalry officer since graduating
from the Military Academy in 1914. He spent several years
as a junior officer posted to the Japanese Embassies in
America and Canada. With the advent of war in Asia,
Kuribayashi commanded a cavalry regiment in combat in
Manchuria and a brigade in northern China. Later, he
served as chief of staff of the <i>Twenty-third Army</i> during
the capture of Hong Kong. Favored by the Emperor, he
returned from China to command the <i>Imperial Guards Division</i>
in Tokyo. After the fall of Saipan in June 1944, he
was assigned to command the defensive fortress of Iwo
Jima.</p>
<p>Kuribayashi was a realist. He saw Iwo Jima’s crude airstrips
as a net liability to the Empire, at best providing
nuisance raids against the B-29s, certain to draw the attention
of American strategic planners. Iwo Jima’s airfields in
American hands would pose an enormous threat to Japan.
Kuribayashi saw only two options: either blow up the entire
island, which proved infeasible, or defend it to the
death. To do the latter effectively he adapted a radical
defensive policy, foregoing the water’s-edge linear tactics
and suicidal <i>Banzai</i> attacks of previous island battles. This
stirred controversy at the highest levels—Imperial Headquarters
even asked the Nazis for advice on repelling
American invasions—as well as among Kuribayashi’s own
officers. Kuribayashi made some compromises with the
semi-independent naval forces on the island, but sacked 18
senior army officers, including his own chief of staff. Those
who remained would implement their commander’s policy
to the letter.</p>
<p>Doomed without naval or air support, Kuribayashi
nevertheless proved to be a resolute and resourceful field
commander. His only tactical error was to authorize the
sector commander to engage the U.S. task force covering
underwater demolitions team operations on D-2. This became
a gift to the attackers, for it revealed to American gunners
the previously masked batteries which otherwise
would have slaughtered the assault waves on D-day.</p>
<p>Japanese accounts indicate Kuribayashi committed <i>hara-kari</i>,
the Japanese ritual suicide, in his cave near Kitano
Point on 23 March 1945, the 33d day of the battle. “Of all
our adversaries in the Pacific,” said General Holland M.
Smith, USMC, “Kuribayashi was the most redoubtable.”
Said another Marine, “Let’s hope the Japs don’t have any
more like him.”</p>
</div>
<hr /></div>
<h2><SPAN name="D-Day" id="D-Day"></SPAN><i>D-Day</i></h2>
<p>Weather conditions around Iwo
Jima on D-day morning, 19 February
1945, were almost ideal. At 0645
Admiral Turner signalled “Land the
landing force!”</p>
<div id="ip_9" class="figcenter" style="width: 654px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_011.jpg" width-obs="654" height-obs="416" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p><i>From the Japanese position overlooking the landing
beaches and Airfield No. 1, the enemy observers had an
unobstructed view of the entire beachhead. From a field sketch
by Cpl Daniel L. Winsor, Jr., USMCR, S-2, 25th Marines.</i></p>
<p>Marine Corps Historical Collection<br/></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Shore bombardment ships did not
hesitate to engage the enemy island
at near point-blank range. Battleships
and cruisers steamed as close as 2,000
yards to level their guns against island
targets. Many of the “Old<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</SPAN></span>
Battleships” had performed this
dangerous mission in all theaters of
the war. Marines came to recognize
and appreciate their contributions. It
seemed fitting that the old <i>Nevada</i>,
raised from the muck and ruin of
Pearl Harbor, should lead the bombardment
force close ashore. Marines
also admired the battleship <i>Arkansas</i>,
built in 1912, and recently
returned from the Atlantic where she
had battered German positions at
Point du Hoc at Normandy during
the epic Allied landing on 6 June
1944.</p>
<div id="ip_11" class="figcenter" style="width: 431px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_013.jpg" width-obs="431" height-obs="335" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 14284</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Members of the 4th Marine Division receive a last-minute briefing before D-day.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Lieutenant Colonels Weller and
William W. “Bucky” Buchanan, both
artillery officers, had devised a modified
form of the “rolling barrage” for
use by the bombarding gunships
against beachfront targets just before
H-Hour. This concentration of naval
gunfire would advance progressively
as the troops landed, always remaining
400 yards to their front. Air
spotters would help regulate the pace.
Such an innovation appealed to the
three division commanders, each
having served in France during World
War I. In those days, a good rolling
barrage was often the only way to
break a stalemate.</p>
<p>The shelling was terrific. Admiral
Hill would later boast that “there
were no proper targets for shore
bombardment remaining on Dog-Day
morning.” This proved to be an
overstatement, yet no one could deny
the unprecedented intensity of firepower
Hill delivered against the areas
surrounding the landing beaches. As
General Kuribayashi would ruefully
admit in an assessment report to Imperial
General Headquarters, “we
need to reconsider the power of bombardment
from ships; the violence of
the enemy’s bombardments is far beyond
description.”</p>
<p>The amphibious task force appeared
from over the horizon, the
rails of the troopships crowded with
combat-equipped Marines watching
the spectacular fireworks. The
Guadalcanal veterans among them
realized a grim satisfaction watching
American battleships leisurely
pounding the island from just offshore.
The war had come full cycle
from the dark days of October 1942
when the 1st Marine Division and
the Cactus Air Force endured similar
shelling from Japanese battleships.</p>
<p>The Marines and sailors were anxious
to get their first glimpse of the
objective. Correspondent John P.
Marquand, the Pulitzer Prize-winning
writer, recorded his own first
impressions of Iwo: “Its silhouette
was like a sea monster, with the little
dead volcano for the head, and
the beach area for the neck, and all
the rest of it, with its scrubby brown
cliffs for the body.” Lieutenant David
N. Susskind, USNR, wrote down his
initial thoughts from the bridge of
the troopship <i>Mellette</i>: “Iwo Jima was
a rude, ugly sight.... Only a geologist
could look at it and not be
repelled.” As described in a subsequent
letter home by Navy Lieutenant
Michael F. Keleher, a surgeon
in the 25th Marines:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The naval bombardment had
already begun and I could see
the orange-yellow flashes as the
battleships, cruisers, and destroyers
blasted away at the island
broadside. Yes, there was
Iwo—surprisingly close, just
like the pictures and models we
had been studying for six
weeks. The volcano was to our
left, then the long, flat black
beaches where we were going to
land, and the rough rocky
plateau to our right.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The commanders of the 4th and
5th Marine Divisions, Major Generals
Clifton B. Cates and Keller E.
Rockey, respectively, studied the island
through binoculars from their
respective ships. Each division would
land two reinforced regiments
abreast. From left to right, the
beaches were designated Green, Red,
Yellow, and Blue. The 5th Division
would land the 28th Marines on the
left flank, over Green Beach, the 27th
Marines over Red. The 4th Division
would land the 23d Marines over Yellow
Beach and the 25th Marines over
Blue Beach on the right flank. General
Schmidt reviewed the latest intelligence
reports with growing
uneasiness and requested a reassignment
of reserve forces with General<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</SPAN></span>
Smith. The 3d Marine Division’s 21st
Marines would replace the 26th Marines
as corps reserve, thus releasing
the latter regiment to the 5th Division.</p>
<p>Schmidt’s landing plan envisioned
the 28th Marines cutting the island
in half, then turning to capture Suribachi,
while the 25th Marines would
scale the Rock Quarry and then serve
as the hinge for the entire corps to
swing around to the north. The 23d
Marines and 27th Marines would
capture the first airfield and pivot
north within their assigned zones.</p>
<p>General Cates was already concerned
about the right flank. Blue
Beach Two lay directly under the observation
and fire of suspected
Japanese positions in the Rock Quarry,
whose steep cliffs overshadowed
the right flank like Suribachi dominated
the left. The 4th Marine Division
figured that the 25th Marines
would have the hardest objective to
take on D-day. Said Cates, “If I knew
the name of the man on the extreme
right of the right-hand squad I’d
recommend him for a medal before
we go in.”</p>
<p>The choreography of the landing
continued to develop. Iwo Jima
would represent the pinnacle of forcible
amphibious assault against a
heavily fortified shore, a complex art
mastered painstakingly by the Fifth
Fleet over many campaigns. Seventh
Air Force Martin B-24 Liberator
bombers flew in from the Marianas
to strike the smoking island. Rocket
ships moved in to saturate nearshore
targets. Then it was time for the
fighter and attack squadrons from
Mitscher’s Task Force 58 to contribute.
The Navy pilots showed their
skills at bombing and strafing, but
the troops naturally cheered the most
at the appearance of F4U Corsairs
flown by Marine Fighter Squadrons
124 and 213 led by Lieutenant
Colonel William A. Millington from
the fleet carrier <i>Essex</i>. Colonel Vernon
E. Megee, in his shipboard capacity
as air officer for General
Smith’s Expeditionary Troops staff,
had urged Millington to put on a special
show for the troops in the assault
waves. “Drag your bellies on the
beach,” he told Millington. The Marine
fighters made an impressive approach
parallel to the island, then
virtually did Megee’s bidding, streaking
low over the beaches, strafing furiously.
The geography of the Pacific
War since Bougainville had kept
many of the ground Marines separated
from their own air support, which
had been operating in areas other
than where they had been fighting,
most notably the Central Pacific. “It
was the first time a lot of them had
ever seen a Marine fighter plane,” said
Megee. The troops were not disappointed.</p>
<div id="ip_12" class="figcenter" style="width: 430px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>Laden with battle-ready V Amphibious Corps Marines, LSMs (landing ship, medium)
head for Iwo’s beaches. Landing craft of this type were capable of carrying
five Sherman tanks. In the left background lies smoke-covered Mount Suribachi.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109598<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_014.jpg" width-obs="430" height-obs="263" alt="" /></div>
<p>The planes had barely disappeared
when naval gunfire resumed, carpeting
the beach areas with a building
crescendo of high-explosive shells.
The ship-to-shore movement was
well underway, an easy 30-minute
run for the tracked landing vehicles
(LVTs). This time there were enough
LVTs to do the job: 68 LVT(A)4 armored
amtracs mounting snub-nosed
75mm cannon leading the way, followed
by 380 troop-laden LVT 4s and
LVT 2s. The waves crossed the line
of departure on time and chugged
confidently towards the smoking
beaches, all the while under the
climactic bombardment from the
ships. Here there was no coral reef,
no killer neap tides to be concerned
with. The Navy and Marine frogmen
had reported the approaches free of
mines or tetrahedrons. There was no
premature cessation of fire. The “rolling
barrage” plan took effect. Hardly
a vehicle was lost to the desultory
enemy fire.</p>
<p>The massive assault waves hit the
beach within two minutes of H-hour.
A Japanese observer watching the
drama unfold from a cave on the
slopes of Suribachi reported, “At nine
o’clock in the morning several
hundred landing craft with amphibious
tanks in the lead rushed ashore
like an enormous tidal wave.” Lieutenant
Colonel Robert H. Williams,
executive officer of the 28th Marines,
recalled that “the landing was a magnificent
sight to see—two divisions
landing abreast; you could see the
whole show from the deck of a ship.”
To this point, so far, so good.</p>
<p>The first obstacle came not from
the Japanese but the beach and the
parallel terraces. Iwo Jima was an
emerging volcano; its steep beaches
dropped off sharply, producing a
narrow but violent surf zone. The<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</SPAN></span>
soft black sand immobilized all
wheeled vehicles and caused some of
the tracked amphibians to belly
down. The boat waves that closely
followed the LVTs had more trouble.
Ramps would drop, a truck or jeep
would attempt to drive out, only to
get stuck. In short order a succession
of plunging waves hit the stalled craft
before they could completely unload,
filling their sterns with water and
sand, broaching them broadside. The
beach quickly resembled a salvage
yard.</p>
<div id="ip_13" class="figcenter" style="width: 624px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_015.jpg" width-obs="624" height-obs="800" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>LANDING PLAN<br/>
<span class="subhead">IWO JIMA</span></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr">E.L. Wilson</div>
</div>
<p>The infantry, heavily laden, found
its own “foot-mobility” severely restricted.
In the words of Corporal Edward
Hartman, a rifleman with the
4th Marine Division: “the sand was
so soft it was like trying to run in
loose coffee grounds.” From the 28th
Marines came this early, laconic
report: “Resistance moderate, terrain
awful.”</p>
<p>The rolling barrage and carefully
executed landing produced the
desired effect, suppressing direct enemy
fire, providing enough shock and
distraction to enable the first assault
waves to clear the beach and begin
advancing inward. Within minutes
6,000 Marines were ashore. Many
became thwarted by increasing fire
over the terraces or down from the
highlands, but hundreds leapt forward
to maintain assault momentum.
The 28th Marines on the left
flank had rehearsed on similar volcanic
terrain on the island of Hawaii.
Now, despite increasing casualties
among their company commanders
and the usual disorganization of
landing, elements of the regiment
used their initiative to strike across
the narrow neck of the peninsula.
The going became progressively costly
as more and more Japanese strongpoints
along the base of Suribachi
seemed to spring to life. Within 90
minutes of the landing, however, elements
of the 1st Battalion, 28th Marines,
had reached the western shore,
700 yards across from Green Beach.
Iwo Jima had been severed—“like cutting
off a snake’s head,” in the words
of one Marine. It would represent the
deepest penetration of what was becoming
a very long and costly day.</p>
<p>The other three regiments experienced
difficulty leaving the black
sand terraces and wheeling across
towards the first airfield. The terrain
was an open bowl, a shooting gallery
in full view from Suribachi on the left
and the rising tableland to the right.
Any thoughts of a “cakewalk” quickly
vanished as well-directed machine-gun
fire whistled across the open
ground and mortar rounds began
dropping along the terraces. Despite
these difficulties, the 27th Marines
made good initial gains, reaching the
southern and western edges of the
first airfield before noon. The 23d
Marines landed over Yellow Beach
and sustained the brunt of the first
round of Japanese combined arms
fire. These troops crossed the second
terrace only to be confronted by two
huge concrete pillboxes, still lethal
despite all the pounding. Overcoming
these positions proved costly in
casualties and time. More fortified
positions appeared in the broken
ground beyond. Colonel Walter W.
Wensinger’s call for tank support
could not be immediately honored
because of trafficability and congestion
problems on the beach. The
regiment clawed its way several
hundred yards towards the eastern
edge of the airstrip.</p>
<p>No assault units found it easy going
to move inland, but the 25th Marines
almost immediately ran into a
buzz-saw trying to move across Blue<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</SPAN></span>
Beach. General Cates had been right
in his appraisal. “That right flank was
a bitch if there ever was one,” he
would later say. Lieutenant Colonel
Hollis W. Mustain’s 1st Battalion,
25th Marines, managed to scratch
forward 300 yards under heavy fire
in the first half hour, but Lieutenant
Colonel Chambers’ 3d Battalion,
25th Marines, took the heaviest beating
of the day on the extreme right
trying to scale the cliffs leading to the
Rock Quarry. Chambers landed 15
minutes after H-hour. “Crossing that
second terrace,” he recalled, “the fire
from automatic weapons was coming
from all over. You could’ve held
up a cigarette and lit it on the stuff
going by. I knew immediately we
were in for one hell of a time.”</p>
<div id="ip_14" class="figcenter" style="width: 655px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_016.jpg" width-obs="655" height-obs="409" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110128</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Tracked landing vehicles (LVTs), jam-packed with 4th Marine
Division troops, approach the Line of Departure at H-hour
on D-day. In the center rear can be seen the control vessels
which attempted to maintain order in the landing.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>This was simply the beginning.
While the assault forces tried to overcome
the infantry weapons of the local
defenders, they were naturally
blind to an almost imperceptible stirring
taking place among the rocks
and crevices of the interior highlands.
With grim anticipation, General
Kuribayashi’s gunners began unmasking
the big guns—the heavy artillery,
giant mortars, rockets, and
anti-tank weapons held under tightest
discipline for this precise moment.
Kuribayashi had patiently waited until
the beaches were clogged with
troops and material. Gun crews knew
the range and deflection to each landing
beach by heart; all weapons had
been preregistered on these targets
long ago. At Kuribayashi’s signal,
these hundreds of weapons began to
open fire. It was shortly after 1000.</p>
<div id="ip_14b" class="figcenter" style="width: 430px;">
<div class="caption top"><p><i>H-hour at Iwo Jima, 19 February 1945.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USN) NH65311<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_016a.jpg" width-obs="430" height-obs="241" alt="" /></div>
<p>The ensuing bombardment was as
deadly and terrifying as any of the<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</SPAN></span>
Marines had ever experienced. There
was hardly any cover. Japanese artillery
and mortar rounds blanketed
every corner of the 3,000-yard-wide
beach. Large-caliber coast defense
guns and dual-purpose antiaircraft
guns firing horizontally added a
deadly scissors of direct fire from the
high ground on both flanks. Marines
stumbling over the terraces to escape
the rain of projectiles encountered the
same disciplined machine-gun fire
and mine fields which had slowed the
initial advance. Casualties mounted
appallingly.</p>
<div id="ip_15" class="figcenter" style="width: 429px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_017.jpg" width-obs="429" height-obs="297" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110109</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Marines of the 4th Division pour ashore from their landing craft on Yellow and
Blue Beaches on D-day. Enemy fire had not hit this assault wave yet as it landed.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ip_15b" class="figcenter" style="width: 654px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>As soon as it hit the beach on the right side of the V Amphibious
Corps line, the 25th Marines was pinned down by
accurate and heavy enemy fire. Meanwhile, landing craft, supplies,
and vehicles pile up in the surf behind Marines.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110108<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_017a.jpg" width-obs="654" height-obs="401" alt="" /></div>
<div id="ip_15c" class="figcenter" style="width: 644px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_018.jpg" width-obs="644" height-obs="373" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111691</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>5th Division Marines land on Red and Green Beaches at the
foot of Mount Suribachi under heavy fire coming from enemy
positions overlooking the black sand terraces. The 28th
Marines had not yet wheeled to the left towards Suribachi.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ip_15d" class="figcenter" style="width: 654px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>With bullets and artillery shells screaming overhead, Marines
crawl along the beaches and dig into the soft volcanic ash
for cover from the deadly fire. Note the geyser of water as
a shell lands close to a landing craft headed into the beach.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109618<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_018a.jpg" width-obs="654" height-obs="410" alt="" /></div>
<p>Two Marine combat veterans observing
this expressed a grudging admiration
for the Japanese gunners. “It
was one of the worst blood-lettings
of the war,” said Major Karch of the
14th Marines. “They rolled those artillery
barrages up and down the
beach—I just didn’t see how anybody
could live through such heavy fire
barrages.” Said Lieutenant Colonel
Joseph L. Stewart, “The Japanese
were superb artillerymen.... Somebody
was getting hit every time they
fired.” At sea, Lieutenant Colonel
Weller tried desperately to deliver
naval gunfire against the Japanese
gun positions shooting down at 3d
Battalion, 25th Marines, from the
Rock Quarry. It would take longer
to coordinate this fire: the first
Japanese barrages had wiped out the<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</SPAN></span>
3d Battalion, 25th Marines’ entire
Shore Fire Control Party.</p>
<div id="ip_16" class="figcenter" style="width: 431px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_019.jpg" width-obs="431" height-obs="275" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111115</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Marines pull their ammunition cart onto the beach from their broached landing
craft on D-day, all the while under heavy enemy fire. Some troops did not make it.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</SPAN></span>
As the Japanese firing reached a
general crescendo, the four assault
regiments issued dire reports to the
flagship. Within a 10-minute period,
these messages crackled over the
command net:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1036: (From 25th Marines) “Catching
all hell from the quarry. Heavy
mortar and machine gun fire.”</p>
<p>1039: (From 23d Marines) “Taking
heavy casualties and can’t move for
the moment. Mortars killing us.”</p>
<p>1042: (From 27th Marines) “All
units pinned down by artillery and
mortars. Casualties heavy. Need tank
support fast to move anywhere.”</p>
<p>1046: (From 28th Marines) “Taking
heavy fire and forward movement
stopped. Machine gun and
artillery fire heaviest ever seen.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The landing force suffered and
bled but did not panic. The profusion
of combat veterans throughout the
rank and file of each regiment helped
the rookies focus on the objective.
