<h2><SPAN name="XIII" id="XIII"></SPAN>XIII</h2>
<br/>
<p><i>The Secession Movement—South Carolina
Secession—Buchanan's Neglect—Disloyal
Cabinet Members—Washington Central
Cabal—Anderson's Transfer to Sumter—Star
of the West—Montgomery Rebellion—Davis
and Stephens—Corner-stone Theory—Lincoln
Inaugurated—His Inaugural
Address—Lincoln's Cabinet—The Question of
Sumter—Seward's Memorandum—Lincoln's
Answer—Bombardment of Sumter—Anderson's
Capitulation</i></p>
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<p>It is not the province of these chapters to relate in detail the
course of the secession movement in the cotton States in the
interim which elapsed between the election and inauguration of
President Lincoln. Still less can space be given to analyze and set
forth the lamentable failure of President Buchanan to employ the
executive authority and power of the government to prevent it, or
even to hinder its development, by any vigorous opposition or
adequate protest. The determination of South Carolina to secede was
announced by the governor of that State a month before the
presidential election, and on the day before the election he sent
the legislature of the State a revolutionary message to formally
inaugurate it. From that time forward the whole official machinery
of the State not only led, but forced the movement which culminated
on December 20 in the ordinance of secession by the South Carolina
convention.</p>
<p>This official revolution in South Carolina was quickly<SPAN name="page176" id="page176"></SPAN> imitated by similar official revolutions
ending in secession ordinances in the States of Mississippi, on
January 9, 1861; Florida, January 10; Alabama, January 11; Georgia,
January 19; Louisiana, January 26; and by a still bolder usurpation
in Texas, culminating on February 1. From the day of the
presidential election all these proceedings were known probably
more fully to President Buchanan than to the general public,
because many of the actors were his personal and party friends;
while almost at their very beginning he became aware that three
members of his cabinet were secretly or openly abetting and
promoting them by their official influence and power.</p>
<p>Instead of promptly dismissing these unfaithful servants, he
retained one of them a month, and the others twice that period, and
permitted them so far to influence his official conduct, that in
his annual message to Congress he announced the fallacious and
paradoxical doctrine that though a State had no right to secede,
the Federal government had no right to coerce her to remain in the
Union.</p>
<p>Nor could he justify his non-action by the excuse that
contumacious speeches and illegal resolves of parliamentary bodies
might be tolerated under the American theory of free assemblage and
free speech. Almost from the beginning of the secession movement,
it was accompanied from time to time by overt acts both of treason
and war; notably, by the occupation and seizure by military order
and force of the seceding States, of twelve or fifteen harbor
forts, one extensive navy-yard, half a dozen arsenals, three mints,
four important custom-houses, three revenue cutters, and a variety
of miscellaneous Federal property; for all of which insults to the
flag, and infractions of the sovereignty of the United States,
President Buchanan <SPAN name="page177" id="page177"></SPAN>could recommend no more efficacious
remedy or redress than to ask the voters of the country to reverse
their decision given at the presidential election, and to appoint a
day of fasting and prayer on which to implore the Most High "to
remove from our hearts that false pride of opinion which would
impel us to persevere in wrong for the sake of consistency."</p>
<p>Nor must mention be omitted of the astounding phenomenon that,
encouraged by President Buchanan's doctrine of non-coercion and
purpose of non-action, a central cabal of Southern senators and
representatives issued from Washington, on December 14, their
public proclamation of the duty of secession; their executive
committee using one of the rooms of the Capitol building itself as
the headquarters of the conspiracy and rebellion they were
appointed to lead and direct.</p>
<p>During the month of December, while the active treason of
cotton-State officials and the fatal neglect of the Federal
executive were in their most damaging and demoralizing stages, an
officer of the United States army had the high courage and
distinguished honor to give the ever-growing revolution its first
effective check. Major Robert Anderson, though a Kentuckian by
birth and allied by marriage to a Georgia family, was, late in
November, placed in command of the Federal forts in Charleston
harbor; and having repeatedly reported that his little garrison of
sixty men was insufficient for the defense of Fort Moultrie, and
vainly asked for reinforcements which were not sent him, he
suddenly and secretly, on the night after Christmas, transferred
his command from the insecure position of Moultrie to the strong
and unapproachable walls of Fort Sumter, midway in the mouth of
Charleston harbor, where he could not be assailed by the raw
Charleston militia companies that had for weeks been <SPAN name="page178" id="page178"></SPAN>
threatening him with a storming assault. In this stronghold,
