<h2>CHAPTER III</h2>
<h3>THE DAWN OF THE NEW PERIOD</h3>
<p>The period which was to be that of the regeneration
of Egypt and its people was ushered in by social
and political storm and tempest. But the first
warning note of its coming, after a brief moment
of panic, was unheeded by the people. Nearly three
centuries had passed since the country had been
invaded by an enemy. That enemy was now the
sovereign Power, and under the grasping, selfish rule
of its executive the trade and commerce of the
country had almost entirely disappeared, and thus
isolated from the rest of the world the people had
no conception of the growth of the power and
civilisation of the European nations. They were,
therefore, completely ignorant of the events and
political impulses that were, though for the moment
indirectly only, shaping the future that lay before
them.</p>
<p>There were both Englishmen and Frenchmen in
the country at the time, but the rulers of the land,
arrogant in their petty might, and the people not
less so in their degradation, alike held all foreigners
in contempt, and thus profited nothing from their<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_35" id="Page_35"></SPAN></span>
presence. They had, therefore, no means of knowing
what the relations between the two great European
Powers were, or of anticipating how those relations
were liable to affect their country. Yet the fact that
brought about the opening of the modern period in
their history and thus decreed the ultimate fate of
the country was the mutual hostility that swayed
the two Powers. This hostility had no relation to
Egypt or its people, and, but for contributing causes,
could never have affected these, yet it was the desire
of the French Government to strike what it fondly
hoped would prove a decisive blow at the growth
of English power in the East, that was the chief
inspiring cause of its decision to order the invasion
of Egypt. The Directory, which was at the time
the governing body in France, had indeed more than
one reason for taking this step, nor was it under the
Directory that the eyes of the French had been
turned to the valley of the Nile for the first time.
Leibnitz, in 1672, had urged upon Louis XIV. the
conquest of the country as an object worthy of his
attention, declaring that the possession of it would
render France the mistress of the world, and though
nothing was done at that time to realise the far-seeing
policy he advocated, there can be no doubt
that the idea was never abandoned. Talleyrand,
indeed, said that on his accession to office, he had
found more than one project for its accomplishment
lying in the pigeon-holes of the Foreign Office, and
he himself entered heartily into the scheme, believing
that it would be a most important move towards the
fulfilment of his theory that the future of France<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_36" id="Page_36"></SPAN></span>
depended upon the extension of her influence along
the shores of the Mediterranean. Volney, the
traveller and author of the "Ruins of Empires,"
having visited Egypt had, in 1786, reported that it
was in a practically defenceless condition, and
Magallon, the French Consul at Alexandria, having
for years urged the Government to interfere on
behalf of its subjects in Egypt, had, in 1796, made
a voyage to France with the express purpose of
protesting against the indignities and ill-usage from
which they were suffering, and fully confirmed the
views of Volney and Leibnitz. The Directory were
thus at once shown the possibility of acquiring a
colony of the utmost value and provided with a
reasonable excuse for its annexation. These and
other arguments, against which the fact that the
French nation was then at peace and on good terms
with the Sultan of Turkey, the sovereign of the
country, weighed as nothing, decided the Directory.
In March, 1798, therefore, the order to organise an
expedition for the conquest of Egypt was given to
Bonaparte, and two months later, on May 19th, he
set out in command of a vast armada, sailing from
Toulon and other ports of the south of France.</p>
<p>Thus it was the aspirations of the French nation
for the extension of its influence in the Mediterranean
and for the acquisition of new colonies and
its conquest rivalry with England, and not events
in the country itself, that heralded the dawn of the
new period, and eventually, though chiefly indirectly,
produced the greatest change in the condition and
prospects of the people that their history records.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_37" id="Page_37"></SPAN></span>The rapidity with which the French expedition
was prepared, and the secrecy with which its
destination was concealed, led the Directory and
Bonaparte himself to hope that it would escape all
risk of interference on its way to Egypt. In this
they were not disappointed, but hearing of the
assembling of a great military and naval force in
the south of France, and believing that it was
intended to make a descent upon the Irish coast
with a view to co-operation with the rebels there,
Lord Vincent warned Nelson to watch for, and,
if possible, destroy it. The people of India were
then, however, like those of Ireland, in negotiation
with the French, and in particular the famous
Tippoo Sultan, "The Tiger of Mysore," longing to
be revenged for the defeat and losses Lord Cornwallis
had inflicted upon him, had sought their aid.