Communications remained effective.
Keen-eyed aerial observers spotted
some of the now-exposed gun positions
and directed naval gunfire effectively.
Carrier planes screeched in
low to drop napalm canisters. The
heavy Japanese fire would continue
to take an awful toll throughout the
first day and night, but it would
never again be so murderous as that
first unholy hour.</p>
<p>Marine Sherman tanks played hell
getting into action on D-day. Later
in the battle these combat vehicles
would be the most valuable weapons
on the battlefield for the Marines;
this day was a nightmare. The assault
divisions embarked many of their
tanks on board medium landing
ships (LSMs), sturdy little craft that
could deliver five Shermans at a
time. But it was tough disembarking
them on Iwo’s steep beaches. The
stern anchors could not hold in the
loose sand; bow cables run forward
to “deadmen” LVTs parted under the
strain. On one occasion the lead tank
stalled at the top of the ramp, blocking
the other vehicles and leaving the
LSM at the mercy of the rising surf.
Other tanks bogged down or threw
tracks in the loose sand. Many of
those that made it over the terraces
were destroyed by huge horned
mines or disabled by deadly accurate
47mm anti-tank fire from Suribachi.
Other tankers kept coming. Their
relative mobility, armored protection,
and 75mm gunfire were most
welcome to the infantry scattered
among Iwo’s lunar-looking, shell-pocked
landscape.</p>
<div id="ip_17" class="figcenter" style="width: 428px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>Shore party Marines man steadying lines while others unload combat cargo from
boats broached in the surf. Note the jeep, one of the first to come ashore, bogged
down axle-deep in the soft black volcanic ash, not to be moved till later.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110593<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_019a.jpg" width-obs="428" height-obs="321" alt="" /></div>
<p>Both division commanders committed
their reserves early. General
Rockey called in the 26th Marines
shortly after noon. General Cates ordered<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</SPAN></span>
two battalions of the 24th Marines
to land at 1400; the 3d
Battalion, 24th Marines, followed
several hours later. Many of the
reserve battalions suffered heavier
casualties crossing the beach than the
assault units, a result of Kuribayashi’s
punishing bombardment from all
points on the island.</p>
<p>Mindful of the likely Japanese
counterattack in the night to come—and
despite the fire and confusion
along the beaches—both divisions
also ordered their artillery regiments
ashore. This process, frustrating and
costly, took much of the afternoon.
The wind and surf began to pick up
as the day wore on, causing more
than one low-riding DUKW to
swamp with its precious 105mm
howitzer cargo. Getting the guns
ashore was one thing; getting them
up off the sand was quite another.
The 75mm pack howitzers fared better
than the heavier 105s. Enough
Marines could readily hustle them up
over the terraces, albeit at great risk.
The 105s seemed to have a mind of
their own in the black sand. The effort
to get each single weapon off the
beach was a saga in its own right.
Somehow, despite the fire and unforgiving
terrain, both Colonel Louis G.
DeHaven, commanding the 14th Marines,
and Colonel James D. Waller,
commanding the 13th Marines,
managed to get batteries in place,
registered, and rendering close fire
support well before dark, a singular
accomplishment.</p>
<p>Japanese fire and the plunging surf
continued to make a shambles out of
the beachhead. Late in the afternoon,
Lieutenant Michael F. Keleher,
USNR, the battalion surgeon, was
ordered ashore to take over the 3d
Battalion, 25th Marines aid station
from its gravely wounded surgeon.
Keleher, a veteran of three previous
assault landings, was appalled by the
carnage on Blue Beach as he approached:
“Such a sight on that
beach! Wrecked boats, bogged-down
jeeps, tractors and tanks; burning vehicles;
casualties scattered all over.”</p>
<div id="ip_18" class="figcenter" style="width: 424px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_020.jpg" width-obs="424" height-obs="207" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Marine Corps Combat Art Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>In “Flotsam and Jetsam,” an acrylic painting on masonite by Col Charles H. Waterhouse,
he portrays the loss of his sergeant to mortar fire on the beach on D-day.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ip_18b" class="figcenter" style="width: 632px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_020a.jpg" width-obs="632" height-obs="800" alt="" />
<div class="caption wspace"><p>VAC FRONT LINES D-DAY<br/>
<span class="subhead wspace">19 FEBRUARY 1945</span></p>
<p class="small">28th MARINES ONLY, D PLUS 1, 2, 3</p>
</div>
</div>
<p>On the left center of the action,
leading his machine gun platoon in
the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines’ attack
against the southern portion of
the airfield, the legendary “Manila
John” Basilone fell mortally wounded
by a Japanese mortar shell, a loss
keenly felt by all Marines on the island.
Farther east, Lieutenant<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</SPAN></span>
Colonel Robert Galer, the other
Guadalcanal Medal of Honor Marine
(and one of the Pacific War’s earliest
fighter aces), survived the afternoon’s
fusillade along the beaches
and began reassembling his scattered
radar unit in a deep shell hole near
the base of Suribachi.</p>
<div id="ip_19" class="figcenter" style="width: 431px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_021.jpg" width-obs="431" height-obs="273" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109601</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>As D-day on Iwo Jima comes to a close, the landing beaches are scenes of
death and destruction with LVTs and landing craft wallowing in the waves
and tracked and wheeled vehicles kept out of action, unable to go forward.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Late in the afternoon, Lieutenant
Colonel Donn J. Robertson led his 3d
Battalion, 27th Marines, ashore over
Blue Beach, disturbed at the intensity
of fire still being directed on the
reserve forces this late on D-day.
“They were really ready for us,” he
recalled. He watched with pride and
wonderment as his Marines landed
under fire, took casualties, stumbled
forward to clear the beach. “What
impels a young guy landing on a
beach in the face of fire?” he asked
himself. Then it was Robertson’s
turn. His boat hit the beach too hard;
the ramp wouldn’t drop. Robertson
and his command group had to roll
over the gunwales into the churning
surf and crawl ashore, an inauspicious
start.</p>
<p>The bitter battle to capture the
Rock Quarry cliffs on the right flank
raged all day. The beachhead remained
completely vulnerable to enemy
direct-fire weapons from these
heights; the Marines had to storm
them before many more troops or
supplies could be landed. In the end,
it was the strength of character of
Captain James Headley and Lieutenant
Colonel “Jumping Joe” Chambers
who led the survivors of the 3d
Battalion, 25th Marines, onto the top
of the cliffs. The battalion paid an exorbitant
price for this achievement,
losing 22 officers and 500 troops by
nightfall.</p>
<p>The two assistant division commanders,
Brigadier Generals Franklin
A. Hart and Leo D. Hermle, of
the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions
respectively, spent much of D-day on
board the control vessels marking
both ends of the Line of Departure,
4,000 yards off shore. This reflected
yet another lesson in amphibious
techniques learned from Tarawa.
Having senior officers that close to
the ship-to-shore movement provided
landing force decision-making
from the most forward vantage
point. By dusk General Hermle opted
to come ashore. At Tarawa he had
spent the night of D-day essentially
out of contact at the fire-swept pierhead.
This time he intended to be on
the ground. Hermle had the larger
operational picture in mind, knowing
the corps commander’s desire to
force the reserves and artillery units
on shore despite the carnage in order
to build credible combat power.
Hermle knew that whatever the night
might bring, the Americans now had
more troops on the island than
Kuribayashi could ever muster. His
presence helped his division forget
about the day’s disasters and focus on
preparations for the expected counterattacks.</p>
<p>Japanese artillery and mortar fire
continued to rake the beachhead. The
enormous spigot mortar shells (called
“flying ashcans” by the troops) and
rocket-boosted aerial bombs were
particularly scary—loud, whistling
projectiles, tumbling end over end.
Many sailed completely over the island;
those that hit along the beaches
or the south runways invariably
caused dozens of casualties with each
impact. Few Marines could dig a
proper foxhole in the granular sand
(“like trying to dig a hole in a barrel
of wheat”). Among urgent calls to the
control ship for plasma, stretchers,
and mortar shells came repeated cries
for sand bags.</p>
<p>Veteran Marine combat correspondent
Lieutenant Cyril P. Zurlinden,
soon to become a casualty himself,
described that first night ashore:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At Tarawa, Saipan, and Tinian,
I saw Marines killed and
wounded in a shocking manner,
but I saw nothing like the ghastliness
that hung over the Iwo
beachhead. Nothing any of us
had ever known could compare
with the utter anguish, frustration,
and constant inner battle
to maintain some semblance of
sanity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Personnel accounting was a nightmare
under those conditions, but the
assault divisions eventually reported
the combined loss of 2,420 men
to General Schmidt (501 killed, 1,755
wounded, 47 dead of wounds, 18
missing, and 99 combat fatigue).
These were sobering statistics, but
Schmidt now had 30,000 Marines<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</SPAN></span>
ashore. The casualty rate of eight
percent left the landing force in relatively
better condition than at the
first days at Tarawa or Saipan. The
miracle was that the casualties had
not been twice as high. General
Kuribayashi had possibly waited a
little too long to open up with his big
guns.</p>
<p>The first night on Iwo was ghostly.
Sulfuric mists spiraled out of the
earth. The Marines, used to the
tropics, shivered in the cold, waiting
for Kuribayashi’s warriors to come
screaming down from the hills. They
would learn that this Japanese commander
was different. There would
be no wasteful, vainglorious <i>Banzai</i>
attack, this night or any other. Instead,
small teams of infiltrators,
which Kuribayashi termed “Prowling
Wolves,” probed the lines, gathering
intelligence. A barge-full of Japanese
<i>Special Landing Forces</i> tried a small
counterlanding on the western
beaches and died to the man under
the alert guns of the 28th Marines
and its supporting LVT crews. Otherwise
the night was one of continuing
waves of indirect fire from the
highlands. One high velocity round
landed directly in the hole occupied
by the 1st Battalion, 23d Marines’
commander, Lieutenant Colonel
Ralph Haas, killing him instantly.
The Marines took casualties throughout
the night. But with the first
streaks of dawn, the veteran landing
force stirred. Five infantry regiments
looked north; a sixth turned to the
business at hand in the south: Mount
Suribachi.</p>
</div>
<div class="sidebar">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_10_The_Assault_Commanders_at_Iwo_Jima" id="Sidebar_page_10_The_Assault_Commanders_at_Iwo_Jima"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_9">page 10</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Assault Commanders at Iwo Jima</h3>
<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Four</span> veteran Marine major generals
led the sustained assault
on Iwo Jima: Harry Schmidt,
Commanding General, V Amphibious
Corps; Graves B. Erskine, CG, 3d Marine
Division; Clifton B. Cates, CG, 4th
Marine Division; and Keller E. Rockey,
CG, 5th Marine Division. Each
would receive the Distinguished Service
Medal for inspired combat leadership
in this epic battle.</p>
<div id="ip_9b" class="figright" style="width: 244px;">
<div class="caption top"><p><i>MajGen Harry Schmidt, USMC</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 11180<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_012.jpg" width-obs="244" height-obs="287" alt="" /></div>
<p>General Schmidt was 58 at Iwo Jima
and had served the Corps for 36 years.
He was a native of Holdrege, Nebraska,
and attended Nebraska Normal
College. Expeditionary assignments
kept him from service in World War I,
but Schmidt saw considerable small
unit action in Guam, China, the Philippines,
Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua,
plus four years at sea. He attended the
Army Command and General Staff
College and the Marine Corps Field
Officers’ Course. In World War II,
General Schmidt commanded the 4th
Marine Division in the Roi-Namur and
Saipan operations, then assumed command
of V Amphibious Corps for the
Tinian landing. At Iwo Jima he would
command the largest force of Marines
ever committed to a single battle. “It
was the highest honor of my life,” he
said.</p>
<div id="if_i_012a" class="figleft" style="width: 247px;">
<div class="caption top"><p><i>MajGen Graves B. Erskine, USMC</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Marine Corps Historical Collection<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_012a.jpg" width-obs="247" height-obs="287" alt="" /></div>
<p>General Erskine was 47 at Iwo Jima,
one of the youngest major generals in
the Corps. He had served 28 years on
active duty by that time. A native of
Columbia, Louisiana, he graduated
from Louisiana State University,
received a Marine Corps commission,
and immediately deployed overseas for
duty in World War I. As a platoon
commander in the 6th Marines, Erskine
saw combat at Belleau Wood, Chateau-Thierry,
Soissons, and St. Mihiel, during
which he was twice wounded and
awarded the Silver Star. In the inter-war
years he served in Haiti, Santo
Domingo, Nicaragua, Cuba, and China.
He attended the Army Infantry
School and the Army Command and
General Staff College. In World War II,
Erskine was chief of staff to General
Holland M. Smith during campaigns in
the Aleutians, Gilberts, Marshalls, and
Marianas. He assumed command of
the 3d Marine Division in October
1944.</p>
<div id="if_i_012b" class="figright" style="width: 247px;">
<div class="caption top"><p><i>MajGen Clifton B. Cates, USMC</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 38595<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_012b.jpg" width-obs="247" height-obs="287" alt="" /></div>
<p>General Cates, 51 at Iwo, had also
served the Corps during the previous
28 years. He was one of the few Marine
Corps general officers who held
combat command at the platoon, company,
battalion, regiment, and division
levels in his career. Cates was born in
Tiptonville, Tennessee, and attended
the University of Tennessee. In World
War I, he served as a junior officer in
the 6th Marines at Belleau Wood, Soissons,
St. Mihiel, and Blanc Mont, and
was awarded the Navy Cross, two Silver
Stars, and two Purple Hearts for
his service and his wounds. Between
wars, he served at sea and twice in China.
He attended the Army Industrial
College, the Senior Course at Marine
Corps Schools, and the Army War College.
In World War II he commanded
the 1st Marines at Guadalcanal and the
4th Marine Division at Tinian. Three
years after Iwo Jima, General Cates became
the 19th Commandant of the Marine
Corps.</p>
<div id="if_i_012c" class="figleft" style="width: 246px;">
<div class="caption top"><p><i>MajGen Keller E. Rockey, USMC</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A32295<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_012c.jpg" width-obs="246" height-obs="287" alt="" /></div>
<p>General Rockey was 56 at Iwo Jima
and a veteran of 31 years of service to
the Corps. He was born in Columbia
City, Indiana, graduated from Gettysburg
College, and studied at Yale. Like
his fellow division commanders, Rockey
served in France in World War I. He
was awarded the Navy Cross as a
junior officer in the 5th Marines at
Chateau-Thierry. A second Navy Cross
came later for heroic service in
Nicaragua. He also served in Haiti and
two years at sea. He attended the Field
Officers’ Course at Quantico and the
Army Command and General Staff
Course. He spent the first years of
World War II at Headquarters Marine
Corps in Washington, first as Director,
Division of Plans and Policies, then as
Assistant Commandant. In February
1944 General Rockey assumed command
of the 5th Marine Division and
began preparing the new organization
for its first, and last, great battle of the
war.</p>
<p>Three Marine brigadier generals also
played significant roles in the amphibious
seizure of Iwo Jima: William W.
Rogers, corps chief of staff; Franklin A.
Hart, assistant division commander,
4th Marine Division; and Leo D.
Hermle, assistant division commander,
5th Marine Division.</p>
</div>
<hr /></div>
<h2><SPAN name="Suribachi" id="Suribachi"></SPAN><i>Suribachi</i></h2>
<p>The Japanese called the dormant
volcano Suribachi-yama; the Marines
dubbed it “Hotrocks.” From the start
the Marines knew their drive north
would never succeed without first
seizing that hulking rock dominating
the southern plain. “Suribachi
seemed to take on a life of its own,
to be watching these men, looming
over them,” recalled one observer, adding
“the mountain represented to
these Marines a thing more evil than
the Japanese.”</p>
<p>Colonel Kanehiko Atsuchi commanded
the 2,000 soldiers and sailors
of the Suribachi garrison. The
Japanese had honeycombed the
mountain with gun positions,
machine-gun nests, observation sites,
and tunnels, but Atsuchi had lost
many of his large-caliber guns in the
direct naval bombardment of the
preceding three days. General
Kuribayashi considered Atsuchi’s
command to be semiautonomous,
realizing the invaders would soon cut
communications across the island’s
narrow southern tip. Kuribayashi
nevertheless hoped Suribachi could
hold out for 10 days, maybe two
weeks.</p>
<p>Some of Suribachi’s stoutest
defenses existed down low, around
the rubble-strewn base. Here nearly
70 camouflaged concrete blockhouses
protected the approaches to the
mountain; another 50 bulged from
the slopes within the first hundred
feet of elevation. Then came the
caves, the first of hundreds the Marines
would face on Iwo Jima.</p>
<p>The 28th Marines had suffered
nearly 400 casualties in cutting across
the neck of the island on D-day. On
D+1, in a cold rain, they prepared
to assault the mountain. Lieutenant
Colonel Chandler Johnson, commanding
the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines,
set the tone for the morning as
he deployed his tired troops forward:
“It’s going to be a hell of a day in a
hell of a place to fight the damned
war!” Some of the 105mm batteries
of the 13th Marines opened up in
support, firing directly overhead.
Gun crews fired from positions hastily
dug in the black sand directly next
to the 28th Marines command post.