surrounded on all sides by water, he loyally held possession for
the government and sovereignty of the United States.</p>
<p>The surprised and baffled rage of the South Carolina rebels
created a crisis at Washington that resulted in the expulsion of
the President's treacherous counselors and the reconstruction of
Mr. Buchanan's cabinet to unity and loyalty. The new cabinet,
though unable to obtain President Buchanan's consent to aggressive
measures to reëstablish the Federal authority, was,
nevertheless, able to prevent further concessions to the
insurrection, and to effect a number of important defensive
precautions, among which was the already mentioned concentration of
a small military force to protect the national capital.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the governor of South Carolina had begun the erection
of batteries to isolate and besiege Fort Sumter; and the first of
these, on a sand-spit of Morris Island commanding the main
ship-channel, by a few shots turned back, on January 9, the
merchant steamer <i>Star of the West</i>, in which General Scott
had attempted to send a reinforcement of two hundred recruits to
Major Anderson. Battery building was continued with uninterrupted
energy until a triangle of siege works was established on the
projecting points of neighboring islands, mounting a total of
thirty guns and seventeen mortars, manned and supported by a
volunteer force of from four to six thousand men.</p>
<p>Military preparation, though not on so extensive or definite a
scale, was also carried on in the other revolted States; and while
Mr. Lincoln was making his memorable journey from Springfield to
Washington, telegrams were printed in the newspapers, from day to
day, showing that their delegates had met at
Montgomery,<SPAN name="page179" id="page179"></SPAN> Alabama, formed a provisional congress,
and adopted a constitution and government under the title of The
Confederate States of America, of which they elected Jefferson
Davis of Mississippi President, and Alexander H. Stephens of
Georgia Vice-President.</p>
<p>It needs to be constantly borne in mind that the beginning of
this vast movement was not a spontaneous revolution, but a chronic
conspiracy. "The secession of South Carolina," truly said one of
the chief actors, "is not an event of a day. It is not anything
produced by Mr. Lincoln's election, or by the non-execution of the
fugitive-slave law. It is a matter which has been gathering head
for thirty years." The central motive and dominating object of the
revolution was frankly avowed by Vice-President Stephens in a
speech he made at Savannah a few weeks after his inauguration:</p>
<p>"The prevailing ideas entertained by him [Jefferson] and most of
the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old
Constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in
violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in
<i>principle</i>, socially, morally, and politically.... Our new
government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its
foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth,
that the negro is not equal to the white man; that
slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his
natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the
first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical,
philosophical, and moral truth."</p>
<p>In the week which elapsed between Mr. Lincoln's arrival in
Washington and the day of inauguration, he exchanged the customary
visits of ceremony with President Buchanan, his cabinet, the
Supreme Court, the two Houses of Congress, and other dignitaries.
In his rooms at Willard's Hotel he also held consultations
<SPAN name="page180" id="page180"></SPAN> with leading Republicans about the final
composition of his cabinet and pressing questions of public policy.
Careful preparations had been made for the inauguration, and under
the personal eye of General Scott the military force in the city
was ready instantly to suppress any attempt to disturb the peace or
quiet of the day.</p>
<p>On March 4 the outgoing and incoming Presidents rode side by
side in a carriage from the Executive Mansion to the Capitol and
back, escorted by an imposing military and civic procession; and an
immense throng of spectators heard the new Executive read his
inaugural address from the east portico of the Capitol. He stated
frankly that a disruption of the Federal Union was being formidably
attempted, and discussed dispassionately the theory and illegality
of secession. He held that the Union was perpetual; that resolves
and ordinances of disunion are legally void; and announced that to
the extent of his ability he would faithfully execute the laws of
the Union in all the States. The power confided to him would be
used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging
to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts. But
beyond what might be necessary for these objects there would be no
invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere.
Where hostility to the United States in any interior locality
should be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident
citizens from holding the Federal offices, there would be no
attempt to force obnoxious strangers among them for that object.