Nelson was aware of this, and having a strong sense
of the danger to English interests in India and the
East generally the possession of Egypt by the
French would be, guessed the real destination of
the expedition, and finding that the French had
got away to sea, immediately started in pursuit, and,
acting upon his own conception as to its aim, steered
straight for Egypt. Bonaparte had, however, after
leaving the French coast, proceeded to Malta, which
he seized, and being thus delayed some days on his
way to Egypt, Nelson passed without falling in
with him, and thus it was that on June 21st the
Alexandrians were startled by the approach of the
English Fleet.</p>
<p>As soon as the character of the ships thus unexpectedly<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_38" id="Page_38"></SPAN></span>
appearing on their coast became known
the town was thrown into a state of the greatest
excitement, and the Governor, believing that the
fleet was a hostile one, sent off to Cairo the messengers
whose arrival there I have already chronicled,
and at the same time sent other messengers to summon
the Bedouins, or nomad Arabs, inhabiting the
neighbouring deserts, to assist in the defence of
the town.</p>
<p>Nelson lost no time in sending ashore to seek news
of the French, but the reception given to his officers
was far from friendly. Refusing to credit the statement
that the English came as friends and protectors
and not as enemies, the Governor openly expressed
his distrust, and in doing so simply voiced the feelings
of the people. Utterly ignorant of everything outside
the narrow range of their own experience, it was
indeed impossible for these to comprehend how the
occupation of Egypt by the French could be a
matter of vital importance to the English. So
when Nelson's officers assured the Governor that
they asked nothing more than to await the arrival
of the French and to buy a few supplies of which
the fleet was in need, he answered them that they
could have nothing. "Egypt," said he, "belongs
to the Sultan, and neither the French nor any
other people have anything to do with it, so please
go away."</p>
<p>It was a bold speech, and as foolish as it was bold,
for no one knew better than the Governor himself
that he was quite powerless to oppose the English
if they wished to land, or to take what they needed<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_39" id="Page_39"></SPAN></span>
by force. It was a speech, too, worth noticing, for
it affords a clue to much that puzzles the ordinary
critic of Egyptian history. Judged by any known
canon of social or international courtesy or policy,
it was not less inexcusable than indiscreet, for it was
as likely to enrage an enemy as to anger a friend,
but it was just what one knowing the people might
have expected—the utterance of the impulse of the
moment, and, therefore, a full and truthful statement
of the speaker's thought. For to the Egyptian mind
the visit of a fleet of foreign ships of war could have
no other object than the conquest or raiding of the
country, hence the English Fleet must be a hostile
one. It was neither lawful nor wise to give provision
or succour of any kind to an enemy, therefore they
had nothing to say to the English but "Please go
away."</p>
<p>It was thus that the people of Alexandria argued
then, and it is thus that the people of Egypt
generally still argue. For they have always been
incapable of taking a broad or general view of any
subject. No matter how many-sided a question may
be, they, as a rule, can see but one aspect of it
at a time. They look, in fact, at all things through
a mental telescope that, bringing one narrow and
limited aspect of a subject into bold and clear relief,
shuts from their vision all that surrounds it. Hence
when, as they can and sometimes do, they change
their point of view, the change is commonly as
abrupt as it is thorough, and those who see only the
surface tax them with fickleness. Of late years there
have been signs that, at all events, the educated<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_40" id="Page_40"></SPAN></span>
classes are learning to reason on surer and safer
grounds; but if the reader would understand their
story, he must ever bear in mind the narrow
basis of their judgments and, therefore, of their
actions.</p>
<p>While the answer of the Governor to the English
is thus illustrative of a point to be remembered in
the character of the Egyptians, the life-story of the
man himself also helps us to more fully grasp their
mental attitude under the changing circumstances
of the period. This Governor, Sayed Mahomed
Kerim, was an Egyptian of humble birth, but one
of Arab blood, claiming to be a Sayed or Shereef;
that is to say, a descendant of the Prophet
Mahomed's family, and thus one of the Arab
nobility. In his early manhood this man, who
as a Sayed, was and is blessed and prayed for by
every Mahomedan in the world at every time of
praying, was glad to fill the modest post of a weigher
in the Customs. Gifted with intelligence and other
qualities that commended him to his superiors, by
their favour and his own ability he rose rapidly to
become the local Director of Customs, and eventually,
as we find him, Governor of the town. That
in this position he had the confidence and respect
of his townsmen seems clear; and it is thus evident
that, tyrannical and oppressive as was the rule under