Regimental Executive Officer Lieutenant
Colonel Robert H. Williams
watched the cannoneers fire at Suribachi
“eight hundred yards away
over open sights.”</p>
<div id="ip_20" class="figcenter" style="width: 428px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>A dug-in Marine 81mm mortar crew places continuous fire on Japanese positions
around the slopes of Mount Suribachi preparatory to the attack of the 28th Marines.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109861<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_022.jpg" width-obs="428" height-obs="325" alt="" /></div>
<p>As the Marines would learn during
their drive north, even 105mm
howitzers would hardly shiver the
concrete pillboxes of the enemy. As
the prep fire lifted, the infantry leapt
forward, only to run immediately<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</SPAN></span>
into very heavy machine-gun and
mortar fire. Colonel Harry B. “Harry
the Horse” Liversedge bellowed for
his tanks. But the 5th Tank Battalion
was already having a frustrating
morning. The tankers sought a
defilade spot in which to rearm and
refuel for the day’s assault. Such a location
did not exist on Iwo Jima
those first days. Every time the tanks
congregated to service their vehicles
they were hit hard by Japanese mortar
and artillery fire from virtually
the entire island. Getting sufficient
vehicles serviced to join the assault
took most of the morning. Hereafter
the tankers would maintain and re-equip
their vehicles at night.</p>
<div id="ip_21" class="figcenter" style="width: 647px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_023.jpg" width-obs="647" height-obs="481" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Colonel William P. McCahill Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>The crew of the Sherman tank “Cairo” awaits a repair crew
to replace its tread after it hit a Japanese mine. Note wooden
sheathing on sides of vehicle to protect against magnetic
mines. Damaged vehicles became prime enemy targets.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>This day’s slow start led to more
setbacks for the tankers; Japanese antitank
gunners hiding in the jumbled
boulders knocked out the first approaching
Shermans. Assault
momentum slowed further. The 28th
Marines overran 40 strongpoints and
gained roughly 200 yards all day.
They lost a Marine for every yard
gained. The tankers unknowingly
redeemed themselves when one of
their final 75mm rounds caught
Colonel Atsuchi as he peered out of
a cave entrance, killing him instantly.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, the morning light on
D+1 revealed the discouraging sights
of the chaos created along the
beaches by the combination of Iwo
Jima’s wicked surf and Kuribayashi’s
unrelenting barrages. In the words of
one dismayed observer:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The wreckage was indescribable.
For two miles the debris
was so thick that there were
only a few places where landing
craft could still get in. The
wrecked hulls of scores of landing
boats testified to one price
we had to pay to put our troops
ashore. Tanks and half-tracks
lay crippled where they had
bogged down in the coarse
sand. Amphibian tractors, victims
of mines and well-aimed
shells, lay flopped on their
backs. Cranes, brought ashore
to unload cargo, tilted at insane
angles, and bulldozers were
smashed in their own
roadways.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Bad weather set in, further compounding
the problems of general
unloading. Strong winds whipped
sea swells into a nasty chop; the surf
turned uglier. These were the conditions<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</SPAN></span>
faced by Lieutenant Colonel
Carl A. Youngdale in trying to land
the 105mm-howitzer batteries of his
4th Battalion, 14th Marines. All 12
of these guns were preloaded in
DUKWs, one to a vehicle. Added to
the amphibious trucks’ problems of
marginal seaworthiness with that
payload was contaminated fuel. As
Youngdale watched in horror, eight
DUKWs suffered engine failures,
swamped, and sank with great loss
of life. Two more DUKWs broached
in the surf zone, spilling their invaluable
guns into deep water. At length
Youngdale managed to get his remaining
two guns ashore and into
firing position.</p>
<div id="ip_22" class="figcenter" style="width: 423px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_024.jpg" width-obs="423" height-obs="280" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110319</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Like some recently killed prehistoric monsters, these LVTs lie on their sides, completely
destroyed on the beach by Japanese mines and heavy artillery fire.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>General Schmidt also committed
one battery of 155mm howitzers of
the corps artillery to the narrow
beachhead on D+1. Somehow these
weapons managed to reach the beach
intact, but it then took hours to get
tractors to drag the heavy guns up
over the terraces. These, too, commenced
firing before dark, their deep
bark a welcome sound to the infantry.</p>
<p>Concern with the heavy casualties
in the first 24 hours led Schmidt to
commit the 21st Marines from corps
reserve. The seas proved to be too
rough. The troops had harrowing experiences
trying to debark down cargo
nets into the small boats bobbing
violently alongside the transports;
several fell into the water. The boating
process took hours. Once afloat,
the troops circled endlessly in their
small Higgins boats, waiting for the
call to land. Wiser heads prevailed.
After six hours of awful seasickness,
the 21st Marines returned to its ships
for the night.</p>
<p>Even the larger landing craft, the
LCTs and LSMs, had great difficulty
beaching. Sea anchors needed to
maintain the craft perpendicular to
the breakers rarely held fast in the
steep, soft bottom. “Dropping those
stern anchors was like dropping a
spoon in a bowl of mush,” said Admiral
Hill.</p>
<p>Hill contributed significantly to the
development of amphibious expertise
in the Pacific War. For Iwo Jima, he
and his staff developed armored bulldozers
to land in the assault waves.
They also experimented with hinged
Marston matting, used for expeditionary
airfields, as a temporary
roadway to get wheeled vehicles over
soft sand. On the beach at Iwo, the
bulldozers proved to be worth their
weights in gold. The Marston matting
was only partially successful—LVTs
kept chewing it up in passage—but
all hands could see its
potential.</p>
<div id="ip_22b" class="figcenter" style="width: 430px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>“Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,” acrylic on masonite, is by Col Charles
H. Waterhouse, wounded in his arm on D+2 and evacuated from Iwo Jima.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Marine Corps Combat Art Collection<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_024a.jpg" width-obs="430" height-obs="281" alt="" /></div>
<p>Admiral Hill also worked with the
Naval Construction Battalion (NCB)
personnel, Seabees, as they were
called, in the attempt to bring supply-laden
causeways and pontoon barges
ashore. Again the surf prevailed,
broaching the craft, spilling the cargo.
In desperation, Hill’s beachmasters
turned to round-the-clock
use of DUKWs and LVTs to keep
combat cargo flowing. Once the<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</SPAN></span>
DUKWs got free of the crippling load
of 105mm howitzers they did fine.
LVTs were probably better, because
they could cross the soft beach
without assistance and conduct
resupply or medevac missions directly
along the front lines. Both vehicles
suffered from inexperienced LST
crews in the transport area who too
often would not lower their bow
ramps to accommodate LVTs or
DUKWs approaching after dark. In
too many cases, vehicles loaded with
wounded Marines thus rejected became
lost in the darkness, ran out of
gas and sank. The amphibian tractor
battalions lost 148 LVTs at Iwo
Jima. Unlike Tarawa, Japanese gunfire
and mines accounted for less than
20 percent of this total. Thirty-four
LVTs fell victim to Iwo’s crushing
surf; 88 sank in deep water, mostly
at night.</p>
<p>Once ashore and clear of the loose
sand along the beaches, the tanks,
half-tracks, and armored bulldozers
of the landing force ran into the
strongest minefield defenses yet encountered
in the Pacific War. Under
General Kuribayashi’s direction,
Japanese engineers had planted irregular
rows of antitank mines and
the now-familiar horned antiboat
mines along all possible exits from
both beaches. The Japanese supplemented
these weapons by rigging
enormous makeshift explosives from
500-pound aerial bombs, depth
charges, and torpedo heads, each
triggered by an accompanying pressure
mine. Worse, Iwo’s loose soil retained
enough metallic characteristics
to render the standard mine detectors
unreliable. The Marines were
reduced to using their own engineers
on their hands and knees out in front
of the tanks, probing for mines with
bayonets and wooden sticks.</p>
<p>While the 28th Marines fought to
encircle Suribachi and the beachmasters
and shore party attempted to
clear the wreckage from the beaches,
the remaining assault units of the
VAC resumed their collective assault
against Airfield No. 1. In the 5th Marine
Division’s zone, the relatively
fresh troops of the 1st Battalion, 26th
Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 27th
Marines, quickly became bloodied in
forcing their way across the western
runways, taking heavy casualties
from time-fuzed air bursts fired by
Japanese dual-purpose antiaircraft
guns zeroed along the exposed
ground. In the adjacent 4th Division
zone, the 23d Marines completed the
capture of the airstrip, advancing 800
yards but sustaining high losses.</p>
<div id="ip_23" class="figcenter" style="width: 434px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_025.jpg" width-obs="434" height-obs="228" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Marine Corps Historical Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Marines advance warily on Airfield No. 1 towards wrecked Japanese planes in
which enemy snipers are suspected of hiding. The assault quickly moved on.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Some of the bitterest fighting in the
initial phase of the landing continued
to occur along the high ground above
the Rock Quarry on the right flank.
Here the 25th Marines, reinforced by
the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, engaged
in literally the fight of its life.
The Marines found the landscape,
and the Japanese embedded in it,
unreal:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There was no cover from enemy
fire. Japs dug in reinforced
concrete pillboxes laid down interlocking
bands of fire that cut
whole companies to ribbons.
Camouflage hid all enemy positions.
The high ground on
either side was honeycombed
with layer after layer of Jap emplacements....
Their observation
was perfect; whenever a
Marine made a move, the Japs
would smother the area in a
murderous blanket of fire.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The second day of the battle had
proven unsatisfactory on virtually
every front. To cap off the frustration,
when the 1st Battalion, 24th
Marines, finally managed a breakthrough
along the cliffs late in the
day their only reward was two back-to-back
cases of “friendly fire.” An
American air strike inflicted 11
casualties; misguided salvos from an
unidentified gunfire support ship
took down 90 more. Nothing seemed
to be going right.</p>
<p>The morning of the third day,
D+2, seemed to promise more of the
same frustrations. Marines shivered
in the cold wind and rain; Admiral
Hill twice had to close the beach due
to high surf and dangerous undertows.
But during one of the grace
periods, the 3d Division’s 21st Marines
managed to come ashore, all of
it extremely glad to be free of the
heaving small boats. General
Schmidt assigned it to the 4th Marine
Division at first.</p>
<p>The 28th Marines resumed its assault
on the base of Suribachi, more
slow, bloody fighting, seemingly
boulder by boulder. On the west
coast, the 1st Battalion, 28th Marines,
made the most of field artillery
and naval gunfire support to reach
the shoulder of the mountain. Elsewhere,
murderous Japanese fire restricted<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</SPAN></span>
any progress to a matter of
yards. Enemy mortar fire from all
over the volcano rained down on the
2d Battalion, 28th Marines, trying to
advance along the eastern shore.
Recalled rifleman Richard Wheeler of
the experience, “It was terrible, the
worst I can remember us taking. The
Jap mortarmen seemed to be playing
checkers and using us as squares.”
The Marines used Weasels, handy little
tracked vehicles making their first
field appearance in this battle, to hustle
forward flame-thrower canisters
and evacuate some of the many
wounded.</p>
<div id="ip_24" class="figcenter" style="width: 432px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_026.jpg" width-obs="432" height-obs="249" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Colonel William P. McCahill Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Flamethrower teams look like futuristic fighters as they leave their assembly area
heading for the front lines. The casualty rate for flamethrower operators was high,
since they were prime targets for Japanese fire because of the profile they had with
the flamethrowers strapped to their backs. When they fell, others took their places.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>That night the amphibious task
force experienced the only significant
air attack of the battle. Fifty
<i>kamikaze</i> pilots from the <i>22d Mitate
Special Attack Unit</i> left Katori Airbase
near Yokosuka and flung themselves
against the ships on the outer
perimeter of Iwo Jima. In desperate
action that would serve as a prelude
to Okinawa’s fiery engagements, the
<i>kamikazes</i> sank the escort carrier <i>Bismarck
Sea</i> with heavy loss of life and
damaged several other ships, including
the veteran <i>Saratoga</i>, finally
knocked out of the war. All 50
Japanese planes were expended.</p>
<p>It rained even harder on the fourth
morning, D+3. Marines scampering
forward under fire would hit the
deck, roll, attempt to return fire—only
to discover that the loose volcanic
grit had combined with the rain
to jam their weapons. The 21st Marines,
as the vanguard of the 3d Marine
Division, hoped for good
fortune in its initial commitment after
relieving the 23d Marines. The
regiment instead ran headlong into
an intricate series of Japanese emplacements
which marked the
southeastern end of the main
Japanese defenses. The newcomers
fought hard all day to scratch and
claw an advance of 200 net yards.
Casualties were disproportionate.</p>
<div id="ip_24b" class="figcenter" style="width: 429px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>In the attack of the 28th Marines on the dominating height, a 37mm guncrew fires
at caves at the foot of Suribachi suspected of holding Japanese gun positions.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110139<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_026a.jpg" width-obs="429" height-obs="285" alt="" /></div>
<p>On the right flank, Lieutenant
Colonel Chambers continued to rally
the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines,
through the rough pinnacles above
the Rock Quarry. As he strode about
directing the advance of his decimated
companies that afternoon, a
Japanese gunner shot him through
the chest. Chambers went down
hard, thinking it was all over:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I started fading in and out. I
don’t remember too much
about it except the frothy blood
gushing out of my mouth....
Then somebody started kicking
the hell out of my feet. It was
[Captain James] Headley saying,
“Get up, you were hurt
worse on Tulagi!”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Captain Headley knew Chambers’
sucking chest wound portended a
grave injury; he sought to reduce his
commander’s shock until they could
get him out of the line of fire. This
took doing. Lieutenant Michael F.
Keleher, USNR, now the battalion
surgeon, crawled forward with one
of his corpsmen. Willing hands lifted
Chambers on a stretcher. Keleher<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</SPAN></span>
and several others, bent double
against the fire, carried him down the
cliffs to the aid station and eventually
on board a DUKW making the
evening’s last run out to the hospital
ships. All three battalion commanders
in the 25th Marines had
now become casualties. Chambers
would survive to receive the Medal
of Honor; Captain Headley would
command the shot-up 3d Battalion,
25th Marines, for the duration of the
battle.</p>
<div id="ip_25" class="figcenter" style="width: 427px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_027.jpg" width-obs="427" height-obs="241" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110177</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>From the time of the landing on Iwo Jima, attacking Marines seemed to be moving
uphill constantly. This scene is located between Purple Beach and Airfield No. 2.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ip_25b" class="figcenter" style="width: 652px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>A lone Marine covers the left flank of a patrol as it works
its way up the slopes of Mount Suribachi. It was from this
vantage point on the enemy-held height that Japanese gunners
and observers had a clear view of the landing beaches.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A419744<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_027a.jpg" width-obs="652" height-obs="527" alt="" /></div>
<p>By contrast, the 28th Marines on
D+3 made commendable progress
against Suribachi, reaching the
shoulder at all points. Late in the day
combat patrols from the 1st Battalion,<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</SPAN></span>
28th Marines, and the 2d Battalion,
28th Marines, linked up at
Tobiishi Point at the southern tip of
the island. Recon patrols returned to
tell Lieutenant Colonel Johnson that
they found few signs of live Japanese
along the mountain’s upper slopes on
the northside.</p>
<p>At sundown Admiral Spruance
authorized Task Force 58 to strike
Honshu and Okinawa, then retire to
Ulithi to prepare for the Ryukyuan
campaign. All eight Marine Corps
fighter squadrons thus left the Iwo
Jima area for good. Navy pilots flying
off the 10 remaining escort carriers
would pick up the slack.
Without slighting the skill and valor
of these pilots, the quality of close
air support to the troops fighting
ashore dropped off after this date.
The escort carriers, for one thing,
had too many competing missions,
namely combat air patrols, anti-submarine
sweeps, searches for
downed aviators, harassing strikes
against neighboring Chichi Jima.
Marines on Iwo Jima complained of
slow response time to air support requests,
light payloads (rarely greater
than 100-pound bombs), and high
delivery altitudes (rarely below 1,500
feet). The Navy pilots did deliver a
number of napalm bombs. Many of
these failed to detonate, although this
was not the fault of the aviators; the
early napalm “bombs” were simply
old wing-tanks filled with the mixture,
activated by unreliable detonators.
The Marines also grew
concerned about these notoriously
inaccurate area weapons being
dropped from high altitudes.</p>
<p>By Friday, 23 February (D+4), the
28th Marines stood poised to complete
the capture of Mount Suribachi.
The honor went to the 3d Platoon
(reinforced), Company E, 2d Battalion,
28th Marines, under the command
of First Lieutenant Harold G.
Schrier, the company executive
officer. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson
ordered Schrier to scale the summit,
secure the crater, and raise a 54″×28″
American flag for all to see. Schrier
led his 40-man patrol forward at
0800. The regiment had done its job,
blasting the dozens of pillboxes with
flame and demolitions, rooting out
snipers, knocking out the masked
batteries. The combined-arms
pounding by planes, field pieces, and
naval guns the past week had likewise
taken its toll on the defenders.
Those who remained popped out of
holes and caves to resist Schrier’s advance
only to be cut down. The Marines
worked warily up the steep
northern slope, sometimes resorting
to crawling on hands and knees.</p>
<p>Part of the enduring drama of the
Suribachi flag-raising was the fact
that it was observed by so many people.
Marines all over the island could
track the progress of the tiny column
of troops during its ascent (“those
guys oughta be getting flight pay,”
said one wag). Likewise, hundreds of
binoculars from the ships offshore
watched Schrier’s Marines climbing
ever upward. Finally they reached the
top and momentarily disappeared
from view. Those closest to the volcano
could hear distant gunfire.
Then, at 1020, there was movement
on the summit; suddenly the Stars
and Stripes fluttered bravely.</p>
<p>Lusty cheers rang out from all over
the southern end of the island. The
ships sounded their sirens and whistles.
Wounded men propped themselves
up on their litters to glimpse
the sight. Strong men wept unashamedly.
Navy Secretary Forrestal,
thrilled by the sight, turned to Holland
Smith and said, “the raising of
that flag means a Marine Corps for
another five hundred years.”</p>
<p>Three hours later an even larger
flag went up to more cheers. Few
would know that Associated Press
photographer Joe Rosenthal had just
captured the embodiment of the
American warfighting spirit on film.
<i>Leatherneck</i> magazine photographer
Staff Sergeant Lou Lowery had taken
a picture of the first flag-raising and
almost immediately got in a firefight
with a couple of enraged Japanese.
His photograph would become a
valued collector’s item. But Rosenthal’s
would enthrall the free world.</p>
<p>Captain Thomas M. Fields, commanding
Company D, 1st Battalion,
26th Marines, heard his men yell
“Look up there!” and turned in time
to see the first flag go up. His first
thought dealt with the battle still at
hand: “Thank God the Japs won’t be
shooting us down from behind any
more.” Meanwhile, the 14th Marines
rushed their echo and flash-ranging
equipment up to the summit. The
landing force sorely needed enhanced
counterbattery fire against
Kuribayashi’s big guns to the north.</p>
<p>The Marines who raised the first
flag were Lieutenant Schrier; Platoon
Sergeant Ernest T. Thomas, Jr.; Sergeant
Henry O. Hansen; Corporal
Charles W. Lindberg; and Privates
First Class Louis C. Charlo and
James Michels. The six men immortalized
by Joe Rosenthal’s photograph
of the second flag-raising were Sergeant
Michael Strank, Pharmacist’s
Mate 2/c John H. Bradley, Corporal
Harlon H. Block, and Privates First
Class Ira H. Hayes, Franklin R. Sousley,
and Rene A. Gagnon.</p>
<p>The 28th Marines took Suribachi
in three days at the cost of more than
500 troops (added to its D-day losses
of 400 men). Colonel Liversedge
began to reorient his regiment for
operations in the opposite direction,
northward. Unknown to all, the battle
still had another month to run its
bloody course.</p>
</div>
<div class="sidebar">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_26_Rosenthals_Photograph_of_Iwo_Jima_Flag-Raising" id="Sidebar_page_26_Rosenthals_Photograph_of_Iwo_Jima_Flag-Raising"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_25">page 26</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">Rosenthal’s Photograph of Iwo Jima Flag-Raising Quickly Became One of the War’s Most Famous</h3>
<div id="if_i_028" class="figright" style="width: 450px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>The six men who participated in the second or “famous”
flag-raising on Mount Suribachi were Marines, joined by
a medical corpsman. They were Sgt Michael Strank; Pharmacist’s
Mate 2/c John H. Bradley, USN; Cpl Harlon H.