The mails, unless repelled, would continue to be furnished in all
parts of the Union; and this course would be followed until current
events and experience should show a change to be necessary. To the
South he made an earnest <SPAN name="page181" id="page181"></SPAN>plea against the folly of disunion,
and in favor of maintaining peace and fraternal good will;
declaring that their property, peace, and personal security were in
no danger from a Republican administration.</p>
<p>"One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought
to be extended," he said, "while the other believes it is wrong and
ought not to be extended; that is the only substantial dispute....
Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our
respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall
between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the
presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different
parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to
face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue
between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more
advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can
aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can
treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens, than laws can
among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and
when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you
cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of
intercourse are again upon you.... In your hands, my dissatisfied
fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil
war. The government will not assail you. You can have no conflict
without being yourselves the aggressors.... I am loath to close. We
are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though
passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of
affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every
battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and
hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of
<SPAN name="page182" id="page182"></SPAN> the Union, when again touched, as surely
they will be, by the better angels of our nature."</p>
<p>But the peaceful policy here outlined was already more difficult
to follow than Mr. Lincoln was aware. On the morning after
inauguration the Secretary of War brought to his notice freshly
received letters from Major Anderson, commanding Fort Sumter in
Charleston harbor, announcing that in the course of a few weeks the
provisions of the garrison would be exhausted, and therefore an
evacuation or surrender would become necessary, unless the fort
were relieved by supplies or reinforcements; and this information
was accompanied by the written opinions of the officers that to
relieve the fort would require a well-appointed army of twenty
thousand men.</p>
<p>The new President had appointed as his cabinet William H.
Seward, Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the
Treasury; Simon Cameron, Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, Secretary
of the Navy; Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Montgomery
Blair, Postmaster-General; and Edward Bates, Attorney-General. The
President and his official advisers at once called into counsel the
highest military and naval officers of the Union to consider the
new and pressing emergency revealed by the unexpected news from
Sumter. The professional experts were divided in opinion. Relief by
a force of twenty thousand men was clearly out of the question. No
such Union army existed, nor could one be created within the limit
of time. The officers of the navy thought that men and supplies
might be thrown into the fort by swift-going vessels, while on the
other hand the army officers believed that such an expedition would
surely be destroyed by the formidable batteries which the
insurgents had erected to close the harbor. In view <SPAN name="page183" id="page183"></SPAN>of all
the conditions, Lieutenant-General Scott, general-in-chief of the
army, recommended the evacuation of the fort as a military
necessity.</p>
<p>President Lincoln thereupon asked the several members of his
cabinet the written question: "Assuming it to be possible to now
provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to
attempt it?" Only two members replied in the affirmative, while the
other five argued against the attempt, holding that the country
would recognize that the evacuation of the fort was not an
indication of policy, but a necessity created by the neglect of the
old administration. Under this advice, the President withheld his
decision until he could gather further information.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, three commissioners had arrived from the provisional
government at Montgomery, Alabama, under instructions to endeavor
to negotiate a <i>de facto</i> and <i>de jure</i> recognition of
the independence of the Confederate States. They were promptly
informed by Mr. Seward that he could not receive them; that he did
not see in the Confederate States a rightful and accomplished
revolution and an independent nation; and that he was not at
liberty to recognize the commissioners as diplomatic agents, or to
hold correspondence with them. Failing in this direct application,
they made further efforts through Mr. Justice Campbell of the
Supreme Court, as a friendly intermediary, who came to Seward in
the guise of a loyal official, though his correspondence with
Jefferson Davis soon revealed a treasonable intent; and, replying
to Campbell's earnest entreaties that peace should be maintained,
Seward informed him confidentially that the military status at
Charleston would not be changed without notice to the governor of