which they lived, there was an open path to place and
power for able men. Bribery and corruption, it is
true, were rife, so much so, that we may safely
assume that Sayed Mahomed did not attain his high
position wholly without their aid, but they did not<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_41" id="Page_41"></SPAN></span>
play the dominating part assigned them by historians
of the time.</p>
<p>We shall see but little more of this Sayed
Mahomed, for though still a young man, he had but
a short span of life to run, yet the little we shall see
makes him a notable man, and one that should be
studied. Bold, impulsive, proud and fearless, with
that decision of character so praised by Foster;
quick to decide and unalterable in his decisions,
deciding rightly from his own standpoint, but often
with too limited a view—emphatically more of an
Arab than an Egyptian type, and yet in the few
glances we get of him, illustrating, most aptly, the
Egyptian character. Thus, as his answer to the
English was essentially Egyptian and not Arab in
substance and manner, so also was his subsequent
action. For an Arab in such a strait would have
sought to gain time by fair-speaking, so that he
might take such measures as he could, or at the
worst secure better terms, whereas Sayed Mahomed
spoke in a manner that, had the English been, as
he supposed, enemies, must have precipitated hostilities,
and having done so, again Egyptian-like,
made no adequate attempt to protect the town from
the possible consequences of his rashness.</p>
<p>Whether fortunately or otherwise no man can say,
Nelson, too intent upon the object he had in view
to be moved from his immediate purpose, took the
rebuff offered him calmly, and, after a day's rest
off the port, sailed away, leaving the Alexandrians
to congratulate themselves upon their own astuteness
and to indulge themselves in vain-glorious<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_42" id="Page_42"></SPAN></span>
anticipations of the prodigies of valour they were
to perform should the French land upon their
shores.</p>
<p>A week having passed by without the appearance
of an enemy, the people had regained their wonted
calm, when as unexpectedly as though no warning
had been given of its coming the French fleet of
twenty-one vessels of war and over three hundred
transports was seen in the offing heading for the
port. This sudden and unlooked-for proof of the
reality of the danger they had refused to credit
produced the utmost consternation.</p>
<p>Once more the Governor despatched messengers
in all haste to the capital, and describing the French
fleet as one "without beginning or end," begged
earnestly, but all too late, for aid.</p>
<p>The people of Cairo, like those of Alexandria,
when their first alarm at the arrival of Nelson's
fleet had passed away, seeing in his departure a
confirmation of their own conception of his visit,
ceased to think of the matter save as the subject
of jest, but were overwhelmed with dismay at the
new alarm, even the Government, which had been
but little moved by the first, being now stirred to
activity and a sense of danger.</p>
<p>The Government of Egypt was then, at least
nominally, such as it had been constituted after
the Turkish conquest in 1517 by Sultan Selim.
Keenly recognising the impossibility of enforcing
his authority in a province of the Empire so far
off and so difficult of access from his own capital,
the Sultan had, not unwisely, contented himself<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_43" id="Page_43"></SPAN></span>
with organising a system of government that was,
in his opinion, the one most likely to ensure the
permanency of his sovereignty and guarantee him
the receipt of a goodly share of the wealth of his
new possession. Egypt was placed, therefore, as
the other provinces of the Empire then were, and
still are, under the government of a Pacha, who
was in effect, though he was accorded neither the
style nor the honour of that rank, a viceroy. But
the Sultan, anxious to hold the Pacha in check by
some power ever present and active, divided the
territory under his charge into twenty-four districts,
and placed each of these, as a kind of local governorship,
in the hands of a Mamaluk chief or Bey. Of
the Beys chosen for these posts seven were to form
a Dewan, or Council of State, nominally to advise
and assist, but in reality to control the Pacha,
whose decisions this Council was empowered to
veto. All real power was therefore vested in the
Mamaluks, who, it is perhaps scarcely necessary
to recall, were the troops that, originally brought
into the country as slaves by the Fatimite Caliphs,
had gradually developed their power and influence
until their chiefs had become feudal lords, holding
lands and keeping, according to their individual
means, troops of mounted followers, whose physical
qualities and effective training rendered them one
of the finest bodies of cavalry that has ever existed.
As must invariably happen when a weak and incompetent
Government seeks the aid of slaves or
mercenaries to sustain its failing dominion, the
Mamaluks had eventually acquired such power that<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_44" id="Page_44"></SPAN></span>
they were enabled to usurp the government of the
country, and had, as we have seen, maintained
their position as Sultans of Egypt from the time
of Salah ed Deen up to the Turkish conquest.