Block; and PFCs Ira H. Hayes, Franklin R. Sousley, and
Rene A. Gagnon. AP photographer Joe Rosenthal recalls
stumbling on the picture accidentally: “I swung my camera
around and held it until I could guess that this was the peak
of the action, and shot.... Had I posed that shot, I would,
of course, have ruined it.... I would have also made
them turn their heads so that they could be identified ...
and nothing like the existing picture would have resulted.”</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Associated Press<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_028.jpg" width-obs="450" height-obs="564" alt="" /></div>
<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">There</span> were two flags raised over Mount Suribachi
on Iwo Jima, but not at the same time. Despite
the beliefs of many, and contrary to the supposed
evidence, none of the photographs of the two flag-raisings
was posed. To begin with, early on the morning of 23
February 1945, four days after the initial landings, Captain
Dave E. Severance, the commander of Company E, 2d
Battalion, 28th Marines, ordered Lieutenant Harold G.
Schrier to take a patrol and an American flag to the top
of Suribachi. Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, a <i>Leatherneck</i>
magazine photographer, accompanied the patrol. After
a short fire fight, the 54″-by-28″ flag was attached to a
long piece of pipe, found at the crest of the mountain, and
raised. This is the flag-raising which Lowery photographed.
As the flag was thought to be too small to be seen from
the beach below, another Marine from the battalion went
on board <i>LST 779</i> to obtain a larger flag. A second patrol
then took this flag up to Suribachi’s top and Joe Rosenthal,
an Associated Press photographer, who had just come
ashore, accompanied it.</p>
<p>As Rosenthal noted in his oral history interview, “...
my stumbling on that picture was, in all respects, accidental.”
When he got to the top of the mountain, he stood in
a decline just below the crest of the hill with Marine Sergeant
William Genaust, a movie cameraman who was killed
later in the campaign, watching while a group of five Marines
and a Navy corpsman fastened the new flag to another
piece of pipe. Rosenthal said that he turned from Genaust
and out of the corner of his eye saw the second flag being
raised. He said, “Hey, Bill. There it goes.” He continued:
“I swung my camera around and held it until I could guess
that this was the peak of the action, and shot.”</p>
<p>Some people learned that Rosenthal’s photograph was
of a second flag-raising and made the accusation that it was
posed. Joe Rosenthal: “Had I posed that shot, I would, of
course, have ruined it.... I would have also made them
turn their heads so that they could be identified for [Associated
Press] members throughout the country, and nothing
like the existing picture would have resulted.”</p>
<p>Later in the interview, he said: “This picture, what it
means to me—and it has a meaning to me—that has to be
peculiar only to me ... I see all that blood running down
the sand. I see those awful, impossible positions to take
in a frontal attack on such an island, where the batteries
opposing you are not only staggered up in front of you,
but also standing around at the sides as you’re coming on
shore. The awesome situation, before they ever reach that
peak. Now, that a photograph can serve to remind us of
the contribution of those boys—that was what made it important,
not who took it.”</p>
<p>Rosenthal took 18 photographs that day, went down to
the beach to write captions for his undeveloped film packs,
and, as the other photographers on the island, sent his films
out to the command vessel offshore. From there they were
flown to Guam, where the headquarters of Admiral Chester
W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet/Commander
in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, was situated, and where the
photos were processed and censored. Rosenthal’s pictures
arrived at Guam before Lowery’s, were processed, sent to
the States for distribution, and his flag-raising picture became
one of the most famous photographs ever taken in
the war, or in any war.—<i>Benis M. Frank</i></p>
</div>
<hr /></div>
<h2><SPAN name="The_Drive_North" id="The_Drive_North"></SPAN><i>The Drive North</i></h2>
<p>The landing force still had much
to learn about its opponent. Senior
intelligence officers did not realize until
27 February, the ninth day of the
battle, that General Kuribayashi was
in fact on Iwo Jima, or that his fighters
actually numbered half again the
original estimate of 13,000.</p>
<p>For Kuribayashi, the unexpectedly
early loss of the Suribachi garrison
represented a setback, yet he
occupied a position of great strength.<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</SPAN></span>
He still had the equivalent of eight
infantry battalions, a tank regiment,
two artillery and three heavy mortar
battalions, plus the 5,000 gunners
and naval infantry under his counterpart,
Rear Admiral Toshinosuke
Ichimaru. Unlike other besieged garrisons
in the Central Pacific, the two
Japanese services on Iwo Jima functioned
well together.</p>
<div id="ip_28" class="figcenter" style="width: 429px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_030.jpg" width-obs="429" height-obs="206" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Marine Corps Historical Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Marine half-track scores a hit on a Japanese strongpoint with its 75mm gun.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Kuribayashi was particularly
pleased with the quality of his artillery
and engineering troops.
Colonel Chosaku Kaido served as
Chief of Artillery from his seemingly
impregnable concrete blockhouse
on a promontory on the east central
sector of the Motoyama Plateau, a
lethal landmark the Marines soon
dubbed “Turkey Knob.” Major General
Sadasue Senda, a former artillery
officer with combat experience in
China and Manchuria, commanded
the <i>2d Independent Mixed Brigade</i>,
whose main units would soon be
locked into a 25-day death struggle
with the 4th Marine Division.
Kuribayashi knew that the <i>204th
Naval Construction Battalion</i> had
built some of the most daunting
defensive systems on the island in
that sector. One cave had a tunnel
800 feet long with 14 separate exits;
it was one of hundreds designed to
be defended in depth.</p>
<p>The Japanese defenders waiting for
the advance of the V Amphibious
Corps were well armed and confident.
Occasionally Kuribayashi
authorized company-sized spoiling
attacks to recapture lost terrain or
disrupt enemy assault preparations.
These were not suicidal or sacrificial.
Most were preceded by stinging artillery
and mortar fires and aimed at
limited objectives. Kuribayashi’s iron
will kept his troops from large-scale,
wasteful <i>Banzai</i> attacks until the last
days. One exception occurred the
night of 8 March when General Senda
grew so frustrated at the tightening
noose being applied by the 4th
Marine Division that he led 800 of
his surviving troops in a ferocious
counterattack. Finally given a multitude
of open targets, the Marines
cut them down in a lingering melee.</p>
<p>For the first week of the drive
north, the Japanese on Iwo Jima actually
had the attacking Marines outgunned.
Japanese 150mm howitzers
and 120mm mortars were superior to
most of the weapons of the landing
force. The Marines found the enemy
direct fire weapons to be equally
deadly, especially the dual-purpose
antiaircraft guns and the 47mm tank
guns, buried and camouflaged up to
their turrets. “The Japs could <i>snipe</i>
with those big guns,” said retired
Lieutenant General Donn J. Robertson.
The defenders also had the advantage
of knowing the ground.</p>
<div id="ip_28b" class="figcenter" style="width: 428px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>The drive north by the 3d Battalion, 28th Marines, enters rugged terrain. Under
heavy Japanese fire, this attack netted only 200 yards despite supporting fires.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111988<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_030a.jpg" width-obs="428" height-obs="219" alt="" /></div>
<p>Not surprisingly, most casualties in
the first three weeks of the battle
resulted from high explosives: mortars,
artillery, mines, grenades, and
the hellacious rocket bombs. <i>Time</i>
correspondent Robert Sherrod
reported that the dead at Iwo Jima,
both Japanese and American, had
one thing in common: “They all died
with the greatest possible violence.
Nowhere in the Pacific War had I
seen such badly mangled bodies.
Many were cut squarely in half.”</p>
<p>Close combat was rough enough;
on Iwo Jima the stress seemed endless
because for a long time the Marines
had no secure “rear area” in
which to give shot-up troop units a
respite. Kuribayashi’s gunners
throughout the Motoyama Plateau
could still bracket the beaches and
airfields. The enormous spigot mortar
shells and rocket bombs still came
tumbling out of the sky. Japanese infiltrators
were drawn to “softer targets”<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</SPAN></span>
in the rear. Anti-personnel
mines and booby traps, encountered
here on a large scale for the first time
in the Pacific, seemed everywhere.
Exhausted troop units would stumble
out of the front lines seeking
nothing more than a helmet-full of
water in which to bathe and a deep
hole in which to sleep. Too often the
men had to spend their rare rest periods
repairing weapons, humping
ammo, dodging major-caliber incoming,
or having to repel yet another
nocturnal Japanese probe.</p>
<p>General Schmidt planned to attack
the Japanese positions in the north
with three divisions abreast, the 5th
on the left, the 3d (less the 3d Marines)
in the center, and the 4th on
the right, along the east coast. The
drive north officially began on D+5,
the day after the capture of Suribachi.
Prep fires along the high
ground immediately north of the second
airfield extended for a full hour.
Then three regimental combat teams
moved out abreast, the 26th Marines
on the left, the 24th Marines on the
right, and the 21st Marines again in
the middle. For this attack, General
Schmidt consolidated the Sherman
tanks of all three divisions into one
armored task force commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel William R. “Rip”
Collins. It would be the largest concentration
of Marine tanks in the
war, virtually an armored regiment.
The attack plan seemed solid.</p>
<p>The Marines soon realized they
were now trying to force passage
through Kuribayashi’s main defensive
belt. The well-coordinated attack degenerated
into desperate, small-unit
actions all along the front. The 26th
Marines on the left, aided by the
tanks, gained the most yardage, but
it was all relative. The airfield runways
proved to be lethal killing
zones. Marine tanks were bedeviled
by mines and high-velocity direct fire
weapons all along the front. On the
right flank, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander
A. Vandegrift, Jr., son of the
Commandant, became a casualty.
Major Doyle A. Stout took command
of the 3d Battalion, 24th
Marines.</p>
<p>During the fighting on D+5,
General Schmidt took leave of Admiral
Hill and moved his command
post ashore from the amphibious
force flagship <i>Auburn</i> (AGC 10).
Colonel Howard N. Kenyon led his<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</SPAN></span>
9th Marines ashore and into a staging
area. With that, General Erskine
moved the command post of the 3d
Marine Division ashore; the 21st Marines
reverted to its parent command.
Erskine’s artillery regiment, the 12th
Marines under Lieutenant Colonel
Raymond F. Crist, Jr., continued to
land for the next several days.
Schmidt now had eight infantry regiments
committed. Holland Smith still
retained the 3d Marines in Expeditionary
Troops reserve. Schmidt
made the first of several requests to
Smith for release of this seasoned
outfit. The V Amphibious Corps had
already suffered 6,845 casualties.</p>
<div id="ip_30" class="figcenter" style="width: 654px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_032.jpg" width-obs="654" height-obs="483" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110604</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Expended shells and open ammunition boxes testify to the
heavy supporting fire this water-cooled, .30-caliber Browning
machine gun poured on the enemy as Marines advanced
in the furious and difficult battle for the heights of Suribachi.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>The next day, D+6, 25 February,
provided little relief in terms of
Japanese resistance. Small groups of
Marines, accompanied by tanks,
somehow made it across the runway,
each man harboring the inescapable
feeling he was alone in the middle of
a gigantic bowling alley. Sometimes
holding newly gained positions
across the runway proved more
deadly than the process of getting
there. Resupply became nearly impossible.
Tanks were invaluable;
many were lost.</p>
<p>Schmidt this day managed to get
on shore the rest of his corps artillery,
two battalions of 155mm howitzers
under Colonel John S. Letcher. Well-directed
fire from these heavier field
pieces eased some of the pressure. So
did call fire from the cruisers and destroyers
assigned to each maneuver
unit. But the Marines expressed disappointment
in their air support.
The 3d Marine Division complained
that the Navy’s assignment of eight
fighters and eight bombers on station
was “entirely inadequate.” By noon
on this date General Cates sent a
message to Schmidt requesting that
“the Strategic Air Force in the Marianas
replace Navy air support immediately.”
Colonel Vernon E. Megee,
now ashore as Air Commander Iwo
Jima and taking some of the heat
from frustrated division commanders,
blamed “those little spit-kit
Navy fighters up there, trying to
help, never enough, never where they
should be.”</p>
<p>In fairness, it is doubtful whether
any service could have provided effective
air support during the opening
days of the drive north. The Air
Liaison Parties with each regiment
played hell trying to identify and
mark targets, the Japanese maintained
masterful camouflage, frontline
units were often “eyeball-to-<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</SPAN></span>eyeball”
with the enemy, and the air
support request net was overloaded.
The Navy squadrons rising from the
decks of escort carriers improved
thereafter, to the extent that their
conflicting missions would permit.
Subsequent strikes featured heavier
bombs (up to five hundred pounds)
and improved response time. A week
later General Cates rated his air support
“entirely satisfactory.” The battle
of Iwo Jima, however, would
continue to frustrate all providers of
supporting arms; the Japanese almost
never assembled legitimate targets in
the open.</p>
<p>“The Japs weren’t <i>on</i> Iwo Jima,” said
Captain Fields of the 26th Marines,
“they were <i>in</i> Iwo Jima.”</p>
<p>Richard Wheeler, who survived
service with the 28th Marines and
later wrote two engrossing books
about the battle, pointed out this
phenomenon:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This was surely one of the
strangest battlefields in history,
with one side fighting wholly
above the ground and the other
operating almost wholly within
it. Throughout the battle,
American aerial observers marveled
at the fact that one side
of the field held thousands of
figures, either milling around or
in foxholes, while the other side
seemed deserted. The strangest
thing of all was that the two
contestants sometimes made
troop movements simultaneously
in the same territory, one
maneuvering on the surface and
the other using tunnels beneath.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As the Marines struggled to wrest
the second airfield from the Japanese,
the commanding terrain features rising
to the north caught their attention.
Some would become known by
their elevations (although there were
<i>three</i> Hill 362s on the island), but
others would take the personality
and nicknames assigned by the attackers.
Hence, the 4th Marine Division
would spend itself attacking
Hill 382, the “Amphitheater,” and
“Turkey Knob” (the whole bristling
complex became known as “The
Meatgrinder”). The 5th Division
would earn its spurs and lose most
of its invaluable cadre of veteran
leaders attacking Nishi Ridge and
Hills 362-A and 362-B, then end the
fighting in “The Gorge.” The 3d Division
would focus first on Hills Peter
and 199-Oboe, just north of the second
airfield, then the heavily fortified
Hill 362-C beyond the third
airstrip, and finally the moonscape
jungle of stone which would become
known as “Cushman’s Pocket.”</p>
<p>Lieutenant Colonel Robert E.
Cushman, Jr., a future Commandant,
commanded the 2d Battalion, 9th
Marines at Iwo Jima. Cushman and
his men were veterans of heavy fighting
in Guam, yet they were appalled
by their first sight of the battlefield.
Wrecked and burning Sherman tanks
dotted the airstrips, a stream of
casualties flowed to the rear, “the
machine-gun fire was terrific.” Cushman
mounted his troops on the surviving
tanks and roared across the
field. There they met the same
reverse-slope defenses which had
plagued the 21st Marines. Securing
the adjoining two small hills—Peter
and 199-Oboe—took the 3d Marine
Division three more days of intensely
bitter fighting.</p>
<p>General Schmidt, considering the
3d Division attack in the center to be
his main effort, provided priority fire
support from Corps artillery, and
directed the other two divisions to allocate
half their own regimental fire
support to the center. None of the
commanders was happy with this.
Neither the 4th Division, taking
heavy casualties in The Amphitheater
as it approached Hill 382, nor the
5th Division, struggling to seize Nishi
Ridge, wanted to dilute their organic
fire support. Nor was General Erskine
pleased with the results. The
main effort, he argued, should clearly
receive the main fire. Schmidt
never did solve this problem. His
Corps artillery was too light; he
needed twice as many battalions and
bigger guns—up to 8-inch howitzers,
which the Marine Corps had not yet
fielded. He had plenty of naval gunfire
support available and used it
abundantly, but unless the targets lay
in ravines facing to the sea he lost the
advantage of direct, observed fire.</p>
<div id="ip_31" class="figcenter" style="width: 432px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>“The Grenade,” an acrylic painting on canvas by Col Charles H. Waterhouse.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Marine Corps Combat Art Collection<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_033.jpg" width-obs="432" height-obs="312" alt="" /></div>
<p>Schmidt’s problems of fire support<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</SPAN></span>
distribution received some alleviation
on 26 February when two Marine
observation planes flew in from the
escort carrier <i>Wake Island</i>, the first
aircraft to land on Iwo’s recaptured
and still fire-swept main airstrip.
These were Stinson OY single-engine
observation planes, nicknamed
“Grasshoppers,” of Lieutenant Tom
Rozga’s Marine Observation Squadron
(VMO) 4, and they were followed
the next day by similar planes
from Lieutenant Roy G. Miller’s
VMO-5. The intrepid pilots of these
frail craft had already had an adventurous
time in the waters off Iwo
Jima. Several had been launched
precariously from the experimental
Brodie catapult on <i>LST 776</i>, “like a
peanut from a slingshot.” All 14 of
the planes of these two observation<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</SPAN></span>
squadrons would receive heavy
Japanese fire in battle, not only while
airborne but also while being serviced
on the airstrips as well. Yet these
two squadrons (and elements of
VMO-1) would fly nearly 600 missions
in support of all three divisions.
Few units contributed so much to the
eventual suppression of Kuribayashi’s
deadly artillery fire. In time the mere
presence of these small planes overhead
would influence Japanese gunners
to cease fire and button up
against the inevitable counterbattery
fire to follow. Often the pilots would
undertake pre-dawn or dusk missions
simply to extend this protective
“umbrella” over the troops, risky flying
given Iwo’s unlit fields and constant
enemy sniping from the adjacent
hills.</p>
<div id="ip_33" class="figcenter" style="width: 430px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_035.jpg" width-obs="430" height-obs="252" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110922</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>A Marine dashes past a fallen Japanese killed a short time earlier, all the
while himself a target of searching enemy fire, during heavy fighting in the north.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>The 4th Marine Division finally
seized Hill 382, the highest point
north of Suribachi, but continued to
take heavy casualties moving
through The Amphitheater against
Turkey Knob. The 5th Division overran
Nishi Ridge, then bloodied itself
against Hill 362-A’s intricate defenses.