South Carolina. On March 29 a cabinet meeting for the second time
<SPAN name="page184" id="page184"></SPAN>discussed the question of Sumter. Four of
the seven members now voted in favor of an attempt to supply the
fort with provisions, and the President signed a memorandum order
to prepare certain ships for such an expedition, under the command
of Captain G.V. Fox.</p>
<p>So far, Mr. Lincoln's new duties as President of the United
States had not in any wise put him at a disadvantage with his
constitutional advisers. Upon the old question of slavery he was as
well informed and had clearer convictions and purposes than either
Seward or Chase. And upon the newer question of secession, and the
immediate decision about Fort Sumter which it involved, the members
of his cabinet were, like himself, compelled to rely on the
professional advice of experienced army and navy officers. Since
these differed radically in their opinions, the President's own
powers of perception and logic were as capable of forming a correct
decision as men who had been governors and senators. He had reached
at least a partial decision in the memorandum he gave Fox to
prepare ships for the Sumter expedition.</p>
<p>It must therefore have been a great surprise to the President
when, on April 1, Secretary of State Seward handed him a memorandum
setting forth a number of most extraordinary propositions. For a
full enumeration of the items the reader must carefully study the
entire document, which is printed below in a foot-note;<SPAN name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></SPAN><SPAN href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</SPAN> but the principal points for which it had
evidently been written and presented can be given in a few
sentences.</p>
<p>A month has elapsed, and the administration has neither a
domestic nor a foreign policy. The administration must at once
adopt and carry out a novel, radical, and aggressive policy. It
must cease saying a word about slavery, and raise a great outcry
about Union. It must declare war against France and Spain, and
combine and organize all the governments of North and South America
in a crusade to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. This policy once
adopted, it must be the business of some one incessantly to pursue
it. "It is not in my especial province," wrote Mr. Seward; "but I
neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility." This phrase,
which is a key to the whole memorandum, enables the reader easily
to translate its meaning into something like the following:</p>
<p>After a month's trial, you, Mr. Lincoln, are a failure as
President. The country is in desperate straits, and must use a
desperate remedy. That remedy is to submerge the South Carolina
insurrection in a continental war. Some new man must take the
executive helm, and wield the undivided presidential authority. I
should have been nominated at Chicago, and elected in November, but
am willing to take your place and perform your <SPAN name="page185" id="page185"></SPAN>
duties.</p>
<p><SPAN name="page186" id="page186"></SPAN>Why William H. Seward, who is fairly
entitled to rank as a great statesman, should have written this
memorandum and presented it to Mr. Lincoln, has never been
explained; nor is it capable of explanation. Its suggestions were
so visionary, its reasoning so fallacious, its assumptions so
unwarranted, its conclusions so malapropos, that it falls below
critical examination. Had Mr. Lincoln been an envious or a
resentful man, he could not have wished for a better occasion to
put a rival under his feet.</p>
<p>The President doubtless considered the incident one of
phenomenal strangeness, but it did not in the least disturb his
unselfish judgment or mental equipoise. There was in his answer no
trace of excitement or passion. He pointed out in a few sentences
of simple, quiet explanation that what the administration had done
was exactly a foreign and domestic policy which <SPAN name="page187" id="page187"></SPAN>the
Secretary of State himself had concurred in and helped to frame.
Only, that Mr. Seward proposed to go further and give up Sumter.
Upon the central suggestion that some one mind must direct, Mr.
Lincoln wrote with simple dignity:</p>
<p>"If this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of
policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being
changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of
unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I
wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the
cabinet."</p>
<p>Mr. Lincoln's unselfish magnanimity is the central marvel of the
whole affair. His reply ended the argument. Mr. Seward doubtless
saw at once how completely he had put himself in the President's
power. Apparently, neither of the men ever again alluded to the
incident. No other persons except Mr. Seward's son and the
President's private secretary ever saw the correspondence, or knew
of the occurrence. The President put the papers away in an envelop,
and no word of the affair came to the public until a quarter of a
century later, when the details were published in Mr. Lincoln's
biography. In one mind, at least, there was no further doubt that
the cabinet had a master, for only some weeks later Mr. Seward is
known to have written: "There is but one vote in the cabinet, and
that is cast by the President." This mastery Mr. Lincoln retained
with a firm dignity throughout his administration. When, near the
close of the war, he sent Mr. Seward to meet the rebel
commissioners at the Hampton Roads conference, he finished his
short letter of instructions with the imperative sentence: "You
will not assume to definitely consummate anything."</p>