Under the system of government established by
the Sultan Selim, though unable to regain the
absolute independence they had lost, they soon recovered
almost all their former influence and power,
and as they controlled the military strength of the
country, the small Turkish garrison being quite
helpless to oppose them, they soon became, as
before, the real rulers of the land. Being invariably
foreigners, or the immediate descendants of
foreigners, Circassians, Armenians, or other slaves,
it was but natural that these Beys should have no
sympathy for the people of the country, and, with
the arrogance characteristic of a military body that
has attained political power, despised all outside of
their own ranks, and held it a disgrace to intermarry
with the Egyptians. Actuated by none but
the most selfish aims, they sought and cared for
nothing but their own interests, each of them being
a veritable Ishmael, looking upon all men as his
enemies, only accepting the co-operation of his fellow
Mamaluks as a necessary measure of defence, confiding
in the loyalty of his immediate followers only
so far as he was able to control them by rendering
their faithfulness to him conducive to their own
interests. Among themselves they of necessity
accepted the domination of the one who by force
of arms, intrigues, or other favouring circumstances,
was in a position to enforce his will against that<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_45" id="Page_45"></SPAN></span>
of the others, and, as might be expected, the Bey
who held this prominent position was the one to
whom the post of Sheikh el Beled, or Governor of
Cairo, was accorded, that being the post of all others
the most coveted by them, this Bey being, in
practice, the real Governor of the country, his power
being only limited by the necessity he was under
of consulting and conciliating the wishes of the
other members of the Dewan.</p>
<p>It may seem strange that with the power they
thus possessed the Mamaluks should continue to
offer even a faint show of respect to the Pacha,
or of loyalty to the Empire, for light as was the
yoke these laid upon them, it was sufficiently
galling to men who lived as they did each wholly
absorbed in the prosecution of his own personal
aims and interests, and the more so that, as the
wealth of the country declined under their greedy
and ruthless rule, the remittances of revenue exacted
by the Sultan was a yearly draft that seriously
limited their resources. But if the Mamaluk hated
and despised all men not of his own class, he was
in turn hated by all others with a hatred all the
fiercer and more bitter that it had no outlet. Thus,
with no friend upon whom he could rely save his
own right arm, the Mamaluk chief, however powerful,
was fain to accept the patronage of the Sultan
as the only aid he could look for in his combat
with the world, and he must needs, therefore, be
content to pay for that aid with a certain tribute
of grudging loyalty. Nor must it be forgotten
that, ever ready to combine and co-operate against<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_46" id="Page_46"></SPAN></span>
a common foe, each Mamaluk was equally ready
to turn his hand and sword against his fellow if
thereby he might gain aught for himself. Had it
not been for the mutual distrust the knowledge
of this fact forced upon them, they might easily
have regained the independence wrested from them
by the Turks. This had, indeed, been momentarily
accomplished by Ali Bey, who, in 1766, not only
succeeded in setting himself up as Sultan of Egypt,
but aspiring to extend his rule, had attacked and
conquered the Mahomedan holy cities of Mecca
and Medina in Arabia. His triumph was, however,
but shortlived, for Mahomed Bey, the most trusted
of his favourites, to whom he had confided the
command of an army for the conquest of Syria,
abandoned his task, and revolting, took his master
Ali prisoner by a treacherous ambush. Unable
alone to maintain the power he had thus for the
moment seized, the traitor at once tendered his
submission to the Sultan, and was, in reward for
his "fidelity," appointed Pacha of Egypt. His
tenancy of this office was, however, but brief, his
death soon after, leaving the country once more a
prey to the mutual rivalries of the Beys. In the
contest for supremacy that followed, two of these,
freed slaves of his, though constantly opposed to
and frequently in arms against each other, eventually
agreed to share the power between them, the
one, Murad Bey, becoming the military chief of the
Mamaluks, and the other, Ibrahim Bey, the Sheikh
el Beled.</p>
<p>Under the joint sway of these two men the<span class="pagenum"><SPAN name="Page_47" id="Page_47"></SPAN></span>
country enjoyed a brief period of greater quiet
and peace than it had known for a long time, and
although the tyranny and oppression from which
they suffered was little if at all abated, the people
had been so completely despoiled before and had
so little to lose that, as "He that is down need
fear no fall," they had but small anxiety for the
morrow.</p>
<p>This was the condition that existed on that
memorable night of the 23rd of June in 1798, the
eve of the day upon which Cairo had its first
warning of the approach of the French. Could a
plebiscite of the hopes and fears of the people
have been taken on that evening, we may be sure
that it would have been unfavourable to any change,
and that they would have elected to bear the ills
they had, rather than face the possibly far worse
any change might bring to them.</p>
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