Said Colonel Thomas A. Wornham,
commanding the 27th Marines, of
these defenses: “They had interlocking
bands of fire the likes of which
you never saw.” General Cates
redeployed the 28th Marines into this
slugfest. On 2 March a Japanese gunner
fired a high-velocity shell which
killed Lieutenant Colonel Chandler
Johnson immediately, one week after
his glorious seizure of Suribachi’s
summit. The 28th Marines captured
Hill 362-A at the cost of 200
casualties.</p>
<p>On the same day Lieutenant
Colonel Lowell E. English, commanding
the 2d Battalion, 21st Marines,
went down with a bullet
through his knee. English was bitter.
His battalion was being rotated to the
rear. “We had taken very heavy
casualties and were pretty well disorganized.
I had less than 300 men
left out of the 1200 I came ashore
with.” English then received orders to
turn his men around and plug a gap
in the front lines. “It was an impossible
order. I couldn’t move that disorganized
battalion a mile back north
in 30 minutes.” General Erskine did
not want excuses. “You tell that
damned English he’d better be there,”
he told the regimental commander.
English fired back, “You tell that son
of a bitch I will be there, and I was,
but my men were still half a mile behind
me and I got a blast through the
knee.”</p>
<p>On the left flank, the 26th Marines
mounted its most successful, and
bloodiest, attack of the battle, finally
seizing Hill 362-B. The day-long
struggle cost 500 Marine casualties
and produced five Medals of Honor.
For Captain Frank C. Caldwell, commanding
Company F, 1st Battalion,
26th Marines, it was the worst single
day of the battle. His company
suffered 47 casualties in taking the
hill, including the first sergeant and
the last of the original platoon commanders.</p>
<p>Overall, the first nine days of the
V Amphibious Corps drive north
had produced a net gain of about
4,000 yards at the staggering cost of
7,000 American casualties. Several of
the pitched battles—Airfield No. 2,
Hill 382, Hill 362-B, for example—would
of themselves warrant a
separate commemorative monograph.
The fighting in each case was
as savage and bloody as any in Marine
Corps history.</p>
<div id="ip_33b" class="figcenter" style="width: 204px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>“Fire in the Hole,” an acrylic painting on
untempered masonite by Col Charles
H. Waterhouse, reflects the extensive
use of TNT to blast Japanese caves.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Marine Corps Combat Art Collection<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_035a.jpg" width-obs="204" height-obs="302" alt="" /></div>
<p>This was the general situation
previously described at the unsuspected
“turning point” on 4 March
(D+13) when, despite sustaining
frightful losses, the Marines had
chewed through a substantial chunk
of Kuribayashi’s main defenses, forcing
the enemy commander to shift his
command post to a northern cave.<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</SPAN></span>
This was the afternoon the first crippled
B-29 landed. In terms of American
morale, it could not have come at
a better time. General Schmidt ordered
a general standdown on 5
March to enable the exhausted assault
forces a brief respite and the opportunity
to absorb some replacements.</p>
<div id="ip_34" class="figcenter" style="width: 651px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_036.jpg" width-obs="651" height-obs="416" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111933</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>The 3d Battalion, 28th Marines, finds the terrain on Iwo Jima
more broken and forbidding than the black sands of the
beaches as they advance in a frontal attack northward against
unremitting fire from determined Japanese troops.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>The issue of replacement troops
during the battle remains controversial
even half a century later. General
Schmidt, now faced with losses
approaching the equivalent of one
entire division, again urged General
Smith to release the 3d Marines.
While each division had been assigned
a replacement draft of several
thousand Marines, Schmidt
wanted the cohesion and combat experience
of Colonel James M. Stuart’s
regimental combat team. Holland
Smith believed that the replacement
drafts would suffice, presuming that
each man in these hybrid units had
received sufficient infantry training
to enable his immediate assignment
to front-line outfits. The problem lay
in distributing the replacements in
small, arbitrary numbers—not as
teamed units—to fill the gaping holes
in the assault battalions. The new
men, expected to replace invaluable
veterans of the Pacific War, were not
only new to combat, but they also
were new to each other, an assortment
of strangers lacking the life-saving
bonds of unit integrity. “They
get killed the day they go into battle,”
said one division personnel
officer in frustration. Replacement
losses within the first 48 hours of
combat were, in fact, appalling.
Those who survived, who learned
the ropes and established a bond
with the veterans, contributed significantly
to the winning of the battle.
The division commanders, however,
decried the wastefulness of this policy
and urged unit replacements by
the veteran battalions of the 3d Marines.
As General Erskine recalled:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I asked the question of Kelly
Turner and Holland Smith and
the usual answer was, “You got
enough Marines on the island
now; there are too damn many
here.” I said, “The solution is
very easy. Some of these people
are very tired and worn out,
so take them out and bring in
the 3d Marines.” And they practically
said, “You keep quiet—we’ve
made the decision.” And
that was that.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Most surviving senior officers
agreed that the decision not to use
the 3d Marines at Iwo Jima was ill-advised
and costly. But Holland
Smith never wavered: “Sufficient
troops were on Iwo Jima for the capture
of the island ... two regiments
were sufficient to cover the front assigned
to General Erskine.” On 5
March, D+14, Smith ordered the 3d
Marines to sail back to Guam.</p>
<div id="ip_34b" class="figcenter" style="width: 653px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_037.jpg" width-obs="653" height-obs="306" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Marine Corps Historical Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>“Turkey Knob,” the outcropping which anchored the positions
of the Japanese</i> 2d Mixed Brigade <i>against the advance of the
4th Marine Division for many days, was sketched by Cpl
Daniel L. Winsor, Jr., USMCR, S-2 Section, 25th Marines.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ip_34c" class="figcenter" style="width: 657px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>Weary troops of Company G, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines,
rest in a ditch, guarded by a Sherman tank. They are waiting
for the tanks to move forward to blast the numerous pillboxes
between Motoyama Airfields No. 1 and No. 2.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109666<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_037a.jpg" width-obs="657" height-obs="478" alt="" /></div>
<p>Holland Smith may have known
the overall statistics of battle losses
<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</SPAN></span>sustained by the landing force to that
point, but he may not have fully appreciated
the tremendous attrition of
experienced junior officers and senior
staff noncommissioned officers taking
place every day. As one example,
the day after the 3d Marines, many
of whose members were veterans of
Bougainville and Guam, departed the
amphibious objective area, Company
E, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines,
suffered the loss of its seventh company
commander since the battle began.
Likewise, Lieutenant Colonel
Cushman’s experiences with the 2d
Battalion, 9th Marines, seemed
typical:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The casualties were fierce. By
the time Iwo Jima was over I
had gone through two complete
sets of platoon leaders, lieutenants.
After that we had such
things as artillery forward observers
commanding companies
and sergeants leading the platoons,
which were less than
half-strength. It was that bad.</p>
</blockquote>
<div id="ip_36" class="figcenter" style="width: 430px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_038.jpg" width-obs="430" height-obs="254" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110626</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>A light machine gun crew of Company H, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, hugs the
ground and takes advantage of whatever cover it can from an enemy gunner.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Lieutenant Colonel English recalled
that by the 12th day the 2d Battalion,
21st Marines, had “lost every
company commander.... I had one
company exec left.” Lieutenant
Colonel Donn Robertson, commanding
the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines,
lost all three of his rifle company
commanders, “two killed by the same
damned shell.” In many infantry
units, platoons ceased to exist;
depleted companies were merged to
form one half-strength outfit.</p>
</div>
<div class="sidebar gray">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_29_The_Japanese_320mm_Spigot_Mortar" id="Sidebar_page_29_The_Japanese_320mm_Spigot_Mortar"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_29">page 29</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Japanese 320mm Spigot Mortar</h3>
<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">One</span> of the unique Japanese weapons that Marines
encountered on Iwo Jima was the 320mm spigot
mortar. These enormous defensive weapons
were emplaced and operated by the Japanese Army’s <i>20th
Independent Mortar Battalion</i>.</p>
<p>The mortar tube, which had a small cavity at the muzzle,
rested on a steel baseplate which, in turn, was supported
by a wooden platform. Unlike a conventional mortar, the
five-foot long projectile was placed over the tube instead
of being dropped down the barrel. The mortar shell had
a diameter of nearly 13 inches, while the mortar tube was
little more than 10 inches wide. The weapon could hurl
a 675-pound shell a maximum of 1,440 yards. The range
was adjusted by varying the powder charge, while changes
in deflection were accomplished by brute force: shoving and
pushing the base platform.</p>
<p>Although the tubes only held out for five or six rounds,
enough shells were lobbed onto Marine positions to make
a lasting impression on those who suffered through that
campaign. According to a platoon leader who served with
the 28th Marines, the spigot mortar (referred to as “the
screaming Jesus” in his unit) was always afforded a healthy
respect and, along with the eight-inch Japanese naval rocket,
remains one of his most vivid memories of Iwo Jima.
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who commanded the 2d
Battalion, 9th Marines, at Iwo Jima and went on to become
the 25th Commandant of the Marine Corps, recalled that
the tumbling projectile’s inaccuracy made it that much more
terrifying. “You could see it coming,” he said, “but you never
knew where the hell it was going to come down.”</p>
<p class="sigright"><i>Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
<div id="ip_29" class="figcenter" style="width: 301px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_031.jpg" width-obs="301" height-obs="461" alt="" /></div>
</div></div>
<div class="sidebar">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_32_Marine_Corps_Air_Support_During_Iwo_Jima" id="Sidebar_page_32_Marine_Corps_Air_Support_During_Iwo_Jima"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_32">page 32</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">Marine Corps Air Support During Iwo Jima</h3>
<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">For</span> a few special moments just prior to the landing on
D-day at Iwo Jima the Marines’ long-cherished
vision of an integrated air-ground team seemed to
have been realized. As assault troops neared the beach in
their tracked amphibian vehicles, dozens of Marine Vought
F4U Corsairs swept low over the objective, paving the way
with rockets and machine-gun fire. “It was magnificent!”
exclaimed one observer. Unfortunately, the eight Marine
fighter squadrons present at Iwo that morning came from
the fast carriers of Task Force 58, not the amphibious task
force; three days later TF 58 left for good in pursuit of more
strategic targets. Thereafter, Navy and Army Air Force pilots
provided yeoman service in support of the troops fighting
ashore. Sustained close air support of amphibious forces
by Marine air was once again postponed to some future
combat proving ground.</p>
<p>Other Marine aviation units contributed significantly to
the successful seizure of Iwo Jima. One of the first to see
action was Marine Bombing Squadron (VMB) 612, based
on Saipan, whose flight crews flew North American PBJ
Mitchell medium bombers in nightly, long-range rocket attacks
against Japanese ships trying to resupply Iwo Jima
from other bases in the Volcano and Bonin Islands. These
nightly raids, combined with U.S. Navy submarine interdictions,
significantly reduced the amount of ammunition
and fortification material (notably barbed wire) delivered
to Iwo Jima’s defenders before the invasion.</p>
<div id="if_i_034" class="figright" style="width: 300px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>Marine LtCol Donald K. Yost in his F4U Corsair takes off
from the flight deck of the</i> Cape Gloucester <i>(CVE 109) to
provide close air support to the fighting troops ashore. This
was one of a number of Marine aircraft flown at Iwo Jima.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 262047<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_034.jpg" width-obs="300" height-obs="182" alt="" /></div>
<p>The contributions of the pilots and aerial spotters from
three Marine observation squadrons (VMOs-1, -4 and -5)
are described at length in the text. Flying in to Iwo initially
from escort carriers, or launched precariously by the infamous
“Brodie Slingshot” from <i>LST 776</i>, or eventually
taking off from the captured airstrips, these intrepid crews
were quite successful in spotting enemy artillery and mortar
positions, and reporting them to the Supporting Arms
Control Center. When Japanese antiaircraft gunners
managed to down one of the “Grasshoppers,” Marines from
all points of the island mourned.</p>
<p>Marine transport aircraft from Marine Transport Squadrons
(VMR) 952, 253, and 353 based in the Marianas delivered
critical combat cargo to the island during the height
of the battle. The Marines frequently relied on aerial delivery
before the landing force could establish a fully functional
beachhead. On D+10, for example, VMR-952
air-dropped critically needed mortar shells, machine gun
parts, and blood within Marine lines. On 3 March, Lieutenant
Colonel Malcolm S. Mackay, CO of VMR-952,
brought in the first Marine transport to land on the island,
a Curtiss Commando R5C loaded with ammunition. All
three squadrons followed suit, bringing supplies in, taking
wounded men out.</p>
<p>On 8 March, Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron
(VMTB) 242 flew in to Iwo Jima from Tinian to assume
responsibility for day and night anti-submarine patrols
from the departing escort carrier force.</p>
<p>Colonel Vernon E. Megee, USMC, had the distinction
of commanding the first Landing Force Air Support Control
Unit, a milestone in the evolution of amphibious command
and control of supporting arms. Megee came ashore
on D+5 with General Schmidt, but the offloading process
was still in such disarray that he could not assemble his
communications jeeps for another five days. This did little
to deter Megee. Using “borrowed” gear, he quickly moved
inland, coordinating the efforts of the Air Liaison Parties,
encouraging the Navy pilots to use bigger bombs and listening
to the complaints of the assault commanders. Megee’s
subsequent work in training and employing Army P-51
Mustang pilots in direct support was masterful.</p>
<p>Before the battle’s end, General Kuribayashi transmitted
to Tokyo 19 “lessons learned” about the problems of defending
against an American amphibious assault. One of these
axioms said: “The enemy’s air control is very strong; at least
thirty aircraft are flying ceaselessly from early morning to
night above this very small island.”</p>
</div>
<hr /></div>
<h2><SPAN name="The_Bitter_End" id="The_Bitter_End"></SPAN><i>The Bitter End</i></h2>
<p>The American drive north continued
after the 5 March standdown,
but the going never got any easier.
The nature of enemy fire changed—fewer
big guns and rockets, less observed
fire from the highlands—but
now the terrain grew uglier, deteriorating
into narrow, twisted gorges
wreathed in sulfur mists, lethal killing
zones. Marine casualties continued
to mount, but gunshot
wounds began to outnumber high-explosive
shrapnel hits. The persistent
myth among some Marine units
that Japanese troops were all near-sighted
and hence poor marksmen
ended for good at Iwo Jima. In the
close-quarters fighting among the
badlands of northern Iwo Jima,
Japanese riflemen dropped hundreds
of advancing Marines with well-aimed
shots to the head or chest.
“Poor marksmen?” snorted Captain
Caldwell of Company F, 1st Battalion,
26th Marines, “The Japs we
faced all fired ‘Expert.’”</p>
<div id="ip_36b" class="figcenter" style="width: 431px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>Mopping up the caves with grenades and Browning automatic rifles, Marines flush
out remaining Japanese hidden in Iwo Jima’s numerous and interconnecting caves.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142472<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_038a.jpg" width-obs="431" height-obs="252" alt="" /></div>
<p>Supporting arms coordination
grew more effective during the battle.
Colonel “Buzz” Letcher established
what some have identified as
the first corps-level Supporting Arms
Coordination Center (SACC), in
which senior representatives of artillery,
naval gunfire, and air support
pooled their talents and resources.
While Letcher lacked the manpower
and communications equipment to
serve as corps artillery officer and
simultaneously run a full-time
SACC, his efforts represented a
major advancement in this difficult
art. So did Colonel Vernon Megee’s
Landing Force Air Support Control
Unit, which worked in relative harmony
with the fledgling SACC. Instances
of friendly fire still occurred,<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</SPAN></span>
perhaps inevitably on that crowded
island, but positive control at the
highest level did much to reduce the
frequency of such accidents. In terms
of response time, multiple-source
coordination probably worked better
at the division level and below.
Most infantry battalions, for example,
had nothing but praise for the
Air Liaison Parties, Shore Fire Control
Parties, and artillery forward observer
teams which deployed with
each maneuver unit.</p>
<div id="ip_38" class="figcenter" style="width: 429px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_040.jpg" width-obs="429" height-obs="282" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Marine Corps Combat Art Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>“The Target,” by Col Charles H. Waterhouse.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>While the Marines remained angry
at the paucity of the overall preliminary
naval bombardment of Iwo
Jima, all hands valued the continuous
and responsive support received
from D-day onward. Many of the
gunfire ships stood in close—frequently
less than a mile
offshore—to deliver along the flanks
and front lines, and many took hits
from masked Japanese coast defense
batteries. There were literally no safe
zones in or around the island. Two
aspects of naval gunfire at Iwo Jima
rate special mention. One was the extent
to which the ships provided illumination
rounds over the
battlefield, especially during the early
days before landing force artillery
could assume the bulk of these missions.
The second unique aspect was
the degree of assistance provided by
the smallest gunships, frequently
modified landing craft armed with
4.2-inch mortars, rockets, or 20mm
guns. These “small boys” proved invaluable,
especially along the northwest
coast where they frequently
worked in lock-step with the 5th Marine
Division as it approached The
Gorge.</p>
<p>While the Marines comprised the
bulk of the landing force at Iwo Jima,
they received early and increasing
support from elements of the U.S.
Army. Two of the four DUKW companies
employed on D-day were
Army units. The 138th Antiaircraft
Artillery Group provided 90mm AA
batteries around the newly captured
airfields. Major General James E.
Chaney, USA, who would become
Island Commander, Iwo Jima, at the
battle’s end, landed on D+8 with advance
elements of the 145th Infantry.</p>
<p>As far as the Marines on the
ground were concerned, the most
welcome Army units flew into Iwo
Jima on 6 March (D+15). This was
the 15th Fighter Group, the vanguard
of VII Fighter Command destined to
accompany the B-29s over Tokyo.
The group included the 47th Fighter
Squadron, a seasoned outfit of North
American P-51 Mustangs. Although
the Army pilots had no experience
in direct air support of ground
troops, Colonel Megee liked their
“eager-beaver attitude” and willingness
to learn. He also appreciated the
fact that the Mustangs could deliver
1,000-pound bombs. Megee quickly
trained the Army pilots in striking
designated targets on nearby islands
in response to a surface-based controller.
In three days they were ready
for Iwo Jima. Megee instructed the
P-51 pilots to arm their bombs with
12-second delay fuzes, attack parallel
to the front lines, and approach from
a 45-degree angle. Sometimes these
tactics produced spectacular results,
especially along the west coast,
where the big bombs with delayed
fuzes blew the sides of entire cliffs
into the ocean, exposing enemy caves
and tunnels to direct fire from the
sea. “The Air Force boys did a lot of
good,” said Megee. With that, the escort
carriers departed the area and
left close air support to the 47th
Fighter Squadron for the duration of
the battle.</p>
<p>While technically not a “supporting
arm,” the field medical support
provided the assault Marines primarily
by the Navy was a major contributor
to victory in the prolonged
battle. The practice of integrating
surgeons, chaplains, and corpsmen
within the Fleet Marine Force units
continued to pay valuable dividends.
In many cases company corpsmen
were just as tough and combat-savvy
as the Marines they accompanied. In
all cases, a wounded Marine immediately
knew “his” corpsman would
move heaven and earth to reach him,
bind his wounds, and start the long
process of evacuation. Most Marines
at Iwo Jima would echo the sentiments
of Staff Sergeant Alfred I.