<p>From this strange episode our narrative must return to the
question of Fort Sumter. On April 4, official <SPAN name="page188" id="page188"></SPAN>notice
was sent to Major Anderson of the coming relief, with the
instruction to hold out till the eleventh or twelfth if possible;
but authorizing him to capitulate whenever it might become
necessary to save himself and command. Two days later the President
sent a special messenger with written notice to the governor of
South Carolina that an attempt would be made to supply Fort Sumter
with provisions only; and that if such attempt were not resisted,
no further effort would be made to throw in men, arms, or
ammunition, without further notice, or unless in case of an attack
on the fort.</p>
<p>The building of batteries around Fort Sumter had been begun,
under the orders of Governor Pickens, about the first of January,
and continued with industry and energy; and about the first of
March General Beauregard, an accomplished engineer officer, was
sent by the Confederate government to take charge of and complete
the works. On April 1 he telegraphed to Montgomery: "Batteries
ready to open Wednesday or Thursday. What instructions?"</p>
<p>At this point, the Confederate authorities at Montgomery found
themselves face to face with the fatal alternative either to begin
war or to allow their rebellion to collapse. Their claim to
independence was denied, their commissioners were refused a
hearing; yet not an angry word, provoking threat, nor harmful act
had come from President Lincoln. He had promised them peace,
protection, freedom from irritation; had offered them the benefit
of the mails. Even now, all he proposed to do was—not to send
guns or ammunition or men to Sumter, but only bread and provisions
to Anderson and his soldiers. His prudent policy placed them in the
exact attitude described a month earlier in his inaugural; they
could have no <SPAN name="page189" id="page189"></SPAN>conflict without being themselves the
aggressors. But the rebellion was organized by ambitious men with
desperate intentions. A member of the Alabama legislature, present
at Montgomery, said to Jefferson Davis and three members of his
cabinet: "Gentlemen, unless you sprinkle blood in the face of the
people of Alabama, they will be back in the old Union in less than
ten days." And the sanguinary advice was adopted. In answer to his
question, "What instructions?" Beauregard on April 10 was ordered
to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter, and, in case of refusal,
to reduce it.</p>
<p>The demand was presented to Anderson, who replied that he would
evacuate the fort by noon of April 15, unless assailed, or unless
he received supplies or controlling instructions from his
government. This answer being unsatisfactory to Beauregard, he sent
Anderson notice that he would open fire on Sumter at 4:20 on the
morning of April 12.</p>
<p>Promptly at the hour indicated the bombardment was begun. As has
been related, the rebel siege-works were built on the points of the
islands forming the harbor, at distances varying from thirteen
hundred to twenty-five hundred yards, and numbered nineteen
batteries, with an armament of forty-seven guns, supported by a
land force of from four to six thousand volunteers. The
disproportion between means of attack and defense was enormous.
Sumter, though a work three hundred by three hundred and fifty feet
in size, with well-constructed walls and casemates of brick, was in
very meager preparation for such a conflict. Of its forty-eight
available guns, only twenty-one were in the casemates, twenty-seven
being on the rampart <i>en barbette</i>. The garrison consisted of
nine commissioned officers, sixty-eight non-commissioned officers
and privates, eight musicians, and forty-three <SPAN name="page190" id="page190"></SPAN>
non-combatant workmen compelled by the besiegers to remain to
hasten the consumption of provisions.</p>
<p>Under the fire of the seventeen mortars in the rebel batteries,
Anderson could reply only with a vertical fire from the guns of
small caliber in his casemates, which was of no effect against the
rebel bomb-proofs of sand and roofs of sloping railroad iron; but,
refraining from exposing his men to serve his barbette guns, his
garrison was also safe in its protecting casemates. It happened,
therefore, that although the attack was spirited and the defense
resolute, the combat went on for a day and a half without a single
casualty. It came to an end on the second day only when the
cartridges of the garrison were exhausted, and the red-hot shot
from the rebel batteries had set the buildings used as officers'
quarters on fire, creating heat and smoke that rendered further
defense impossible.</p>
<p>There was also the further discouragement that the expedition of
relief which Anderson had been instructed to look for on the
eleventh or twelfth, had failed to appear. Several unforeseen
contingencies had prevented the assembling of the vessels at the
appointed rendezvous outside Charleston harbor, though some of them
reached it in time to hear the opening guns of the bombardment. But
as accident had deranged and thwarted the plan agreed upon, they
could do nothing except impatiently await the issue of the
fight.</p>
<p>A little after noon of April 13, when the flagstaff of the fort
had been shot away and its guns remained silent, an invitation to
capitulate with the honors of war came from General Beauregard,
which Anderson accepted; and on the following day, Sunday, April
14, he hauled down his flag with impressive ceremonies, and leaving
the fort with his faithful garrison, proceeded in a steamer to New
York.</p>
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