Thomas, a half-track platoon commander
in the 25th Marines: “We had
outstanding corpsmen; they were just
like family.”</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the luxury of having
first-rate medical assistance so
close to the front lines took a terrible
toll. Twenty-three doctors and 827
corpsmen were killed or wounded at<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</SPAN></span>
Iwo Jima, a casualty rate twice as
high as bloody Saipan.</p>
<div id="ip_39" class="figcenter" style="width: 433px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_041.jpg" width-obs="433" height-obs="318" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110902</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>Navy corpsmen tend a Marine who was shot in the back by enemy sniper fire.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Rarely had combat medical support
been so thoughtfully prepared
and provided as at Iwo Jima. Beyond
the crude aid stations, further toward
the rear, Navy and Army field hospitals
arose. Some Marines would be
wounded, receive treatment in a field
hospital tent, recuperate in a bunker,
and return to the lines—often to
receive a second or third wound. The
more seriously wounded would be
evacuated off the island, either by
direct air to Guam, or via one of
several fully staffed hospital ships
which operated around the clock within
the amphibious objective area.
Within the first month of the fighting
on Iwo Jima, 13,737 wounded
Marines and corpsmen were evacuated
by hospital ship, another 2,449
by airlift.</p>
<div id="ip_39b" class="figcenter" style="width: 428px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>Installed in an abandoned Japanese dugout several thousand yards behind the fighting,
4th Marine Division surgeons operated on those badly wounded Marines and
Navy corpsmen who might not have survived a trip to the hospital ship.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111506<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_041a.jpg" width-obs="428" height-obs="451" alt="" /></div>
<p>For a wounded Marine, the
hazardous period came during the
first few minutes after he went down.
Japanese snipers had no compunctions
about picking off litter crews,
or corpsmen, or sometimes the
wounded man himself as his buddies
tried to slide him clear of the fire.
One of the most celebrated examples
of casualty evacuation occurred after
a Japanese sniper shot Corporal
Edwin J. Canter, a rocket truck crew
chief in the 4th Marine Division,
through the abdomen. The rocket
trucks always drew an angry fusillade
of counterbattery fire from the
Japanese, and Canter’s friends knew
they had to get him away from the
launch site fast. As a nearby motion
picture crew recorded the drama,
four Marines hustling Canter down
a muddy hillside heard the scream of
an incoming shell, dumped the
wounded man unceremoniously and
scattered for cover. The explosion
killed the film crew and wounded
each of the Marines, including
Canter, again. The film footage survived,
appeared in stateside
newsreels—and eventually became
part of the movie “Sands of Iwo<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</SPAN></span>
Jima.” Canter was evacuated to a
hospital ship, thence to hospitals in
Guam, Hawaii, and the States. His
war had ended.</p>
<div id="ip_40" class="figcenter" style="width: 644px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_042.jpg" width-obs="644" height-obs="505" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110852</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>As the fighting moved inland, the beaches of Iwo Jima became
very busy places with the continual incoming flow of
supplies. Note the many roads leading off the beaches over
which trucks, LVTs, and DUKWs headed to the front lines.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Meanwhile the beachmasters and
shore party personnel performed
spectacular feats to keep the advancing
divisions fully armed and
equipped. It is difficult to imagine the
scope of logistical management and
sheer, back-breaking work required
to maintain such a high volume of
supplies and equipment moving over
such precarious beaches. A single
beach on the west coast became functional
on D+11, but by that time the
bulk of landing force supplies were
on shore. General unloading ended
the next day, releasing the vulnerable
amphibious ships from their
tether to the beachhead. Thereafter,
ammunition resupply became the
critical factor. On one occasion, well-aimed
Japanese fire detonated the entire
5th Marine Division ammo
dump. In another tense moment, the
ammunition ship <i>Columbia Victory</i>
came under direct Japanese fire as she
approached the western beaches to
commence unloading. Watching Marines
held their breath as the ship became
bracketed by fire. The ship
escaped, but the potential still existed
for a disaster of catastrophic
proportions.</p>
<p>The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion
and the 62d Naval Construction
Battalion (Seabees) repaired and extended
the captured runways. In
short order, an entire Seabee brigade
moved ashore. Marines returning to
the beaches from the northern highlands
could hardly recognize the
place they had first seen on D-day.
There were now more than 80,000
Americans on the small island. Seabees
had bulldozed a two-lane road
up to the top of Suribachi.</p>
<p>Communications, often maligned
in earlier amphibious assaults, were
never better than at Iwo Jima. Radios
and handsets were now waterproof,
more frequencies were available, and
a variety of radio systems served the
varying needs of the landing force.
Forward observer teams, for example,
used the back-pack SCR-610,
while companies and platoons favored
the SCR-300 “walkie-talkies,”
or the even lighter SCR-536 “Spam<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</SPAN></span>
Can” portables. Said Lieutenant
Colonel James P. Berkeley, executive
officer of the 27th Marines and a
former communications officer, “At
Iwo we had near-perfect communications,
all any commander could
ask for.” As the battle progressed, the
Marines began stringing telephone
lines between support units and forward
command posts, wisely elevating
the wire along upright posts to
avoid damage by tracked vehicles.</p>
<p>Japanese counterintelligence teams
expected to have a field day splicing
into the proliferation of U.S. telephone
lines, but the Marines baffled
them by heavy use of Navajo code
talkers. Each division employed
about two dozen trained Navajos.
The 5th Marine Division command
post established six Navajo networks
upon arrival on the island. No one,
throughout the war, insofar as anyone
knew, was ever able to translate
the Navajo code talkers’ voice transmissions.</p>
<div id="ip_41" class="figcenter" style="width: 425px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>“Iwo Jima,” proof lithograph of two Navajo code talkers, by Sgt John Fabion.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Marine Corps Combat Art Collection<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_043.jpg" width-obs="425" height-obs="592" alt="" /></div>
<p>African-American troops played a
significant role in the capture of Iwo
Jima. Negro drivers served in the
Army DUKW units active throughout
the landing. Black Marines of the
8th Ammunition Company and the
36th Depot Company landed on D-day,
served as stevedores on those
chaotic beaches, and were joined by
the 33d and 34th Depot Companies
on D+3. These Marines were incorporated
into the VAC Shore Party
which did Herculean work sustaining
the momentum of the American
drive northwards. When Japanese
counterattacks penetrated to the
beach areas, these Marines dropped
their cargo, unslung their carbines,
and engaged in well-disciplined fire
and maneuver, inflicting more
casualties than they sustained. Two
Marines, Privates James W. Whitlock
and James Davis, received the Bronze
Star. Said Colonel Leland S. Swindler,
commanding the VAC Shore
Party, the entire body of black Marines
“conducted themselves with
marked coolness and courage.”</p>
<p>News media coverage of the Iwo
Jima battle was extensive and largely
unfettered. Typical of the scores of
combat correspondents who stuck
with the landing force throughout
the battle was Marine Technical Sergeant
Frederick K. “Dick” Dashiell,
a former Associated Press writer assigned
to the 3d Marine Division.
Although downright scared sometimes,
and filled with horror often,
Dashiell stood the test, for he wrote
81 front-line communiques, pounding
out news releases on his portable
typewriter on the edge of his
foxhole. Dashiell’s eye for detail
caught the flavor of the prolonged assault.
“All is bitter, frontal assault, always
uphill,” he wrote. He described
how the ceaseless wind filled the air
with fine volcanic grit, and how often
the Marines had to stop and clean the
grit from their weapons—and how
naked that made any Marine feel.</p>
<p>Most Marines were exhausted at
this point in the battle. Occasional
hot food delivered close behind the
front lines, or more frequently fresh
fruit and milk from the nearby ships,
helped morale some. So did watching<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</SPAN></span>
more and more crippled B-29s
soar in for emergency landings, often
two or three a day. “It felt good to
see them land,” said Sergeant James
“Doc” Lindsey, a squad leader in
Company G, 2d Battalion, 25th Marines.
“You knew they’d just come
from Tokyo.”</p>
<div id="ip_43" class="figcenter" style="width: 429px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_045.jpg" width-obs="429" height-obs="443" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142845</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>From the viewpoint of Marine company commanders, having their own “artillery,”
in the form of 60mm mortars, was a very satisfying matter. A 60mm mortar crew
is at work, in a natural depression, lobbing round after round at enemy positions.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>General Erskine came down with
pneumonia during this period, but
refused to be evacuated. Colonel
Robert E. Hogaboom, his chief of
staff, quietly kept the war moving.
The division continued to advance.
When Erskine recovered, Hogaboom
adjusted accordingly; the two were
a highly effective team.</p>
<p>Erskine had long sought the opportunity
to conduct a battalion-sized
night operation. It rankled him
that throughout the war the Americans
seemed to have conceded the
night to the Japanese. When Hill
362-C continued to thwart his advance,
Erskine directed a pre-dawn
advance devoid of the trappings of
prep fires which always seemed to
identify the time and place of attack.
The distinction of making this unusual
assault went to Lieutenant
Colonel Harold C. “Bing” Boehm,
commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th
Marines. Unfortunately this battalion
was new to this particular sector
and received the attack order too late
the previous day to reconnoiter effectively.
The absence of advance orientation
notwithstanding, the battalion
crossed the line of departure promptly
and silently at 0500 and headed for
Hill 362-C. The unit attained total
surprise along its axis of advance. Before
the sleepy Japanese knew it, the
battalion had hurried across 500
yards of broken ground, sweeping by
the outposts and roasting the occasional
strongpoint with flamethrowers.
Then it was Boehm’s turn to be
surprised. Daylight revealed his battalion
had captured the wrong hill,
an intermediate objective. Hill 362-C
still lay 250 yards distant; now he
was surrounded by a sea of wide-awake
and furiously counterattacking
Japanese infantry. Boehm did
what seemed natural: he redeployed
his battalion and attacked towards
the original objective. This proved
very rough going and took much of
the day, but before dark the 3d Battalion,
9th Marines stood in sole possession
of Hill 362-C, one of
Kuribayashi’s main defensive
anchors.</p>
<p>Boehm’s success, followed shortly
by General Senda’s costly counterattack
against the 4th Marine Division,
seemed to represent another turning
point of the battle. On D+18 a
patrol from the 3d Marine Division
reached the northeast coast. The
squad leader filled a canteen with salt
water and sent it back to General
Schmidt marked “For inspection—not
consumption.” Schmidt welcomed
the symbolism. The next day
the 4th Marine Division finally
pinched out Turkey Knob, moving
out of The Amphitheater towards the
east coast. The end seemed tantalizingly
close, but the intensity of
Japanese resistance hardly waned.
Within the 5th Marine Division’s
zone in the west, the 2d Battalion,
26th Marines, was reporting an aggregate
casualty rate approaching 70
percent. General Rockey warned of
a state of “extreme exhaustion and
fatigue.”</p>
<p>The division commanders began to
look elsewhere for relief of their shot-up
battalions. In the 4th Marine Division,
General Cates formed a
provisional battalion under Lieutenant
Colonel Melvin L. Krulewitch
which conducted a series of attacks
against the many bypassed enemy
positions. The term “mopping up” as
applied to Iwo Jima, whether by
service troops or subsequent Army
garrison units, should be considered
relative. Many pockets of Japanese<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</SPAN></span>
held out indefinitely, well-armed and
defiant to the end. Rooting them out
was never easy. Other divisions used
cannoneers, pioneers, motor transport
units, and amtrackers as light infantry
units, either to augment
front-line battalions or conduct combat
patrols throughout rear areas. By
this time, however, the extreme rear
area at Iwo had become overconfident.
Movies were being shown every
night. Ice cream could be found
on the beach. Men swam in the surf
and slept in tents. This all provided
a false and deadly sense of security.</p>
<p>Not very far to the north, Lieutenant
Colonel Cushman’s 2d Battalion,
9th Marines, became engaged in
a sustained battle in extremely
broken terrain east of the third airfield.
The Marines eventually encircled
the Japanese positions, but the
battle for “Cushman’s Pocket” raged
on. As the battalion commander
reported the action:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The enemy position was a
maze of caves, pillboxes, emplaced
tanks, stone walls and
trenches.... We beat against
this position for eight continuous
days, using every supporting
weapon. The core—main
objective of the sector—still remained.
The battalion was exhausted.
Almost all leaders
were gone and the battalion
numbered about 400, including
350 replacements.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Cushman’s 2d Battalion, 9th Marines,
was relieved, but other elements
of the 9th and 21st Marines,
equally exhausted, had just as
difficult a time. Erskine truly had no
reserves. He called Cushman back
into the pocket. By 16 March
(D+25), Japanese resistance in this
thicket of jumbled rocks ended. The
4th Marine Division, meanwhile,
poured over the hills along the east,
seizing the coast road and blasting
the last Japanese strongpoints from
the rear. Ninety percent of Iwo Jima
now lay in American hands. Radio
Tokyo carried the mournful remarks
of Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso,
who announced the fall of Iwo Jima
as “the most unfortunate thing in the
whole war situation.”</p>
<p>General Smith took the opportunity
to declare victory and conduct
a flag-raising ceremony. With that,
the old warhorse departed. Admiral
Turner had sailed previously. Admiral
Hill and General Schmidt finally
had the campaign to themselves.
Survivors of the 4th Division began
backloading on board ship, their battle
finally over.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</SPAN></span></p>
<div id="ip_46" class="figcenter" style="width: 428px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_048.jpg" width-obs="428" height-obs="468" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Marine Corps Historical Collection</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>After 24 days of the most bitter battle in the history of the Marine Corps to that
date, on 14 March 1945, the colors were raised once again on Iwo Jima to signify
the occupation of the island, although the battle was still raging in the north. The
official end of the campaign would not be until 14 days later, on 26 March.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>The killing continued in the north.
The 5th Marine Division entered The
Gorge, an 800-yard pocket of incredibly
broken country which the troops
would soon call “Death Valley.” Here
General Kuribayashi maintained his
final command center in a deep cave.
Fighting in this ungodly landscape
provided a fitting end to the battle—nine
endless days of cave-by-cave assaults
with flamethrowers and demolitions.
Combat engineers used 8,500
tons of explosives to detonate one
huge fortification. Progress was slow
and costlier than ever. General Rockey’s
drained and depleted regiments
lost one more man with every two
yards gained. To ease the pressure,
General Schmidt deployed the 3d
Marine Division against Kitano
Point in the 5th Division zone.</p>
<p>Colonel Hartnoll J. Withers directed
the final assault of his 21st Marines
against the extreme northern tip
of the island. General Erskine, pneumonia
be damned, came forward to
look over his shoulder. The 21st Marines
could see the end, and their
momentum proved irresistible. In
half a day of sharp fighting they
cleared the point of the last
defenders. Erskine signalled Schmidt:
“Kitano Point is taken.”</p>
<p>Both divisions made serious efforts
to persuade Kuribayashi to surrender
during these final days, broadcasting
appeals in Japanese, sending personal
messages praising his valor and urging
his cooperation. Kuribayashi remained
a samurai to the end. He
transmitted one final message to
Tokyo, saying “we have not eaten or
drunk for five days, but our fighting
spirit is still running high. We are going
to fight bravely to the last.” Imperial
Headquarters tried to convey
the good news to him that the Emperor
had approved his promotion to
full general. There was no response
from Iwo Jima. Kuribayashi’s promotion
would be posthumous. Fragmentary
Japanese accounts indicate
he took his own life during the night
of 25–26 March.</p>
<p>In The Gorge, the 5th Marine Division
kept clawing forward. The division
reported that the average
battalion, which had landed with 36
officers and 885 men on D-day, now
mustered 16 officers and 300 men, including
the hundreds of replacements
funneled in during the fighting. The
remnants of the 1st Battalion, 26th
Marines, and the 1st Battalion, 28th
Marines, squeezed the Japanese into
a final pocket, then overwhelmed
them.</p>
<p>It was the evening of 25 March,
D+34, and the amphibious assault
on the rocky fortress of Iwo Jima finally
appeared over. The island grew
strangely quiet. There were far fewer
illumination shells. In the flickering
false light, some saw shadowy
figures, moving south, towards the
airfield.</p>
<p>General Schmidt received the good
news that the 5th Marine Division
had snuffed out the final enemy cave
in The Gorge on the evening of
D+34. But even as the corps commander
prepared his announcement
declaring the end of organized
resistance on Iwo Jima, a very well-organized
enemy force emerged from
northern caves and infiltrated down
the length of the island. This final
spasm of Japanese opposition still
reflected the influence of
Kuribayashi’s tactical discipline. The
300-man force took all night to move
into position around the island’s now
vulnerable rear base area, the tents
occupied by freshly arrived Army pilots
of VII Fighter Command, adjacent
to Airfield No. 1. The<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</SPAN></span>
counterattacking force achieved total
surprise, falling on the sleeping pilots
out of the darkness with swords,
grenades, and automatic weapons.
The fighting was as vicious and bloody
as any that occurred in Iwo Jima’s
many arenas.</p>
<p>The surviving pilots and members
of the 5th Pioneer Battalion improvised
a skirmish line and launched
a counterattack of their own. Seabees
and elements of the redeploying 28th
Marines joined the fray. There were
few suicides among the Japanese;
most died in place, grateful to strike
one final blow for the Emperor. Sunrise
revealed the awful carnage: 300
dead Japanese; more than 100 slain
pilots, Seabees, and pioneers; and
another 200 American wounded. It
was a grotesque closing chapter to
five continuous weeks of savagery.</p>
<p>The 5th Marine Division and the
21st Marines wasted no time in backloading
on board amphibious ships.
The 9th Marines, last of the VAC
maneuver units to land, became the
last to leave, conducting two more
weeks of ambushes and combat
patrols. The 147th Infantry inherited
more of the same. In the first two
months after the Marines left, the
Army troops killed 1,602 Japanese
and captured 867 more.</p>
</div>
<div class="sidebar gray">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_37_The_Marines_Zippo_Tanks" id="Sidebar_page_37_The_Marines_Zippo_Tanks"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_36">page 37</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Marines’ Zippo Tanks</h3>
<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">To</span> the Marines on the ground, the Sherman M4A3
medium tank equipped with the Navy Mark I
flame thrower seemed to be the most valuable
weapon employed in the battle of Iwo Jima.</p>
<p>The Marines had come a long way in the tactical use of
fire in the 15 months since Tarawa, when only a handful
of backpack flame throwers were available to combat the
island’s hundreds of fortifications. While the landing force
still relied on portable flame throwers, most Marines could
see the value of marrying the technology with armored vehicles
for use against the toughest targets. In the Marianas,
the Marines modified M3A1 light tanks with the Canadian
Ronson flame system to good effect; the problems came
from the vulnerability of the small vehicles. At Peleliu, the
1st Marine Division mounted the improvised Mark I system
on a thin-skinned LVT-4; again, vehicle vulnerability
limited the system’s effectiveness. The obvious solution
seemed to be to mount the flame thrower in a medium tank.</p>
<p>The first modification to Sherman tanks involved the installation
of the small E4-5 mechanized flame thrower in
place of the bow machine gun. This was only a marginal
improvement; the system’s short range, modest fuel supply,
and awkward aiming process hardly offset the loss of
the machine gun. Even so, each of the three tank battalions
employed E4-5-equipped Shermans during Iwo Jima.</p>
<p>The best solution to marrying effective flame projection
with mechanized mobility resulted from an unlikely inter-service
task force of Seabees, Army Chemical Warfare Service
technicians, and Fleet Marine Force tankers in Hawaii
before the invasion. According to Lieutenant Colonel William
R. Collins, commanding the 5th Tank Battalion, this
inspired group of field-expedient tinkerers modified the
Mark I flame thrower to operate from within the Sherman’s
turret, replacing the 75mm main gun with a look-alike
launch tube. The modified system could thus be trained
and pointed like any conventional turret gun. Using
napalm-thickened fuel, the “Zippo Tanks” could spew flame
up to 150 yards for a duration of 55–80 seconds, both quantum
tactical improvements.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the <i>ad hoc</i> modification team had only
sufficient time and components to modify eight M4A3
tanks with the Mark I flame system; four each went to the
4th and 5th Tank Battalions. The 3d Tank Battalion, then
staging in Guam, received neither the M4A3 Shermans nor
the field modifications in time for Iwo Jima, although a
number of their “A2” tanks retained the E4-5 system mounted
in the bow.</p>
<p>The eight modified Sherman flame tanks proved ideal
against Iwo Jima’s rugged caves and concrete fortifications.
The Japanese feared this weapon greatly; time and again
suicide squads of “human bullets” would assail the flame
tanks directly, only to be shot down by covering forces or
scorched by the main weapon. Enemy fire and the rough
terrain took their toll on the eight flame tanks, but maintenance
crews worked around the clock to keep them functional.</p>
<p>In the words of Captain Frank C. Caldwell, a company
commander in the 26th Marines: “In my view it was the
flame tank more than any other supporting arm that won
this battle.” Tactical demands for the flame tanks never
diminished. Late in the battle, as the 5th Marine Division
cornered the last Japanese defenders in “The Gorge,” the 5th
Tank Battalion expended napalm-thickened fuel at the rate
of 10,000 gallons per day. The division’s final action report
stated that the flame tank was “the one weapon that caused
the Japs to leave their caves and rock crevices and run.”</p>
<div id="if_i_039" class="figcenter" style="width: 624px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>A Marine flame tank, also known as a “Ronson,” scorches
a Japanese strongpoint. The eight M4A3 Shermans
equipped with the Navy Mark I flame-thrower proved to
be the most valuable weapons systems on Iwo Jima.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 140758<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_039.jpg" width-obs="624" height-obs="267" alt="" /></div>
</div></div>
<div class="sidebar">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_42_Iwos_Fire_Brigades_The_Rocket_Detachments" id="Sidebar_page_42_Iwos_Fire_Brigades_The_Rocket_Detachments"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_41">page 42</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">Iwo’s Fire Brigades: The Rocket Detachments</h3>
<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1">Attached</span> to the assault divisions
of the landing force
at Iwo Jima were provisional
rocket detachments. The infantry
had a love-hate relationship with the
forward-deploying little rocket trucks
and their plucky crews. The “system”
was an International one-ton 4×4 truck
modified to carry three box-shaped
launchers, each containing a dozen
4.5-inch rockets. A good crew could
launch a “ripple” of 36 rockets within
a matter of seconds, providing a
blanket of high explosives on the target.
This the infantry loved—but each
launching always drew heavy return
fire from the Japanese who feared the
“automatic artillery.”</p>
<p>The Marines formed an Experimental
Rocket Unit in June 1943 and first
deployed rail-launched barrage rockets
during the fighting in the upper
Solomons. There the heavily canopied
jungles limited their effectiveness.
Once mounted on trucks and deployed
to the Central Pacific, however, the
weapons proved much more useful,
particularly during the battle of Saipan.
The Marines modified the small
trucks by reinforcing the tail gate to
serve as a blast shield, installing a
hydraulic jack to raise and lower the
launchers, and applying gravity quadrants
and elevation safety chains.
Crude steel rods welded to the bumper
and dashboard helped the driver
align the vehicle with aiming stakes.</p>
<p>Treeless, hilly Iwo Jima proved an
ideal battleground for these so-called
“Buck Rogers Men.” At Iwo, the 1st
Provisional Rocket Detachment supported
the 4th Marine Division and
the 3d Detachment supported the 5th
Division throughout the operation (the
3d Division did not have such a unit
in this battle). Between them, the two
detachments fired more than 30,000
rockets in support of the landing force.</p>
<p>The 3d Detachment landed over Red
Beach on D-day, losing one vehicle to
the surf, others to the loose sand or
heavy enemy fire. One vehicle reached
its firing position intact and launched
a salvo of rockets against Japanese fortifications
along the slopes of Suribachi,
detonating an enemy ammunition
dump. The detachment subsequently
supported the 1st Battalion,
28th Marines’ advance to the summit,
often launching single rockets to clear
suspected enemy positions along the
route.</p>
<p>As the fighting moved north, the
short range, steep angle of fire, and
saturation effect of the rocket launchers
kept them in high demand. They
were particularly valuable in defilade-to-defilade
bombardments marking
the final punctuation of pre-assault
prep fires. But their distinctive flash
and telltale blast also caught the attention
of Japanese artillery spotters. The
rocket trucks rarely remained in one
place long enough to fire more than
two salvos. “Speedy displacement” was
the key to their survival. The nearby
infantry knew better than to stand
around and wave goodbye; this was
the time to seek deep shelter from the
counterbattery fire sure to follow.</p>
<div id="if_i_044" class="figcenter" style="width: 629px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>The positions from which rocket troops launched salvos
of 4.5-inch rockets became very unhealthy places, indeed,
as Japanese artillery and mortars zeroed in on the clouds
of smoke and dust resulting from the firing of the rockets.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111100<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_044.jpg" width-obs="629" height-obs="341" alt="" /></div>
</div></div>
<div class="sidebar">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_44_Amphibious_Logistical_Support_at_Iwo_Jima" id="Sidebar_page_44_Amphibious_Logistical_Support_at_Iwo_Jima"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_43">page 44</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">Amphibious Logistical Support at Iwo Jima</h3>
<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> logistical effort required to sustain the seizure of
Iwo Jima was enormous, complex, largely improvised
on lessons learned in earlier Marine
Corps operations in the Pacific, and highly successful.
Clearly, no other element of the emerging art of amphibious
warfare had improved so greatly by the winter of 1945.
Marines may have had the heart and firepower to tackle
a fortress-like Iwo Jima earlier in the war, but they would
have been crippled in the doing of it by limitations in amphibious
logistical support capabilities. These concepts,
procedures, organizations, and special materials took years
to develop; once in place they fully enabled such large-scale
conquests as Iwo Jima and Okinawa.</p>
<p>For the Iwo Jima operation, VAC had the 8th Field
Depot, commanded by Colonel Leland S. Swindler. The
depot was designed to serve as the nucleus of the shore
party operation; the depot commander was dual-hatted as
the Shore Party Commander of the Landing Force, in which
capacity he was responsible for coordinating the activities
of the division shore parties. The timing of the logistics support
at Iwo Jima proved to be well conceived and executed.
Liaison teams from the 8th Field Depot accompanied
the 4th and 5th Divisions ashore. On D+3, units of the
field depot came ashore, and two days after this, when VAC
assumed control on shore, the field depot took over and
the unloading continued without interruption.</p>
<p>The V Amphibious Corps at Iwo Jima used every conceivable
means of delivering combat cargo ashore when and
where needed by the landing force. These means sequentially
involved the prescribed loads and units of fire carried
by the assault waves; “hot cargo” preloaded in on-call
waves or floating dumps; experimental use of “one-shot”
preloaded amphibious trailers and Wilson drums; general
unloading; administrative unloading of what later generations
of amphibians would call an “assault follow-on echelon”;
and aerial delivery of critically short items, first by
parachute, then by transports landing on the captured runways.
In the process, the Navy-Marine Corps team successfully
experimented with the use of armored bulldozers and
sleds loaded with hinged Marston matting delivered in the
assault waves to help clear wheeled vehicles stuck in the
soft volcanic sand. In spite of formidable early obstacles—foul
weather, heavy surf, dangerous undertows, and fearsome
enemy fire—the system worked. Combat cargo
flowed in; casualties and salvaged equipment flowed out.</p>
<p>Shortages appeared from time to time, largely the result
of the Marines on shore meeting a stronger and larger
defense garrison than estimated. Hence, urgent calls soon
came for more demolitions, grenades, mortar illumination
rounds, flame-thrower recharging units, and whole blood.
Transport squadrons delivered many of these critical items
directly from fleet bases in the Marianas.</p>
<p>Field medical support at Iwo Jima was a model of exhaustive
planning and flexible application. The Marines
had always enjoyed the finest immediate medical attention
from their organic surgeons and corpsmen, but the backup
system ashore at Iwo Jima, from field hospitals to graves
registration, was mind-boggling to the older veterans.
Moderately wounded Marines received full hospital treatment
and rehabilitation; many returned directly to their
units, thus preserving at least some of the rapidly decreasing
levels of combat experience in frontline outfits. The
more seriously wounded were treated, stabilized, and
evacuated, either to offshore hospital ships or by air transport
to Guam.</p>
<p>The Marines fired an unprecedented half million artillery
rounds in direct and general support of the assault units.
More rounds were lost when the 5th Marine Division dump
blew up. The flow never stopped. The Shore Party used
DUKWs, LVTs, and larger craft for rapid offloading of ammunition
ships dangerously exposed to Iwo Jima’s enemy
gunners. Marine Corps ammunition and depot companies
hustled the fresh munitions ashore and into the neediest
hands.</p>
<p>Lieutenant Colonel James D. Hittle, USMC, served as
D-4 of the 3d Marine Division throughout the battle of Iwo
Jima. While shaking his head at the “crazy-quilt” logistic
adaptations dictated by Iwo’s geography, Hittle saw creative
staff management at all levels. The 3d Division, earmarked
as the reserve for the landing, found it difficult to
undertake combat loading of their ships in the absence of
a scheme of maneuver on shore, but the staff made valid
assumptions based on their earlier experiences. This paid
huge dividends when the corps commander had to commit
the 21st Marines as a separate tactical unit well in advance
of the division. Thanks to foresightful combat
loading, the regiment landed fully equipped and supported,
ready for immediate deployment in the fighting.</p>
<p>To augment the supplies coming across the beach, the
3d Division staff air officer “appropriated” a transport plane
and made regular runs to the division’s base in Guam,
bringing back fresh beef, mail, and cases of beer. The 3d
Division G-4 also sent his transport quartermaster (today’s
embarkation officer) out to sea with an LVT-full of war souvenirs;
these were bartered with ship’s crews for donations
of fresh fruit, eggs, bread—“we’d take anything.” General
Erskine distributed these treats personally to the men in
the lines.</p>
<p>Retired Brigadier General Hittle marveled at the density
of troops funnelled into the small island. “At one point we
had 60,000 men occupying less than three-and-a-half square
miles of broken terrain.” These produced startling neighbors:
a 105mm battery firing from the middle of the shore
party cantonment; the division command post sited 1,000
yards from Japanese lines; “giant B-29s taking off and landing
forward of the CP of an assault regiment.”</p>
<p>In the effort to establish a fresh-water distilling plant,
Marine engineers dug a “well” near the beach. Instead of
a source of salt water the crew discovered steaming mineral
water, heated by Suribachi’s supposedly dormant volcano.
Hittle moved the 3d Division distilling site elsewhere;
this spot became a hot shower facility, soon one of the most
popular places on the island.</p>
<div id="if_i_046" class="figcenter" style="width: 628px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_046.jpg" width-obs="628" height-obs="431" alt="" />
<div class="captionr">
<p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109635<br/></p>
</div>
</div></div>
<hr /></div>
<h2><SPAN name="Iwo_Jimas_Costs" id="Iwo_Jimas_Costs"></SPAN><i>Iwo Jima’s Costs, Gains, and Legacies</i></h2>
<p>In its 36 days of combat on Iwo
Jima, the V Amphibious Corps killed
approximately 22,000 Japanese soldiers
and sailors. The cost was staggering.
The assault units of the
corps—Marines and organic Navy
personnel—sustained 24,053 casualties,
by far the highest single-action
losses in Marine Corps history. Of
these, a total of 6,140 died. Roughly
one Marine or corpsman became a
casualty for every three who landed
on Iwo Jima.</p>
<p>According to a subsequent analysis
by military historian Dr. Norman
Cooper, “Nearly seven hundred
Americans gave their lives for every
square mile. For every plot of ground
the size of a football field, an average
of more than one American and
five Japanese were killed and five
Americans wounded.”</p>
<div id="ip_47" class="figcenter" style="width: 435px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>The fighting hardly over, grizzled, begrimed, and tired Marines solemnly display
the spoils of war captured in a very long, difficult, and hard-fought battle.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Marine Corps Historical Collection<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_049.jpg" width-obs="435" height-obs="337" alt="" /></div>
<p>The assault infantry units bore the
brunt of these losses. Captain William
T. Ketcham’s Company I, 3d
Battalion, 24th Marines, landed on
D-day with 133 Marines in the three
rifle platoons. Only nine of these
men remained when the remnants of
the company reembarked on D+35.
Captain Frank C. Caldwell reported
the loss of 221 men from Company
F, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. At the
end, a private first class served as platoon
commander for Caldwell’s
merged first and second platoons.
Elsewhere in the 1st Battalion, 26th
Marines, Captain Tom Fields relinquished
command of Company D on
the eighth day to replace the battalion
executive officer. Rejoining his
company at the end of the battle,
Fields was sickened to find only 17
of the original 250 men still in the
ranks. Company B, 1st Battalion,
28th Marines, went through nine
company commanders in the fighting;
12 different Marines served as
platoon leader of the second platoon,
including two buck privates. Each division,
each regiment, reported similar
conditions.</p>
<p>As the extent of the losses became
known in the press, the American
public reacted with shock and dismay
as they had 14 months earlier
at Tarawa. This time, however, the
debate about the high cost of forcibly
seizing an enemy island raged in
the press while the battle was still being
fought.</p>
<p>The Marine Corps released only
one official communique about
specific battle losses during the battle,
reporting casualties of nearly
5,000 men on 22 February. Five days
later, at the insistence of press baron
William Randolph Hearst, an early
supporter of the MacArthur-for-President
claque, the <i>San Francisco
Examiner</i> ran a front page editorial
bewailing the Marines’ tactics and
losses. “It’s the same thing that happened
at Tarawa and Saipan,” the
editorial stated, urging the elevation
of General MacArthur to supreme
command in the Pacific, because “HE<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</SPAN></span>
SAVES THE LIVES OF HIS OWN
MEN.” With that, 100 off-duty Marines
stormed the offices of the <i>Examiner</i>
demanding an apology.
Unfortunately, the Hearst editorial
received wide play; many families of
Marines fighting at Iwo Jima forwarded
the clippings. Marines
received these in the mail while the
fighting still continued, an unwelcome
blow to morale.</p>
<div id="ip_48" class="figcenter" style="width: 431px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_050.jpg" width-obs="431" height-obs="318" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110599</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>The fighting continues and continues. For weary flamethrower operators Pvt Richard
Klatt, left, and PFC Wilfred Voegeli the campaign is just one cave after another.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>President Roosevelt, long a master
of public opinion, managed to keep
the lid on the outcry by emphasizing
the sacrifice of the troops as
epitomized by the Joe Rosenthal photograph
of the second Suribachi flag-raising.
The photograph was already
widely renowned. FDR made it the
official logo of the Seventh War Bond
Drive and demanded the six flag-raisers
be reassigned home to enhance
popular morale. Regrettably,
three of the six men had already been
killed in subsequent fighting in the
drive north on Iwo Jima.</p>
<p>The Joint Chiefs of Staff looked
appraisingly at Iwo Jima’s losses. No
one questioned the objective; Iwo
Jima was an island that categorically
had to be seized if the strategic
bombing campaign was ever going to
be effective. The island could therefore
not be bypassed or “leap-frogged.”
There is considerable evidence
that the Joint Chiefs considered
the use of poison gas during the Iwo
Jima planning phase. Neither Japan
nor the United States had signed the
international moratorium, there were
no civilians on the island, the Americans
had stockpiles of mustard gas
shells in the Pacific theater. But President
Roosevelt scotched these considerations
quickly. America, he
declared, would never make first use
of poison gas. In any case, the use of
poison gas on an area as relatively
small as Iwo Jima, whose prevailing
winds would quickly dissipate the
gas fumes, became moot. This left
the landing force with no option but
a frontal amphibious assault against
the most heavily fortified island
America ever faced in the war.</p>
<div id="ip_48b" class="figcenter" style="width: 430px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>Uncommon valor in a peaceful setting: this 4th Division Marine threatens the
enemy even in death. His bayonet fixed and pointing in the direction of the
enemy, he was killed by a sniper before he even got off the beach on D-day.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109624<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_050s.jpg" width-obs="430" height-obs="353" alt="" /></div>
<p>On the other hand, seizure of Iwo
Jima provided significant strategic
benefits. Symbolically, the Marines
raised the flag over Mount Suribachi
on the same day that General MacArthur
entered Manila. The parallel
capture of the Philippines and Iwo
Jima, followed immediately by the
invasion of Okinawa, accelerated the
pace of the war, bringing it at long
last to Japan’s doorstep. The three<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</SPAN></span>
campaigns convincingly demonstrated
to the Japanese high command
that the Americans now had the
capability—and the will—to overwhelm
even the most stoutly defended
islands. Kyushu and Honshu
would be next.</p>
<p>Iwo Jima in American hands
produced immediate and highly visible
benefits to the strategic bombing
campaign. Marines fighting on the island
were reminded of this mission
time and again as crippled B-29 Superforts
flew in from Honshu. The
capture of Iwo Jima served to increase
the operating range, payload,
and survival rate of the big bombers.
The monthly tonnage of high explosives
dropped on Imperial Japan by
B-29s based in the Marianas increased
eleven-fold in March alone.
As early as 7 April a force of 80 P-51
Mustangs of VII Fighter Command
took off from Iwo Jima to escort
B-29s striking the Nakajima aircraft
engine plant in Tokyo. But the Army
Air Force valued Iwo Jima most of
all as an emergency landing field. By
war’s end, a total of 2,251 B-29s made
forced landings on the island. This
figure represented 24,761 flight crewmen,
many of whom would have
perished at sea without the availability
of Iwo Jima as a safe haven. Said
one B-29 pilot, “whenever I land on
this island I thank God for the men
who fought for it.”</p>
<p>General Tadamichi Kuribayashi
proved to be one of the most competent
field commanders the Marines
ever faced. He displayed a masterful
grasp of the principles of simplicity
and economy of force, made maximum
use of Iwo’s forbidding terrain,
employed his artillery and mortars
with great skill, and exercised command
with an iron will virtually to
the end. He was also a realist.
Without hope of even temporary
naval or air superiority he knew he
was doomed from the start. In five
weeks of unremitting pressure, the
Americans breached every strongpoint,
exterminated his forces, and
seized the island.</p>
<div id="ip_49" class="figcenter" style="width: 434px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_051.jpg" width-obs="434" height-obs="344" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142434</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>With his buddies holding the four corners of the National Colors, the last rites
for a fallen Marine are offered by the chaplain at a temporary gravesite in Iwo’s
black sand. Chaplains of all religious persuasions heroically ministered to all Marines
and Corpsmen throughout the thick of the fighting at their own risk.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>Iwo Jima represented at once the
supreme test and the pinnacle of
American amphibious capabilities in
the Pacific War. The sheer magnitude
of the task—planning the assault and
sustaining of that many troops
against such a formidable
objective—made Operation Detachment
an enduring model of “detailed
planning and violent execution.” Here
the element of surprise was not available
to the attacker. Yet the speed of
the American landing and the toughness
with which assault units withstood
the withering barrages
astounded the Japanese defenders.
“The landing on Iwo was the epitome
of everything we’d learned over the
years about amphibious assaults,”
said Colonel Wornham of the 27th
Marines. Bad as the enemy fire became
on D-day, there were no reports
of “Issue in doubt.” Lieutenant
Colonel Galer compared Iwo Jima
with his Guadalcanal experience:
“Then it was ‘can we hold?’ Here at
Iwo Jima the question was simply
‘When can we get it over?’”</p>
<p>The ship-to-shore assault at Iwo
was impressive enough, but the real
measure of amphibious effectiveness
can be seen in the massive, sustained
logistical support which somehow
flowed over those treacherous
beaches. Not only did the Marines
have all the ammunition and
flamethrower refills they needed,
around the clock, but they also had
many of the less obvious necessities
and niceties which marked this battle
as different from its predecessors.
Marines on Iwo had ample quantities
of whole blood, some of it donated
barely two weeks in advance,
flown in, refrigerated, and available.
The Marines also had mail call, unit
newsletters, fresh water, radio batteries,
fresh-baked bread, and prefabricated
burial markers, thousands of
them.</p>
<p>Iwo Jima featured superior inter-service
cooperation. The Navy-Marine
Corps team rarely functioned
more efficiently. The blue-water
Navy continued to earn the respect
of the Marines, especially on D-2
when the flotilla of tiny LCI gunboats
bravely attacked the coastal defense<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</SPAN></span>
guns to protect the Navy and Marine
frogmen. Likewise, the Marines welcomed
the contributions of the
Army, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic
Survey, Red Cross, and the
host of combat correspondents—all
of whom shared both the misery and
the glory of the prolonged battle.</p>
<div id="ip_51" class="figcenter" style="width: 432px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_053.jpg" width-obs="432" height-obs="293" alt="" />
<div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111147</p>
</div>
<div class="captionl">
<p><i>At the end of a very long fight, a Marine flamethrower operator pauses to light up.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ip_51b" class="figcenter" style="width: 658px;">
<div class="captionl top"><p><i>LtGen Holland M. Smith, USMC, with his Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific, chief of staff, Col Dudley S. Brown, surveys the wreckage
along the landing beaches. Iwo Jima was Gen Smith’s last
battle. After this, he returned to his headquarters on Hawaii.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="captionr top"><p>Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110635<br/></p>
</div>
<ANTIMG src="images/i_053a.jpg" width-obs="658" height-obs="397" alt="" /></div>
<p>Two aspects of the battle remain
controversial: the inadequate preliminary
bombardment and the decision
to use piecemeal replacements instead
of organized units to strengthen the
assault forces. Both decisions, rendered
in the context of several competing
factors, were made by
experienced commanders in good
faith. Unavoidably, Iwo Jima’s biggest
cost to the V Amphibious Corps
was the loss of so many combat veterans
in taking the island. While the
battle served to create a new generation
of veterans among the survivors,
many proud regiments suffered
devastating losses. With these same
units already designated as key components
of the landing force against
the Japanese home islands, such losses
had serious potential implications.
These factors may well have influenced
General Holland Smith’s unpopular
decision to withhold the 3d
Marines from the battle. From the
perspective of an exhausted company
commander on Iwo Jima, Smith’s
decision seemed inexcusable, then
and now; from the wider perspective
of the commanding general, Fleet<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</SPAN></span>
Marine Forces, Pacific, the decision
makes more sense.</p>
<p>Whatever his shortcomings, Holland
Smith probably knew amphibious
warfare better than anyone. Of
the hundreds of after-action reports
filed immediately following the battle,
his official analysis best captured
the essence of the struggle:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There was no hope of surprise,
either strategic or tactical.
There was little possibility for
tactical initiative; the entire
operation was fought on what
were virtually the enemy’s own
terms.... The strength, disposition,
and conduct of the
enemy’s defense required a
major penetration of the heart
of his prepared positions in the
center of the Motoyama Plateau
and a subsequent reduction of
the positions in the difficult terrain
sloping to the shore on the
flanks. The size and terrain of
the island precluded any Force
Beachhead Line. It was an operation
of one phase and one tactic.
From the time the
engagement was joined until the
mission was completed it was a
matter of frontal assault maintained
with relentless pressure
by a superior mass of troops
and supporting arms against a
position fortified to the maximum
practical extent.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We Americans of a subsequent
generation in the profession of arms
find it difficult to imagine a sustained
amphibious assault under such conditions.
In some respects the fighting
on Iwo Jima took on the features of
Marines fighting in France in 1918,
described by one as “a war girt with
horrors.” We sense the drama repeated
every morning at Iwo, after the
prep fires lifted, when the riflemen,
engineers, corpsmen, flame tank
crews, and armored bulldozer operators
somehow found the fortitude
to move out yet again into “Death
Valley” or “The Meatgrinder.” Few of
us today can study the defenses, analyze
the action reports, or walk the
broken ground without experiencing
a sense of reverence for the men who
won that epic battle.</p>
<p>Fleet Admiral Nimitz said these
words while the fighting still raged:
“Among the Americans who served
on Iwo Jima, uncommon valor was
a common virtue,” a sentiment now
chiseled in granite at the base of Felix
de Weldon’s gigantic bronze sculpture
of the Suribachi flag-raising.</p>
<p>Twenty-two Marines, four Navy
corpsmen, and one LCI skipper were
awarded the Medal of Honor for utmost
bravery during the battle of Iwo
Jima. Half were posthumous awards.</p>
<p>General Erskine placed these
sacrifices in perspective in remarks
made during the dedication of the 3d
Marine Division cemetery on the embattled
island:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Victory was never in doubt.
Its cost was. What was in
doubt, in all our minds, was
whether there would be any of
us left to dedicate our cemetery
at the end, or whether the last
Marine would die knocking out
the last Japanese gunner.</p>
</blockquote></div>
<div class="sidebar">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_50_Above_and_Beyond_the_Call_of_Duty" id="Sidebar_page_50_Above_and_Beyond_the_Call_of_Duty"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_49">page 50</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">Above and Beyond the Call of Duty</h3>
<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Twenty-seven</span> men received the Congressional
Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and
intrepidity during the battle of Iwo Jima: 22 Marines,
four Navy corpsmen, and one Navy landing craft
commander. Exactly half of the awards issued to Marines
and corpsmen of the V Amphibious Corps were posthumous.
Within a larger institutional context, Iwo Jima
represented more than one-fourth of the 80 Medals of
Honor awarded Marines during the Second World War.
This was Iwo Jima’s Roll of Honor:</p>
<ul>
<li>Cpl Charles J. Berry, 1/26, 3 March 1945<SPAN name="FNanchor_A" id="FNanchor_A" href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>PFC William R. Caddy, 3/26, 3 March<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>LtCol Justice M. Chambers, 3/25, 19–22 February</li>
<li>Sgt Darrell S. Cole, 1/23, 19 February<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>Capt Robert Dunlap, 1/26, 20–21 February</li>
<li>Sgt Ross F. Gray, 1/25, 21 February</li>
<li>Sgt William G. Harrell, 1/28, 3 March</li>
<li>Lt Rufus G. Herring, USNR, LCI 449, 17 February</li>
<li>PFC Douglas T. Jacobson, 3/23, 26 February</li>
<li>PltSgt Joseph J. Julian, 1/27, 9 March<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>PFC James D. LaBelle, 1/27, 8 March<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>2dLt John H. Leims, 1/9, 7 March</li>
<li>PFC Jacklyn H. Lucas, 1/26, 20 February</li>
<li>1stLt Jack Lummus, 2/27, 8 March<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>Capt Joseph J. McCarthy, 2/24, 21 February</li>
<li>1stLt Harry L. Martin, 5th Pioneer Battalion, 26 March<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>Pvt George Phillips, 2/28, 14 March<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>PhM 1/c Francis J. Pierce, USN, 2/24, 15–16 March</li>
<li>PFC Donald J. Ruhl, 2/28, 19–21 February<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>Pvt Franklin E. Sigler, 2/26, 14 March</li>
<li>Cpl Tony Stein, 1/28, 19 February<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>PhM 2/c George Wahlen, USN, 2/26, 3 March</li>
<li>GySgt William G. Walsh, 3/27, 27 February<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>Pvt Wilson D. Watson, 2/9, 26–27 February</li>
<li>Cpl Hershel W. Williams, 1/21, 23 February</li>
<li>PhM 3/c Jack Williams, USN, 3/28, 3 March<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
<li>PhM 1/c John H. Willis, USN, 3/27, 28 February<SPAN href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN></li>
</ul>
<div class="footnote">
<p><SPAN name="Footnote_A" id="Footnote_A" href="#FNanchor_A" class="fnanchor">A</SPAN> Posthumous</p>
</div>
<div id="if_i_052" class="figcenter" style="width: 613px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_052.jpg" width-obs="613" height-obs="504" alt="" /></div>
</div></div>
<div class="sidebar gray">
<p class="in0 small"><SPAN name="Sidebar_page_52_Assault_Divisions_Command_Structures" id="Sidebar_page_52_Assault_Divisions_Command_Structures"></SPAN>[Sidebar (<SPAN href="#Page_52">page 52</SPAN>):]</p>
<h3 class="nobreak p0">Assault Divisions’ Command Structures</h3>
<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1">As</span> the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions conducted their
final preparations for Operation Detachment, these were
the infantry commanders who would lead the way at the
beginning of the battle:</p>
<div class="center">
<table id="command" summary="Assault Divisions’ Command Structures">
<tr>
<td class="tdc tpad" colspan="2">3d Marine Division</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">3d Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col James A. Stewart</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">9th Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col Howard N. Kenyon</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">1/9</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Carey A. Randall</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">2/9</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Robert E. Cushman, Jr.</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">3/9</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Harold C. Boehm</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">21st Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col Hartnoll J. Withers</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">1/21</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Marlowe C. Williams</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">2/21</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Lowell E. English</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">3/21</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Wendell H. Duplantis</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc tpad" colspan="2">4th Marine Division</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">23d Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col Walter W. Wensinger</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">1/23</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Ralph Haas</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">2/23</td>
<td class="tdr">Maj Robert H. Davidson</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">3/23</td>
<td class="tdr">Maj James S. Scales</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">24th Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col Walter I. Jordan</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">1/24</td>
<td class="tdr">Maj Paul S. Treitel</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">2/24</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Richard Rothwell</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">3/24</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">25th Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col John R. Lanigan</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">1/25</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Hollis U. Mustain</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">2/25</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr.</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">3/25</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Justice M. Chambers</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc tpad" colspan="2">5th Marine Division</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">26th Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col Chester B. Graham</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">1/26</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Daniel C. Pollock</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">2/26</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Joseph P. Sayers</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">3/26</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Tom M. Trotti</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">27th Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col Thomas A. Wornham</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">1/27</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol John A. Butler</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">2/27</td>
<td class="tdr">Maj John W. Antonelli</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">3/27</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Donn J. Robertson</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">28th Marines</td>
<td class="tdr">Col Harry B. Liversedge</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">1/28</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">2/28</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Chandler W. Johnson</td></tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl in1">3/28</td>
<td class="tdr">LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr.</td></tr>
</table></div>
<p class="in0">[Note: Of those infantry battalion commanders who landed
on Iwo Jima on D-Day, only seven remained unwounded
and still retained command at the battle’s end.]</p>
</div>
<hr /></div>
<h2><SPAN name="Sources" id="Sources"></SPAN><i>Sources</i></h2>
<p>The official records of the V Amphibious
Corps at Iwo Jima occupy 27 boxes in the
USMC archives. Within this maze, the most
useful information can be found in the “comments
and recommendations” sections of the After
Action Reports filed by the major units. The
best published official account of the battle is
contained in George W. Garand and Truman R.
Strobridge, <i>Western Pacific Operations</i>, vol IV,
<i>History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in
World War II</i> (Washington: Historical Division,
HQMC, 1971). Three other official accounts are
recommended: LtCol Whitman S. Bartley, <i>Iwo
Jima: Amphibious Epic</i> (Washington: Historical
Division, 1954); Capt Clifford P. Morehouse,
<i>The Iwo Jima Operation</i>, and Bernard
C. Nalty, <i>The U.S. Marines on Iwo Jima: The
Battle and the Flag Raising</i> (Washington:
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1960).
Chapter 10 of Jeter A. Isely and Philip A.
Crowl, <i>The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War</i>
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1951), combines exhaustive research and keen
analysis of the assault on Iwo. Three of the
many postwar published accounts are particularly
recommended: Richard F. Newcomb, <i>Iwo
Jima</i> (New York: Bantam, 1982); Richard
Wheeler, <i>Iwo Jima</i> (New York: Crowell, 1980);
and Bill D. Ross, <i>Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor</i>
(New York: Vanguard Press, 1985).</p>
<p>The most comprehensive Japanese account is
contained in Part II (“Ogasawara Islands
Defense Operations”) in <i>Chubu Taiheyo rikugen
sakusen (2)</i> [Army Operations in the Central
Pacific, vol II], part of the <i>Senshi Sosho</i> War
History Series. Of Japanese accounts in English,
the best is Major Yoshitaka Horie’s “Explanation
of Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of Iwo
Jima,” written in 1946 and available at the Marine
Corps Historical Center (MCHC).</p>
<p>The MCHC maintains an abundance of personal
accounts related to Iwo Jima. Among the
most valuable of these are the Iwo Jima comments
in the Princeton Papers Collection in the
Personal Papers Section. The Marine Corps
Oral History Collection contains 36 well-indexed
memoirs of Iwo Jima participants. The
research library contains a limited edition of
<i>Dear Progeny</i>, the autobiography of Dr.
Michael F. Keleher, the battalion surgeon credited
with saving the life of “Jumping Joe” Chambers
on D+3. The Personal Papers Section also
holds the papers of TSgt Frederick K. Dashiell,
Lt John K. McLean, and Lt Eugene T. Petersen.
For an increased insight, the author also conducted
personal interviews with 41 Iwo
veterans.</p>
<p>The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions
of Marvin Taylor of the Marine
Rocket Troops Association; Helen McDonald
of the Admiral Nimitz Museum: Frederick and
Thomas Dashiell; LtCol Joseph McNamara,
USMCR; BGen James D. Hittle, USMC (Ret);
Mr. Bunichi Ohtsuka; and the entire staff of the
Marine Corps Historical Center, whose collective
“can-do” spirit was personified by the late
Regina Strother, photograph archivist.</p>
<hr /></div>
<h2><SPAN name="About_the_Author" id="About_the_Author"></SPAN><i>About the Author</i></h2>
<div id="if_i_055" class="figleft" style="width: 160px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_055.jpg" width-obs="160" height-obs="191" alt="" /></div>
<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Colonel</span> Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret),
served 29 years on active duty in the Marine
Corps as an assault amphibian officer, including
two tours in Vietnam. He is a
distinguished graduate of the Naval War College
and holds degrees in history from North Carolina,
Georgetown, and Jacksonville. He is a life
member of both the Marine Corps Historical
Foundation and the Naval Institute, a member
of the Society for Military History, the Military
Order of the World Wars, and the North Carolina Writers’ Workshop.</p>
<p>Colonel Alexander, an independent historian, wrote <i>Across the Reef: The Marine
Assault on Tarawa</i> in this series. He is co-author (with Lieutenant Colonel
Merrill L. Bartlett) of <i>Sea Soldiers in the Cold War</i> (Naval Institute Press, 1994)
and the author of “Utmost Savagery: the Amphibious Seizure of Tarawa” (Naval
Institute Press, pending). He has also written numerous feature essays published
in <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, <i>Naval Institute Proceedings</i>, <i>Naval History</i>, <i>Leatherneck</i>,
<i>Amphibious Warfare Review</i>, <i>World War Two</i>, and <i>Florida Historical Quarterly</i>.</p>
</div>
<div class="sidebar" id="About_the_Series">
<div id="if_i_055a" class="figcenter" style="width: 406px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_055a.jpg" width-obs="406" height-obs="114" alt="" /></div>
<p>THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the
World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by
the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance
of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.</p>
<p>Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by
a grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation.</p>
<div class="center">
<p class="bold" style="font-family: sans-serif, serif;">WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</p>
<p><i>DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS</i><br/>
<b>Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)</b><br/>
<br/>
<i>GENERAL EDITOR,<br/>
WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</i><br/>
<b>Benis M. Frank</b><br/>
<br/>
<i>CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT</i><br/>
<b>George C. MacGillivray</b><br/>
<br/>
<i>EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION</i><br/>
<b>Robert E. Struder</b>, Senior Editor; <b>W. Stephen Hill</b>, Visual Information Specialist<br/>
<b>Catherine A. Kerns</b>, Composition Services Technician<br/>
<br/>
Marine Corps Historical Center<br/>
Building 58, Washington Navy Yard<br/>
Washington, D.C. 20374-5040<br/>
<br/>
1994<br/>
<br/>
PCN 190 003131 00</p>
</div>
</div>
<div id="if_i_056" class="figcenter" style="width: 300px;">
<ANTIMG src="images/i_056.jpg" width-obs="300" height-obs="400" alt="" /></div>
</div>
<div class="transnote">
<h2 class="nobreak p1"><SPAN name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes"></SPAN>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
changed.</p>
<p>Simple typographical errors and unbalanced quotation marks
were corrected.</p>
<p>To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;
and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the
original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between
chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the
page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the
Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last
line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more
noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and
each Sidebar is displayed within a box.</p>
<p>Sidebar “<SPAN href="#Sidebar_page_37_The_Marines_Zippo_Tanks">The Marines’ Zippo Tanks</SPAN>” (originally on page <SPAN href="#Page_36">37</SPAN>) used
both “Mark I” and “Mark 1”. Here, all of them are “Mark I”.</p>
</div>
<p>Page <SPAN href="#Page_47">47</SPAN>: “D-4” may be a misprint for “G-4”.</p>
<SPAN name="endofbook"></SPAN>
<div style="break-after:column;"></div><br />